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The Myth of Democratic Peace
by
Leon Hadar
by Leon Hadar
If you’ve been
listening to the recent "democracy is the way to go" sermons
by US President George W Bush and his advisers, you'll have to conclude
that embracing "democracy" – a concept that is open to
different interpretations – is the cure for most of humanity's ills,
ranging from political violence and economic underdevelopment to
male baldness and erectile dysfunction. ("Keep the spark alive...become
the best guy... for her... take Democraticialis....").
Even in the
more modest version, the global democratic crusade launched by the
White House and inspired by the Wilsonian neoconservative ideologues
adopts what the neocons consider to be an axiom of international
relations, that democracies rarely, if ever, wage war against one
another. Translating that maxim into policy terms means that Washington
has the obligation based not only on moral considerations but also
on pure self-interest to promote democracy worldwide as the most
effective way to establish international peace and stability.
Indeed, in
his second inaugural address Mr. Bush has proclaimed that "the
survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success
of liberty in other lands; the best hope for peace in our world
is the expansion of freedom in all the world." He and his foreign
policy aides have argued that one of the main rationales for ousting
Saddam Hussein and occupying Iraq – especially since no weapons
of mass destruction were discovered there – was the need to rid
Mesopotamia of a tyrant and establish a democratic system and pursue
similar regime changes and advance freedom in the rest of the Arab
Middle East.
The Bushies
argue that democracy would not only respond to the legitimate demands
of those living under authoritarian systems, but also reduce the
chances for domestic instability and international wars, and in
that context, would retard the spread of terrorism. Not surprisingly,
the Pentagon and the State Department have become major instruments
for nation building and democracy promotion, as most members of
the policy community in Washington seem to subscribe to a catchy
slogan: "Make Democracy, Not War."
The debate
hasn't been on whether the spread of democracy helps to strengthen
the foundation for international peace, but on the most cost-effective
way to promote political freedom.
But two American
academics and political thinkers are challenging now this conventional
wisdom. In a new book, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies
Go to War (The MIT Press, 2005), Edward D Mansfield of the University
of Pennsylvania and Jack Snyder of Columbia University seem to pull
the intellectual rug from under the rationale presented by the Bush
administration for what it's doing in Iraq and the rest of the Middle
East – arguing that states in the early phases of transition to
democracy are actually more likely than other states to become involved
in war.
Drawing on
both extensive qualitative and quantitative analyses hat they and
other political scientists have conducted, Prof. Mansfield and Prof.
Snyder demonstrate that emerging democracies tend to have weak political
institutions and are especially likely to go to war. Leaders of
these countries attempt to rally support by invoking external threats
and resorting to belligerent, nationalist rhetoric and slogans.
They point to this pattern in cases ranging from revolutionary France
to contemporary Russia. One of the most interesting case studies
is the collapse of the former Yugoslavia.
Bloody chapter
As the mostly
peaceful and relatively prosperous communist Yugoslavia started
transitioning into democracy, the leaders of all the major ethnic
groups in that country, like Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Franjo
Tudjman in Croatia, succeeded in exploiting nationalist sentiments
as a way of getting to power and mobilizing public support through
an open democratic process, including free elections, creating the
conditions for a civil war that has turned out to be the bloodiest
chapter in European history since the end of World War II.
The thesis
is backed by complex statistical models but is in its essence quite
simple: Be afraid, very afraid of new democracies as they are more
likely than not to be unstable and warlike. The authors provide
a mostly "institutional" explanation for that phenomenon,
noting that such countries often lack the rule of law, organized
political parties and professional news media and other political
and legal institutions that can place constraints on the political
leaders. In a period of sweeping political changes and uncertainty
that characterizes the transition to democracy, many voters aspire
for a sense of identity and security and elects populists and demagogues
who promote bellicose nationalism that lead to civil and inter-state
wars.
Pointing to
the Bush administration's campaign to build up democracy in Iraq
and spread it to Palestine, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the authors
warn that "unleashing Islamic mass opinion through a sudden
democratization could only raise the likelihood of war." In
a way, the political changes in Iraq and the rest of the Middle
East have become a political science laboratory to test the author's
theories, and it seems that they have been corroborated by what
has been happening in these countries.
In Iraq, the
recent parliamentary elections helped to consolidate the power of
the leaders of radical Shiite parties and those who represent the
Kurdish separatist national movement; not surprisingly, the Arab-Sunnis
also voted in support of their sectarian representatives. If anything,
the ousting of Saddam Hussein and the free elections has led to
more political instability and ethnic and religious violence and
is creating the conditions for a Yugoslavia-like civil war. In Egypt,
the members of the anti-western Moslem Brotherhood movement have
strengthened their position in the last elections, while in Palestine,
most observers expect the radical Islamic Hamas to gain more power
in the coming parliamentary vote there.
Unstable
states
And let's not
forget that last year's presidential election in Iran – which is
clearly more open than in, say, Saudi Arabia – has ended with the
victory of the most radical anti-American figure in the race. In
short, as the authors suggest, the collapse of the old authoritarian
regimes in the Middle East has given birth to weak and unstable
states and to the rise to power – through free elections – of warlike
ultranationalist politicians.
Prof. Mansfield
and Prof. Snyder focus most of their discussion in their book on
emerging democracies and suggest that mature democracies tend to
be peaceful. Hence, their implication is that Washington and other
western powers have an interest to help create the foundations of
functioning political, economic and legal institutions in emerging
democracies before moving to hold elections there.
But they don't
explain why would, say, Iraqis or Palestinians accept such an arrangement,
that is, postponing free election until their country would be ready
for democracy? Who will make that decision and who will take control
of the country's security until a democratic elected government
comes to power sometime in the future?
Moreover, it
seems to me that you don't need to apply complex statistical models
to figure out that the main cause of wars in the modern age, since
the time of the French Revolution, has been nationalism, and that
democracy is the most loyal ally of nationalism in a sense that
it indeed empowers the people to rally behind their nation, ethnicity,
religion and tribe and help drive into power populist figures that
thrive during times of civil wars and wars between nation-states.
If anything,
the history of Europe in the 19th century suggests that authoritarian
governments were more successful in maintaining a relative peace
in the continent for close to a century. Similarly, the most peaceful
European states during World War II and the ones that avoided entering
into the war were Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, and Turkey,
three non-democratic regimes, and Switzerland that granted women
the right to vote only in 1971(!).
Perhaps
the time has come for an innovative political scientist to conduct
a research to determine whether – and I know that's not very PC
– non-democracies are actually more peaceful than democratic states.
January
18, 2006
Leon
Hadar [send him mail] is
Washington correspondent for the Business
Times of Singapore and the author of Sandstorm:
Policy Failure in the Middle East (Palgrave Macmillan). Visit
his blog.
Copyright
© 2006 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. All rights reserved. Reprinted
with permission of the author.
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