There
Is No American Creed
by Kevin R. C. Gutzman
by Kevin R. C. Gutzman
DIGG THIS
Bradley
C.S. Watson’s recent essay in The Intercollegiate Review,
"Creed and
Culture in the American Founding," establishes a false
choice between an America "founded upon a principled understanding
of natural rights" and an America that "grew primarily
from a set of inherited or customary understandings." In fact,
the American Revolution did not establish a unified American perspective
at all.
The reason
is that there was at the time of the Revolution no "America,"
in the political, intellectual, or religious sense, because there
was no "America" in the constitutional sense. There was
no American nation, only a federation. That federation was first
informal (in the days of the Second Continental Congress), and then
formal (first under the Articles of Confederation, then under the
federal Constitution of 1788). Its content was dependent entirely
upon the wills of thirteen "free and independent states,"
to borrow a phrase from a much-cited, though often misunderstood,
authority.
Why does
Watson offer us an alternative reading? Apparently because he is
a proponent of a (Straussian) creedal understanding of the United
States. Thus, he says that "Our Creed" "by the common
assent of supporters and detractors both, is most notably expressed
in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence with
the assertion that ‘we hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal.’"
Watson
certainly is correct that this is a widely held view. It is an odd
one, nonetheless, to draw from a document whose point is that people
in a geographic section (the colonies) of a larger political community
(the British Empire) have a right to break with that larger community
in case they judge the government of the whole to be behaving in
a way that is inimical to their rights. How, precisely, did the
statement to which Watson draws attention, thus decontextualized,
come to be "our" creed? Watson does not ever exactly say
– and with good reason.
Consider
the case of Virginia. At the onset of the Revolution, the Old Dominion,
oldest of the king’s colonies, extended to what is now Wisconsin.
It had the largest population of whites and the largest population
of blacks of any colony, and it already stood foremost in provision
of talent and manpower to the cause of independence.
Virginia
established its independence of Great Britain on May 15, 1776, by
the May Convention’s resolutions to craft a declaration of rights,
draft a constitution, and enter into federal and treaty relations.
On June 29, 1776, Patrick Henry assumed the governorship of newly
republican Virginia. Since Virginians were loyal to the dispensation
of 1688, they first adopted the Declaration of Rights, and then
implemented their new constitution – the first written constitution
adopted by the people’s representatives in the history of the world.
Did Virginia
do these things at Congress’s bidding, or in cooperation with any
other colony? No, it did not. Rather, it behaved as an independent
republic, a state on a par with Sweden, Spain, France, and Britain
herself.
Watson
mentions that the Virginians’ Declaration of Rights included a statement
of the idea that all men are born free and equal. His intention
here is to attempt to homogenize the experience of the thirteen
colonies-cum-states in subscribing to an American creed.
How can
one tell? Because he does some interesting bowdlerizing on the way.
Thus, Watson says, "The Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776)
claims that ‘all men are by nature equally free and independent,’
with certain ‘inherent rights’ that they cannot by ‘compact’ divest
themselves of.’" Watson’s account is faithful to the draft
language submitted by George Mason’s committee to the full Convention,
which proposed having the Declaration of Rights say, "THAT
all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent natural rights, of which they cannot, by any compact, deprive
or divest their posterity …."
What Watson
omits from his account, however, is the fate of Mason’s language
in the full Convention. On being reported, it met with the immediate
objection of Robert Carter Nicholas – who, as the last colonial
treasurer, was the highest-ranking colonial Virginia official to
take the Patriot side. Nicholas said that if the statement that
all men were born equally free and independent were true, he would
have no problem recognizing it, but it was untrue. Thus, adoption
of such language at the birth of republican Virginia would place
Virginians in the very unenviable position of having to choose between
ignoring their own professed principles, on one hand, and enduring
enormous social convulsions, on the other.
What Nicholas
meant, of course, was that this language was inconsistent with the
continued existence of slavery in Virginia, where an enormous portion
of the population (as much as two-thirds in Tidewater and neighboring
Southside counties) consisted of African slaves. His colleagues
had a ready solution: they inserted Edmund Pendleton’s Lockean language
"when they enter into a state of Society" before the statement
that government was responsible for protecting men’s rights.
What is one
to make of this? Simply that republican Virginians, who at the time
inhabited the only colony of the thirteen that was already independent,
decided even before July 4, 1776 to exclude blacks from their society.
Since they were not entering into a state of society with the whites,
but were being kept as what Jefferson called a captive nation, the
republic’s government need not concern itself with their rights.
What relationship
did the Declaration of American Independence have to this discussion?
Specifically, how did Congress’s promulgation of the famous second
sentence affect the shape of the newly republican Virginian polity?
Simply, not
at all. Virginia’s congressmen had been instructed to have Congress
declare "that these colonies are, and of right ought to be,
free and independent states." In giving its ambassadors to
the Congress ("congressmen") this instruction, Virginian
leaders must have been thinking along the lines of Benjamin Franklin’s
famous statement on another occasion that revolutionaries must all
hang together, or they would surely all hang separately. They wanted
other states to establish their permanent independence, as none
joined Virginia in doing before July 4, because being the only colony
to have broken with the Empire was not a comfortable position; hence
the third of those May 15, 1776 resolutions.
Virginia’s
congressmen, like their colleagues from several (but not all) of
the colonies, had authority to enter into such a declaration. Let
us remember, however, who these congressmen were: they were attorneys
from their states. They had limited authority to speak for their
states in exactly the manner their states told them to. As John
Adams put it, Congress was a meeting place of ambassadors, not a
proper legislature. It did not have any authority independent of
the states’ instructions.
It certainly
did not have authority to launch the separate polities from which
Congress’s members came on some common enterprise on behalf of a
half-baked formulation of Lockean theory (which, of course, everyone
knew perfectly well to be nothing but a fantasy, a legal fiction,
a politicians’ fairy tale) first concocted in Thomas Jefferson’s
bedroom, then revised in a committee meeting room, and finally burnished
by the full Congress.
Watson notes
that there is in the Declaration of Independence a long list of
accusations against King George, and that that list is commonly
overlooked today. Also commonly overlooked today is the gravamen
of the Declaration: that the thirteen former colonies "are,
and of right ought to be, free and independent states." That
was the only thing the Congress was entitled to declare. It was
not empowered to create a single nation of the thirteen nations
(that is what a "state" was in the eighteenth century
– a nation). It certainly was not in a position to bequeath a creed
upon the rest of us, nonsensical or not. Even if we did not know
that the philosophical predicate of the Declaration would not have
been accepted unanimously by the states if they had been asked to
accept it – and we absolutely do know that – we certainly do know
that no one empowered the Congress to draft a creed, acceptable
or not, or to bind the states to it.
Watson’s essay
is distorted, from start to finish, by the assumption that there
was a single American people speaking through a single American
state, apparently informed by a single colonial tradition, in the
time of the Revolution. It is full of phrases such as "the
founders," "the founding," and "our culture,"
when what one must understand to apprehend the Revolution are the
divergent (often completely contradictory) motives impelling different
states first to establish their independence, then to participate
in the Revolution, and finally to create the federal Constitution.
Historians
understand, for example, that many people in Virginia were led to
break with George III not by devotion to some universalist philosophy
inconsistent with the continued existence of slavery, but by considered
determinations that after Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation of 1775, continued
allegiance to the British Empire actually threatened slavery. William
Byrd III, Landon Carter, and others became Patriots in part to
protect slavery. Knowing this, one is unsurprised that not Abraham
Lincoln’s attitudes about natural equality, but Robert Carter Nicholas’s,
carried the day.
Virginians,
having launched their republican ship of state in defense of their
inherited ways – including taxation only by the General Assembly,
trial by jury, self-government, and slavery, among other elements
– remained defensive of their patrimony ever after. Thus, they refused
to be absorbed into some great mass even when the idea pressed upon
them. They ratified the Constitution only after being assured that
they would remain as one of thirteen parties to a contract under
it, that the new congress would have only the powers it was "expressly
delegated," and that they could withdraw from the new Union
just as they had withdrawn first from the British Empire, then from
the Confederation. They formulated the Principles of ’98 in resistance
to Alexander Hamilton’s "Anglican System in Fact." They
insisted in Congress and in their state government that their state
remained perfectly sovereign. Thomas Jefferson, while president,
reflected this tradition in referring to the federal government
as "our foreign government." Finally, when Abraham Lincoln
unconstitutionally called for volunteers to enforce his creed on
the Deep South, Virginia exercised its reserved right to withdraw
from the Union in case continued membership in that federation proved
undesirable.
So when did
Virginia accept some federally enforceable creed? When did it agree
voluntarily to be bound by a Western Hemisphere version of Jacobinism,
forever finding new demons to conquer in the name of "Equality
with the capital ‘E’"? Never.
Virginia’s
experience is not unique.
There are some
practices and principles to which people in the separate states
subscribed during the Revolution. There were elements of shared
experience in the struggle that was the Revolution. One might say
the same things about various other groups of sovereigns engaged
in common enterprises from time to time – say, about the Allies
of World War II, the members of the Third Coalition a century earlier,
or the denizens of crusader states centuries before that. The existence
of significant commonalities should not blind us to the main point,
however.
There is no
American creed.
January
15, 2008
Kevin
R. C. Gutzman, J.D., Ph.D. [send
him mail], Associate Professor of History at Western Connecticut
State University, is the author of Virginia’s
American Revolution: From Dominion to Republic, 17761840
(newly available in paperback) and The
Politically Incorrect Guide to the Constitution.
Copyright
© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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R. C. Gutzman Archives
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