Numerous
responses have come to my attention concerning my last two comments
on this website, and it may be necessary for me to clarify exactly
what I was trying to say. For the record, I did not mean to suggest
that National Review, Weekly Standard, and the rest of
the neocon press should be forced to publish my scribbling or
that of my friends. I could not even imagine how this would happen,
by any means short of a divine revelation to Mr. Buckley and his
buds. In any case I’m not sure that I’d want to appear in their
agitprop publications, beside people whom I would not care to
be associated with. But there is a difference between not publishing
individuals who do not represent one’s changing party line and
going out of one’s way to run down their reputations. And I was
in fact accusing the Washington Post’s and E.J. Dionne’s
as well as Jonah Goldberg’s favorite octogenarian "conservative"
of doing the second. "Pushing them off the bus" involved
something more than refusing to print those who were not congenial
to National Review. It typically meant vilifying nonconformists
or, as the late M.E. Bradford explained when the neoconservatives
and (unbeknownst to him) Buckley went after him, "trying
to take away your livelihood and reputation." Such behavior
goes well beyond not giving a forum to the views of someone whom
the publisher disagrees with.
It also behooves me to make clear to two of my disciples that
I was not linking American "conservatism" to the cause
of big business. I was remarking on the inappropriate use of "conservative"
to describe what, outside of the planter class in the antebellum
South and a few other notable exceptions, signifies "bourgeois
liberalism and more recently, and more catastrophically, social
democrats, leftwing militarists (the term is Bob Higgs’s) and
graying Trots. Since in any case I was not referring to classical
conservatives, there was no way that I could be designating American
businessmen as members of that group. Bourgeois liberal in my
last three books, moreover, refers specifically to the "idea"
of the Euro-American bourgeoisie, as they existed and conceived
of themselves in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Such
an "idea" is pre- and even antidemocratic and while
such liberals were not antithetical to the state, as the political
form of self-conscious nations, they insisted on strict constitutional
limits being placed on state power. Never would bourgeois liberalism
permit "public administration" (which is a primarily
twentieth-century mass democratic phenomenon) to interfere in
family structure or to carry out income redistribution as a social
project. What is inherent in welfare state democracy could only
have developed because bourgeois liberals gave way to another
dominant class, the current political one whose cheering gallery
includes today’s pseudo-conservative movement.
Finally,
it may be useful to stress that I am writing a book on value conservatism
not to settle scores but as a continuation of my study of late
modern political persuasions. American conservatism closely resembles
the Postmarxist Left, the theme of my latest book, in its showcasing
of a globalist, egalitarian ideology. Both are post-liberal and
heavily influenced by the rhetoric and vision of the revolutionary
Left. Each pursues a politics of guilt toward recognized victims,
although obviously some victim groups that rate high on the European
Left, like Muslims, are less beloved to American "conservative"
leaders. Both devote considerable energy to fighting "fascist"
phantoms in a way that is reminiscent of the European Left of
the 1930s.
But beside German nationalists, insufficiently contrite Southern
whites, who have still not come to terms with their racist past,
and Christians who supposedly refuse to face up to their anti-Semitic
legacy, the neoconservative guides of the American conservative
movement have created an Islamo-fascist demon. This reprises opposition
to the current version of liberal democracy, as defined by the
neoconservatives, which is also conveniently linked to strong
anti-Zionist attitudes. One does not have to like the objects
of these neoconservative attacks, who are indeed repulsive, to
perceive in this practice a questionable application of "fascist."
Anti-Israeli Third World troublemakers are depicted as anti-Semitic
European look-alikes, albeit with different costumes, in a thinly
veiled attempt to fit anti-Zionism into the demonology of the
Postmarxist European Left. But it may also reflect the continuing
fixation of those who brandish this concept on a rightwing enemy
that never vanishes.
Even more significant, American "conservatism," like
the European Left, is a movement that cannibalizes its members,
as soon as they depart from the announced new direction. Neither
has the substance or the firm belief system that characterized
European Marxism, and both drift opportunistically from one dogmatically
held position to another, each of which is upheld indignantly
and inflexibly against dissenters. In Europe the Postmarxist Left
has turned ferociously against former leftist politicians who
have challenged the merits of further Third World immigration,
arguing that it is harmful for the working class and that the
incoming Muslims treat women badly. In the US those on the right
who have questioned the neoconservative war against Iraq, the
pro-immigration views of the World Street Journal, or the
neoconservative interpretation of the civil rights movement have
been read out of the respectable Right as "extremists"
or as those who "flirt with fascism."
Characteristic
of the neoconservative-controlled Right and the Postmarxist Left
is the lack of a vital center, outside of the personalities of
powerful journalists, and the tendency to demonize those who resist
party lines. And on the American "Right," like the Postmarxist
Left, there is nothing identifiably "rightwing" about
most of their signature positions in recent years; for example,
the military pursuit of global democracy, crusades against Islamo-fascism,
support for the civil rights and feminist movements, insofar as
they show themselves to be "moderate," in terms of the
other goals being simultaneously pursued by the conservative movement
and by Republicans. The reformed conservative movement does pay
at least lip service to the "moral issues" raised by
the Evangelicals, but that gesture may be little enough reward
for those who wait at their beck and call. The Religious Right,
after all, provides the compliant foot soldiers for Republican
campaigns and for a certain kind of Middle Eastern politics, things
the movement is interested in, without usually getting more than
insincere rhetoric in return. Since, however, the Religious Right
and the neoconservatives agree about the use of American military
force, having the wars they desire, as Larry Vance has correctly
pointed out, may be all the Religious Right should expect
in an alliance of unequals.
But even more than the current Postmarxist Left in Europe, the
conservative movement has thrown people off the bus, if those
believed to be in charge of the movement decide that the expellees
don’t fit. Since the purge victims have made the media Left feel
uncomfortable, this "house-cleaning," celebrated by
E.J. Dionne in his most recent remarks about Buckley, has won
predictable media applause. But while the commended purges may
have targeted some unpleasant eccentrics, praising Buckley for
inquisitorial zeal is a dishonest reaction to character assassination.
It is a bit like extolling the American Communist Party for criticizing
Hitler and the excesses of the Red Scare without bringing up the
rest of the story. The seamy side of both of the aforementioned
objects of praise is thereby placed beyond consideration.
In
the case of the conservative movement, it is precisely that shadow
side that dominates its history. The appearance of continuity
is no more than that, a deliberately fostered illusion that allows
the gullible to believe in a steady, natural progression of ideas
and in the long-term peaceful interaction of their exponents.
Nothing of this kind has happened. Despite the window dressing
that has come from well-intentioned intellectuals, the conservative
movement that arose in the fifties has been a series of purges,
and those kicked off the bus have been reviled and in some cases
professionally ruined, with the help of mainstream leftists. Overlooking
this fact, in the manner of recent historians of the conservative
movement, is to ignore the glaringly obvious.
November
1, 2005