Conservatism
in America Since 1930,
edited by Gregory L. Schneider (New York: NYU Press, 2003), 446+X
pp.
Gregory
L. Schneider, an associate professor of history at Emporia State
University, has followed up his monograph on the conservative
youth organization Young Americans for Freedom with this book
of readings, and useful introductions, on American conservatism.
As a longtime commentator on the same subject, I find this work
to be a visit down memory lane. Schneider’s anthology is admirably
comprehensive, moving from the Southern Agrarians, interwar Distributists,
who idolized the English Catholic critics of big government and
capitalism, Hillaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton, and the elitist
individualist Albert J. Nock, down to the libertarian Murray N.
Rothbard and the fractured conservatism of the post-Reagan era.
Schneider’s
remarks, which exemplify balanced narrative, avoid taking sides
in disputes, and, like George Nash in his history of the postwar
conservative intellectual movement, describe tensions and fissures
without reflecting them. Schneider’s attempt to structure conservative
epochs around political figures, particularly Goldwater and Reagan,
is ultimately justified. Electoral campaigns and Republican standard-bearers
have created the appearance of unity on the American Right, although,
as Schneider indicates, this appeal to solidarity with a view
toward controlling the national executive has only served to paper
over doctrinal differences. The failure of self-described conservatives
to turn around government decisively has radicalized part of the
right, while repeated statements by Heritage Foundation spokespersons
that the "conservative victory was completed" by the
end of the Cold War has not resonated well outside of Beltway
think tanks.
The problem
that Schneider’s anthology underlines is that the American right
has never cohered, outside of certain electoral campaigns and
outside of magazines that have tried to build bridges on the right.
The glaring differences among conservatives were apparent by the
thirties and will strike anyone who thought differently after
reading this anthology. Shared enemies, starting with the New
Deal, have held together the jerry-built conservative alliance,
which embraced at one point both Russell Kirk and Ayn Rand. The
"conservative movement" has been split more than once,
e.g., in the thirties and fifties by the battle between pro-interventionist
and anti-interventionist conservatives and in the eighties and
nineties by the eventually protracted war between neoconservatives
and paleoconservatives. Although Schneider does not belabor this
point in his comments, looking over his readings drives home the
persistence of such divisions.
What separates
the present from the past, however, is the determination of the
establishment right, now equipped with multimillion-dollar foundations
and a publishing-media complex, to shut down debate within the
"movement." There are two reasons for this attempted
suppression: One, the neoconservatives, who are coextensive with
the center or center-left of the sixties, are by now the party
of order and enjoy financial support and media access on a scale
that was unavailable to the marginalized Rights of the thirties
and fifties. Why should the neoconservatives damage their establishment
respectability by being associated with "extremists,"
who may drive away their centrist and moderate Republican donors?
Two, the issues over which self-identified conservative are now
battling seem more profound to the participants than those issues
that divided conservative camps seventy years ago. As particularly
the concluding section of Schneider’s anthology amply shows, including
the attack leveled on me in Commentary in 1987, the warring
sides detest each another far more than they do the liberal left.
Less important than whether the invectives against me were accurate
(they are not) are the bitter charges hurled by Commentary
at the "neo-medieval" right. By the nineties these charges
would include accusations of anti-Semitism and complaints about
"whiffs of fascism." Despite more limited resources,
the paleos have pelted their "Marxist, Trotskyist" accusers
with equally inflamed charges.
Another
reason for what Jon Judis in the eighties named "the conservative
wars" is the media attention and concentrated firepower that
are available to the partisans on both sides. Although an historian
of the paleos, Joe Scotchie, insists that for his subjects "every
day is Monday," this gloomy judgment is only partly true.
The neoconservatives can out-staff and outspend their opponents
at a rate that can no longer be measured; yet the other side enjoys
better funding and more media exposure than the conservatives
of the thirties whom Schneider features in his anthology. In the
fifties, only William F. Buckley on the postwar right had the
access to the mass media that paleo champion Pat Buchanan does
today. Even the much weaker side in the conservative wars can
keep the hostilities going, on the basis of foundations, magazines,
media celebrities, and websites. The anti-New Deal, isolationist
website LewRockwell.com draws more readers than the now neoconservative
National Review. This ideological struggle resembles the
change in war caused by expanding military technology, with the
parallel feature that the media equivalent of nuclear weapons
the Internet can keep an otherwise less well-equipped
side competitive with an economically more powerful foe.
Schneider’s
anthology provides much food for thought; and it may be exactly
what a scholar who blurbed this book claims on the back cover,
"the best collection of conservative writings available today."
It may also be indicative of the partisan motives of others who
put out such collections that this honor should fall to NYU Press,
which has no axes to grind in conservative wars. Nor, from what
I can tell, does the well-informed, clear-writing producer of
this anthology.
An earlier
version of this review was published on ConservativeNet.
August
7, 2003