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Neoconservatism
Taken Down
by
David Gordon
Recently
by David Gordon: Must
Libertarians Be Social Liberals?
Neoconservatism:
An Obituary for an Idea •
By C. Bradley Thompson with Yaron Brook • Paradigm Publishers, 2010
• Xii + 305 pages
To most of
us, neoconservatism is inevitably associated with the Iraq War.
A group of neoconservatives, including Robert Kagan and David
Frum, played with consummate folly a major role in urging the
Bush administration toward initiating that conflict. The movement,
on that ground alone, has little to recommend it; but can one
nevertheless make a case on its behalf?
After all,
neoconservatism was not always associated with reckless foreign-policy
initiatives. To the contrary, in its early days in the 1960s, Irving
Kristol, Nathan Glazer, and Daniel Moynihan offered in the neoconservative
journal The Public Interest cogent criticisms of many aspects
of the welfare state. If Kristol could only muster Two
Cheers for Capitalism, is this not better than most fashionable
intellectuals can do? Perhaps the good elements in neoconservatism
can be detached from the recent foreign-policy madness. C. Bradley
Thompson emphatically disagrees. He argues that neoconservatism
stands in fundamental opposition to individual rights and a free
economy.
Although
neoconservatives have indeed challenged certain aspects of the
welfare state, they have no quarrel with it in principle.
In what
may be Irving Kristol's most shocking statement in defense of
collectivist redistribution and statism, he has suggested that
"the idea of a welfare state is in itself perfectly consistent
with a conservative political philosophy as Bismarck
knew, a hundred years ago." (p. 29)
If this accurately
describes their position, why do the neoconservatives criticize
the welfare state at all? Aside from the technical deficiencies
of particular programs, what concerns them is the way that some
welfare programs encourage unvirtuous behavior. Welfare that rewards
giving birth out of wedlock, e.g., arouses their protests.
This sort
of criticism reveals a key fact about the neoconservatives. They
have a very definite sense of the proper conduct that the state,
or as they are likely to term it, the regime, ought to promote.
Not for them is the libertarian view that each person, so long
as he does not initiate force against others, is free to lead
his life as he wishes. To the contrary, the leaders of the state
have as one of their prime duties the development of the citizens'
characters. Accordingly, freedom of speech most decidedly does
not extend to pornography. Further, the government must inculcate
patriotic sentiment among the people.
More generally,
neoconservatives do not believe in individual rights at all, in
the robust sense with which readers of the Mises Daily
will be familiar.
On a deeper
level, the problem with the [American] Founders' liberalism, according
to Kristol, is that it begins with the individual, and a philosophy
that begins with the "self" must necessarily promote
selfishness, choice, and the pursuit of personal happiness....
A free society grounded on the protection of individual rights
leads inexorably to an amiable philistinism, an easygoing nihilism,
and, ultimately, to "infinite emptiness." (pp. 289)
Thompson mordantly
remarks, "Thus the great political lesson that the neocons have
successfully taught other conservatives ... is to stop worrying
and love the State" (p. 29).
Thompson
is not content with this devastating verdict. He maintains that
existing studies of neoconservatism do not penetrate to the essence:
they have not discovered the philosophical roots of the movement.
He locates this essence in the thought of Leo Strauss, and much
of the book is devoted to a careful exposition and criticism of
his views. [1]
(Even if one dissents from Thompson's intellectual genealogy of
neoconservatism, the discussion of Strauss is of great value for
its own sake.)
Thompson
appears to have set himself a difficult task. Neoconservatism
according to many of its proponents is a tendency rather than
a developed body of doctrine.
Those who
are willing to call themselves neoconservatives (and not all
are) typically describe neoconservatism as an "impulse,"
a "style of thought," or a "mode of thinking."
Its proponents have described neoconservatism as a way of seeing
the world, as a state of mind and not as a systematic political
philosophy. (p. 4)
If this is
right, how can Thompson proceed with his plan to unearth the philosophical
foundations of neoconservatism? Will not a view that repudiates
system prove impervious to analysis?
Thompson
neatly turns this difficulty to his advantage. The rejection of
system manifests in this instance a related view that provides
the key to understanding neoconservatism. A system is composed
of principles that inhere in an ordered structure; but neoconservatives
oppose fixed principles of politics.
For all
their supposed concern for ideas and philosophy, there is something
profoundly antiphilosophical about the neoconservatives. They
eschew moral first principles in favor of a technique or a mode
of thinking, and they scorn absolute, certain moral principles
for what "works." (p. 32)
But in this
very rejection of systematic morality lies concealed a philosophical
doctrine.
But what has
all this to do with Leo Strauss? To make good his case that Strauss's
thought lies behind neoconservatism, Thompson must first establish
that the neocons knew and studied Strauss. He does so by showing
that the acknowledged godfather of neoconservatism, Irving Kristol,
took Strauss as his philosophical master. Thompson places particular
emphasis on a review by Kristol in Commentary (October 1952)
of Strauss's Persecution
and the Art of Writing.
Remarkably,
this document has never been brought to the attention of the
general public until now. Kristol's confrontation with Strauss
came as an epiphany. It was, as Kristol has intimated on several
occasions, the most important intellectual event of his life.
(p. 59)[2]
From Persecution
and the Art of Writing, Kristol absorbed the message that philosophers
needed to conceal their dangerous doctrines from the masses. Philosophy
undermines religious belief and shows also that morality lacks a
rational foundation. But without religion and an accepted morality,
the social order would be overthrown. Further, if the masses were
to become aware of what the philosophers really taught, would they
not suppress these dangerous thinkers? Philosophers form an intellectual
elite, and they rank far superior to those lacking their wisdom.
The ancient
philosophers, mindful of the fate of Socrates, kept always in
mind the need to maintain their distance from the masses. The
Enlightenment abandoned this antique wisdom.
Whereas Socrates-Plato
recognized a wide and unbridgeable chasm between philosophers
and nonphilosophers, the engineers of the modern world
men such as Bacon, Newton, Locke, and Jefferson thought
it possible to make all men reasonable, to bring light to a dark
world through reason and science.... The Enlightenment therefore
represented for Strauss the democratization and thus the degradation
of the Western mind. (pp. 667)
Strauss rejected
capitalism and individualism, which as he saw them rested on a
low view of man. Instead of philosophical wisdom, confined to
an elite, as the highest end of the regime, happiness and wealth
for the masses became the order of the day.[3]
Strauss
argued that the modern liberalism of Locke and Jefferson had
distorted the fundamental structure of human existence, that
without a summum bonum to guide his life, modern man
lacked "completely a star and compass for his life"
and was therefore wrenched away from the natural ordering of
society. (p. 115)
The Enlightenment
taught a further false doctrine: universal human rights. Instead,
Strauss believed, there are no unalterably fixed moral standards.
The statesman, taught by philosophers, must be guided by prudential
judgment about the particular situation he faces. Here precisely
is a key point at which Straussian teaching serves to explain neoconservatism.
As earlier mentioned, the neocons resolutely reject fixed moral
rules and rights.[4]
If Strauss
rejected the Enlightenment, he by no means demanded the abolition
of individualism and capitalism. To the contrary, the ancient
arrangements of the polis could not in our day be restored;
and the regime of the American Founding Fathers offered the best
available bulwark against relativism and nihilism if this
regime was suitably controlled behind the scenes by philosophers
instructed in Straussian wisdom.
What form
would this philosophical guidance take? It is essential that the
inferior masses develop virtuous habits, lest their unbridled
appetites lead to undue disorder. To inculcate virtue and to weaken
the base tendency of people to put their individual well-being
ahead of the common good, what better means than a properly conducted
war? War teaches self-sacrifice.
The moral
component of this is straightforward. As we have seen, the neoconservatives'
ethical prescription for ordinary citizens consists in a life
of selfless sacrifice to others, in which the individual puts
the needs and well-being of others above his own. (p. 180)
Thompson finds
in this argument a principal motive for the neocons' support for
the Iraq War. The neocons aimed not only to spread democracy as
they conceived it to the benighted Iraqis: even more important,
they saw the war as a means to discipline and educate the American
people.
Thompson and
Yaron Brook, the coauthor of the chapter on foreign policy, resolutely
reject this approach to foreign policy. To them, wars are justifiable
only as a means to avert a genuine threat, and "a real postSeptember
11 risk assessment of the threat posed by Iraq would not have resulted
in finding that Iraq was at the top of the list of potential targets."
(p. 179).
Thompson's
interpretation of neoconservatism must confront two fundamental
challenges. First, does he show that Strauss's view really stands
at the base of neoconservatism? A critic might object that what
holds true of Irving Kristol might not apply to others in the neoconservative
movement. Further, has Thompson correctly interpreted Strauss? Was
Strauss an advocate of a particular philosophy in his own right
rather than a historian of political thought; and if he did wish
to convey a philosophical message, is it the one Thompson attributes
to him? I strongly suspect that Thompson can successfully meet these
tests. Neoconservatism: An Obituary for an Idea is essential
reading for anyone interested in either the neoconservatives or
Leo Strauss.
Notes
[1]
Thompson is an Objectivist, and accordingly believes as a general
thesis that ideas determine history. Readers will not fail to
recall Leonard Peikoff's endeavor in Ominous Parallels
to trace the roots of Nazism to Kant's philosophy. I do not
think this effort was entirely successful.
[2]
Thompson mentions that Kristol's wife, Gertrude Himmelfarb,
also wrote about Strauss. One might also note that his brother-in-law,
Milton Himmelfarb, had studied Strauss's works carefully and
wrote about Strauss on several occasions. See, e.g., "On Leo
Strauss", Commentary (August 1974).
[3]
Strauss was influenced in his opposition to capitalism by his
friend and academic patron R.H. Tawney, the eminent English socialist.
Like Strauss, Tawney deplored what he called the "acquisitive
society." See Simon Green, "The Tawney-Strauss Connection: On
Historicism and Values in the History of Political Ideas", Journal
of Modern History, June 1995.
[4]
Ironically, in view of the Objectivist portrayal of Kant as the
fons et origo of modern philosophical evil, Straussians
such as Harry Jaffa denounce fixed moral rules as Kantian.
Copyright
© 2011 by LewRockwell.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in
part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.
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