What’s the Argument for Democracy?
by
David Gordon
Unlike
many concepts in political theory, such as liberty or justice, democracy
is easy to define. It denotes government by the majority, whether
directly or indirectly. In the present essay, I shall restrict the
discussion to government in control of a reasonably large territory.
This restriction leads to, but perhaps does not entail, a further
limitation. The type of government I shall endeavor to discuss is
a variety of indirect democracy, i.e., a representative democracy,
as in the United States and Great Britain, where the national legislature
is popularly elected. Representative democracy is not the only conceivable
sort of indirect democracy: imagine, e.g., a system in which the
people by plebiscite can veto laws but only a non-elected body can
propose them. Nevertheless, it is the system of government most
frequently commended to all and sundry.
Though
it is easy to characterize democracy, recent political theory has
been marked by a conspicuous omission. Virtually no argument is
ever offered to support the desirability of representative democracy,
and the little that is available seems distressingly weak. Why ought
democracy to be either instituted or promoted, let alone exported,
as a recent book by Joshua Muravchik (Exporting
Democracy) advocates? One would think that as important
a question as that of the best political system would have generated
an enormous literature. In point of fact, most writing on the subject
simply takes for granted the desirability of democracy and inquires
how existing democracies may be improved. The issue of whether democracy
is a "good thing" is not thought worth raising.
A
notable example of the omission I contend exists is a recent volume,
The
Conquest of Politics, by Bernard Barber, a distinguished
political theorist teaching at Rutgers University. Barber criticizes
a number of philosophers who have written about politics, including
John Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, and Robert Nozick, for presuming to
arrive at agendas for a just political order in the absence of democratic
discussion. The decision of the people, rather than the excogitations
of philosophers "voyaging through strange seas of thought alone,"
should determine questions of distributive justice. To think otherwise
is to be undemocratic.
But
what if it is? Why should one care about democracy? Barber does
not tell us. He does contend that groups of people involved in discussions
are likely to arrive at wiser decisions than individuals who think
by themselves. Whether this is true is an issue Barber does not
think it necessary to establish. It is sufficient for him that Rousseau
supported the contention. Suppose, however, that he is correct on
the issue, surely an empirical one. His point would perhaps show
that if a society is democratically governed, it is wiser to decide
matters through discussion than without it. This point, though,
does not address the issue of whether democracy is desirable, since
it concerns a separate matter, the benefits of wide discussion of
policy. Popular deliberation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition of democracy. The British government in the early 19th
century was hardly democratic but allowed wide discussion of public
issues. Further, if in fact political discussion is desirable, why
must it include all or most of the adult population? Why is it not
enough to have discussions among the members of the legislature?
From "discussion is good" to "the more people involved
in a discussion, the better," hardly follows.
Barber,
whatever criticism one might make of him, at least has something
to say. Concerning another group, the so-called Western Straussians
headed by Harry Jaffa, it is difficult to give its members even
this much credit. Is it an argument for democracy that Abraham Lincoln
favored the system? The elaborate attempt of Jaffa, in Crisis
of the House Divided, to argue that Lincoln correctly interpreted
the Declaration of Independence to support a system of egalitarian
democracy seems of purely historical interest. Why should Lincoln’s
position be of any present-day importance? It is no more an argument
for democracy that Lincoln favored it than it is one against this
system that King James I opposed it.
What
of the claim that the Declaration of Independence either mandates
democratic government or, less strongly, recommends it? At best,
the point would be relevant to the United States, for which the
Declaration counts as an important historical document, rather than
as a universal argument for democracy, unless, of course, it is
contended that the Declaration enshrines principles of universal
validity. But what is the argument for this claim?
Even
if one restricts the discussion to the United States, appeal to
the Declaration does not by itself take one very far. It seems more
than doubtful, to say the least, that the Declaration can be taken
to require democracy. It does not, after all, list among its grievances
against George III that the monarch was undemocratic: it is the
specific complaints adduced, rather than the absence of democracy,
that the Declaration instances as the reasons entitling the colonies
to "dissolve the political bands" that connect them with
Great Britain.
To
this one might counter that democracy is still the system most favored
by the Declaration: even if other systems must be tolerated they
are less than ideal. Although I am strongly inclined to dissent
from this interpretation, I lack sufficient knowledge of the literature
on the Declaration to discuss it in detail. (One related argument
will however be discussed below.)
But
suppose the Declaration did recommend democracy. Once more
the question would arise: what is the significance of this? Some
argument would need to be provided that the assumed view of the
Declaration has binding authority. Surely the argument: the Declaration
is one of the founding documents of the United States; therefore,
any preference to be found in it regarding a proper political system
ought to be followed by contemporary Americans, moves too fast.
What precisely is the view of tradition supporting this position?
Or is the argument rather that democracy has theoretical support
independent of the Declaration, but that the support of the Declaration
adds weight to this? But this merely returns us to the point at
issue: what is the argument for democracy?
It
might be contended that the argument that I have claimed to have
trouble locating is in fact quite straightforward. Everyone ought
to be in control of his own affairs, to the extent that his liberty
does not impinge on the equal liberty of others. No one has the
right to enslave another, using him as a mere tool. A version of
this argument is, I suspect, behind Jaffa’s appeal to the Declaration
in support of an egalitarian republic. If "all men are created
equal," how can a political system be justifiable in which
some are entitled to lord it over others?
The
principal difficulty with this argument is that it is far from evident
how democracy emerges from the considerations here alleged in its
support. Democracy is not a system in which each controls his own
affairs but rather one in which the majority controls everyone.
The principle of liberty from which the argument begins, which seems
to me eminently plausible, leads to a regime of strictly limited
control rather than to democracy. If it is replied that the argument
shows the need for democracy combined with a Bill of Rights, we
must again ask where does democracy come in? It seems to have nothing
to do with the case.
But
this argument has not yet concluded. If a strictly limited but undemocratic
state exists, its rulers will still have more power than other citizens,
however limited their restriction of individual liberty. Only democracy,
a critic may claim, can eliminate this disparity.
But
why ought it to be eliminated? It does not follow from the principle
of liberty that everyone ought to be equal in power: if this is
denied, I, for one, would like to see the reasoning set out. To
assume that no person ought to have more political power than anyone
else begs the question at issue, the desirability of democracy.
This premise cannot be used as part of an independent argument in
support of democracy: it is itself a restatement of an extreme version
of democracy.
Some
philosophers might contend that we have failed in our quest for
the justification of democracy because we have not plunged deeply
enough into the foundations of ethics. Is it not a basic principle
of morality, as Ronald Dworkin contends, that everyone is entitled
to be treated with equal consideration and respect? Only a democracy,
it might be claimed, can obey this imperative.
I
must confess it is not so evident to me as it is to Dworkin that
the principle of equal consideration is correct. No doubt everyone
should be treated with the respect due to him: but why equal
respect? Is everyone of equal moral value? Charles Manson and
David Hume? Fidel Castro and Douglas MacArthur? Perhaps, though,
the point intended is a different one. Even though people differ
in moral value, the respect due to them ought not to mirror their
moral worth. (Presumably, supporters of this position will not regard
defense against criminals as inconsistent with their concept of
respect.)
Once
more, this principle strikes me as implausible, but even if, contrary
to fact, I had a good argument against it which did not appeal to
conflicting moral intuitions, further discussion of it would take
us too far afield. Instead, following our established tack, we inquire:
does this principle support democracy?
It
will hardly come as a surprise that it does not. As Dworkin himself
has noted in another connection, treating people with equal respect
does not imply treating them identically. The principle requires
equal consideration of each person’s claims. It does not tell us
without other principles what the outcome of that consideration
will be. Dworkin is himself not only a democrat but a supporter
of distributing economic resources along egalitarian lines; however,
he does not obtain his results from the principle of respect alone.
The details of Dworkin’s argument will not be discussed here; I
have mentioned him only because his principle of equal respect,
or similar rules, is often invoked in support of democracy.
Bruce
Ackerman, for example, devises in his influential Social
Justice in the Liberal State a series of imaginary conversations
designed to illustrate the appropriate political and social principles.
A requirement of his conversations, the outcomes of which turn out
invariably to be democratic and egalitarian, is that no one claim
that he is intrinsically more valuable than anyone else. Why not?
Some people are better than others. Why must this moral fact be
suppressed? How strong is an argument for democracy that rests on
the refusal to allow reference to an obvious truth? Incidentally,
Benjamin Barber, whom we have earlier discussed, criticizes Ackerman
for a different reason he is insufficiently democratic.
Are
there no good arguments for democracy? Perhaps we have overlooked
the obvious. Is it not wrong to impose a government on people without
their consent? To do so seems inconsistent with a free society.
If this is true, do we not at last have the argument for democracy
which we have so far sought in vain?
Not
at all. Consent has to do with the acceptance of the authority of
a government by those subject to it: democracy refers to a type
of rule, i.e., control by the majority or its agents. Consent neither
implies nor is implied by democracy. Dictatorial regimes have enjoyed
widespread recognition of their authority: one need only mention
Napoleon during the years of his political success. A democratic
system, moreover, can be forcibly imposed on a country without the
consent of its citizens. In this case, the citizens are able democratically
to govern themselves but cannot change the system, even if they
overwhelmingly wish to do so. The United States has often acted
in just this fashion in Latin America, since the days when Woodrow
Wilson decided that the Mexican government was insufficiently democratic
for his taste. Wilson also declined to grant Germany an armistice
in World War I until the country replaced its monarchy with a republic.
Although
consent and democracy need not in fact be connected, it might be
argued that they ought to be. Only a democratic system ought to
receive popular consent, even if people are benighted enough to
think otherwise. But this contention presupposes that there exists
an acceptable account of consent. Though I cannot here argue the
point and can hardly ask readers simply to accept my assessment,
it does seem to me that none of the principal theories of consent
withstands philosophical criticism. It is in part on this basis
that I support a libertarian system, in which the issue of consent
to political authority does not arise. The arguments advanced in
this essay do not, however, appeal to specifically libertarian contentions:
the principle of liberty discussed earlier was deliberately worded
in a way intended to be generally acceptable. But all this is by
the way.
If
in response it is alleged that even if we lack a convincing theory
of consent, we at least know that the existence of a democratic
system is a necessary condition of the yet-to-be found account,
I fear that the familiar litany must be repeated: why is this so?
Perhaps
the most substantial argument in support of democracy is that of
the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises. A democratic regime, since
it by hypothesis enjoys majority support, will best insure that
political change avoids violence. A government that people dislike
but cannot alter democratically will, in contrast, be susceptible
to revolution, with its attendant destruction.
Mises’s
argument seems to me vulnerable at several points. It does not address
the contention raised earlier that a democratic system can itself
be unpopular: unless the majority has the power to abolish democracy,
Mises’s own argument would suggest the likelihood of revolution.
He might, however, reply that, though he cannot show that democracy
always leads to stability, it remains the system most likely to
do so.
More
directly to the essence, Mises fails to address the problem of revolutions
brought about by minorities. Why should a dissatisfied minority
confine itself to attempting to secure majority support for its
proposals? Mises might reply that it has little choice since the
majority opposes it, it will lose should it attempt to seize power
by force.
But
this flies in the face of history; are not revolutions often, indeed
usually, the result of efforts by a determined minority? Little
purpose would be served by a long list of historical examples, though
the French and Russian Revolutions will do for a start; but the
list is unnecessary. All that is required to challenge Mises’ claim
is to note that it is an empirical issue, not one to be settled
a priori, whether revolutions stem in a significant number
of cases from dissatisfied majorities. Unless they do, Mises has
not shown that a system with majority support is in practice needed
to avert revolution.
Mises’
claim that a government elected by a majority is unlikely to be
overthrown violently by that same majority seems plausible. But
if he has located a sufficient condition for immunizing a government
against a revolution with majority support, he has failed to adduce
a necessary one. Any regime that enjoys widespread popular approval
will meet Mises’ requirement, which in fact is an instance of the
trivial point that a group will not overthrow a system it supports.
Furthermore, even if Mises is correct that democracy maximizes stability,
precisely how does this work? If, finally, Mises were to respond
that since governments may lose their support, democracy is necessary
to allow changes in opinion to register their effect, an exactly
similar rejoinder is appropriate. Any government responsive
to popular discontent will be in a position to avert revolution,
not just a democracy.
A
supporter of democracy may reject the entire line of approach pursued
in this essay. Why are arguments to justify democracy needed at
all? Do we require arguments that we should not gratuitously inflict
pain on others, or not betray our country to the enemy? Would we
not look askance at someone who raised the question of whether he
should steal as a "live option" rather than as a philosophical
perplexity? Similarly, it might be contended that democracy stands
in no need of further justification.
It
seems to me entirely right that some truths, including certain principles
of ethics, are known to be correct without the need for justification
through argument. But is it plausible to think that the issue of
how best to organize the making of political decisions is a matter
open to direct apprehension? If it is, what are the intuitively
evident principles governing division of power between legislature
and executive? The requirements for public office, etc.? If these
latter issues cannot be settled on intuitive grounds, why should
we think the more general issue can be? What are the boundaries
of intuition? Is this question also a matter of intuitive judgment?
If,
in spite of these considerations, someone does have such a moral
intuition, I have nothing to say against him. But to those for whom
the question is a matter of inquiry, a case of this sort is irrelevant.
Political theory cannot advance unless the analysis of controversial
issues can proceed beyond the point of unsupported reiteration of
prior convictions.
Those
who support democracy but wish to go beyond appeal to an intuition
of its desirability have work to do. Perhaps there is an argument
that does show that democracy is entailed by sound morality. Much
more likely, it seems to me, there is not. The slogan "Vox
populi, vox Dei" and its endless modern variants are best consigned
to the rubbish heap of exploded superstitions.
This
article was first published in This World, Number 27, Winter
1992.
January
25,
2005
Copyright ©
2005 LewRockwell.com
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