Soft
Despotism
by
David Gordon
by David Gordon
Soft
Despotism, Democracy's Drift: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Tocqueville,
and the Modern Prospect. By Paul A. Rahe. Yale University
Press, 2009. Xxiii + 374 pages.
Paul Rahe's
outstanding book can be considered an extended commentary on a famous
passage in Tocqueville's Democracy
in America:
Over these
[citizens] is elevated an immense, tutelary power, which takes
sole charge of assuring their enjoyment and of watching over their
fate. It is absolute, attentive to detail, regular, provident,
and gentle
It works willingly for their happiness, but it
wishes to be the only agent and the sole arbiter of that happiness.
It provides for their security, foresees and supplies their needs,
guides them in their principal affairs, directs their testaments,
divides their inheritances
In this fashion, every day, it
renders the employment of free will less useful and more rare;
it confines the action of the will within a smaller space and
bit by bit it steals from each citizen the use of that which is
his own. Equality has prepared men for all of these things: it
has disposed them to put up with them and often even to regard
them as a benefit. (pp. 18788, quoting Tocqueville)
As Rahe abundantly
demonstrates, this passage has great relevance to recent American
history. Tocqueville's comment, he shows, represents the culmination
of a line of thought that began with Montesquieu. Although Montesquieu
in the eighteenth century was regarded as a great thinker, he does
not figure much today in discussions of political theory. Most people
view him as a figure merely of historical interest. Rahe shows that
the modern view is seriously mistaken: Montesquieu offered a penetrating
discussion of the problems of modern political regimes.
Montesquieu
in Considerations
on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline
rejected both the desirability and possibility of a modern return
to the virtue characteristic of classical antiquity, with its preeminent
stress on military valor.
The point
that Montesquieu intended to make is clear enough. We should not
want to imitate the Romans
And even if for some perverse
reason we wanted to imitate the Romans, he then demonstrates in
his Universal Monarchy, we could not succeed. (p. 7)
Instead, a
commercial society, of which England was the foremost example, offered
the best prospects for a flourishing social order under modern conditions.
England, though ostensibly ruled by a king, was in fact a "republic
concealed under the form of a monarchy" (p. 37). Unlike a genuine
monarchy, it aimed at liberty and economic prosperity and demanded
no particular virtue from the people.
It by no means
followed from the success of English society, though, that the people
in it lived in contentment. Quite the contrary, they found themselves
in an anxious state, which Montesquieu termed "inquiétude."
With characteristic erudition, Rahe traces this notion to the Jansenist
Blaise Pascal and his disciple Pierre Nicole. They held that after
the Fall, human beings were in the grip of concupiscence. Though
a malign emotion, it could simulate the effects of the virtues and
produce, in unintended fashion, a workable society.
Nicole devoted
a seminal essay suggesting that Christian charity is politically
and socially superfluous that, in its absence, thanks to
the particular providence of God, l'amour propre is perfectly
capable of providing a foundation for the proper ordering of civil
society, of the political order, and of human life in this world
more generally. (p. 43)
Montesquieu,
following Montaigne, secularized this notion; here we have a principal
source of Bernard Mandeville's view that private vices were public
benefits and more generally, of the Scottish Enlightenment concept
of the unintended consequences of human action.
In the modern
world, then, we can obtain a tolerable, though not ideal, order
by following the English model. But a danger threatens this happy
outcome: in certain circumstances, the executive might seize control
of the reins of power and transform society into a despotic system.
In Montesquieu's
judgment, the legislature within a modern republic would be in
serious danger of succumbing fully to executive influence only
in the unlikely event that the management of commerce and industry
within that republic were somehow, to a very considerable extent,
entrusted to the executive. In such a polity should the populace
in general and the middle class in particular ever be beholden
to government for their economic well-being, the situation of
the citizens would indeed be grim. (p. 58)
To prevent
this transition to despotism, it is essential to preserve the intermediate
powers, such as the nobility and clergy, who can interpose their
authority between the central government and the people. Without
these powers, the executive may take control, in the manner just
described. The course of French history prior to the 1789 illustrates
an analogous transition, though in a monarchy rather than a republic.
Under Louis XIV and his successors, the power of the nobility to
resist royal authority had been suppressed; the ensuing growth of
an all-powerful central state helped bring about the revolution,
as a reaction against the state's excesses. Malesherbes, a highly
placed liberal aristocrat and close reader of Montesquieu, warned
Louis XVI of the dangers of undue centralization, to no avail. In
the Grandes Remonstrances of 1775, Malesherbes and his colleagues
on the Cour des aides charged "that the system of administration
put in place by Louis XIV and further developed under Louis XV had
made of the French monarchy an 'Oriental despotism'."
Malesherbes, who was executed under the Revolution for his defense
of Louis XVI, was Tocqueville's great-grandfather, and like his
ancestor, Tocqueville continued the line of analysis begun by Montesquieu.
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