Super
Weapons and Global Dominion
by
Alfred McCoy and Tom Engelhardt
TomDispatch
Recently
by Tom Engelhardt: Monopolizing
War? What America Knows How to Do Best
In the 1950s
and early 1960s, the Cold War was commonly said to have partially
plunged "into the shadows" as a secret, off-the-grid,
spy-versus-spy conflict fought between the planet's two superpowers.
No one caught this mood better than John le Carré in his
famed
Smiley novels which offered a riveting portrait of Soviet, British,
and American spies locked in mortal combat, yet with more in common
with each other than with either of their aboveground societies.
So many decades later, with the Soviet Union long gone, it's strange
to discover that, in the case of the United States at least, those
"shadows" have only lengthened. Increasingly, as the Iraq
War fades into history (and out of memory) and the Afghan War winds
down, the American way of war itself is being drawn into those shadows.
Admittedly,
since World War II, control over war who to fight, when to
wage it, and how to fight it has been on a migratory path
into the White House and the national security bureaucracy, leaving
Congress and the American people out in the cold. In the last decade,
however, a high-tech, privatized, covert version of war has become
presidential property, fought at the White House's behest by robots,
warrior
corporations, and two presidentially controlled "private"
forces (a paramilitarized CIA and the Joint
Special Operations Command). With this transformation has gone
a series of decisions that have plunged American-style war ever
further into darkness. In the last few years, for instance, two
presidents, enveloped in a penumbra of secrecy and without the knowledge
of the American people or possibly much of Congress, deployed the
latest in experimental weaponry weapons that could someday
unravel our world in the first
cyberwar in history. They wielded
what someday will undoubtedly be reclassified as weapons of mass
destruction against
Iran, paving the way for future global cyberwars which could
devastate this country.
In the same
years, the same two presidents took control of another new form
of conflict, drone warfare. Across the Greater Middle East and northern
Africa, they launched massive, high-tech campaigns of assassination
("targeted killings") that may have no equivalent in history.
These have involved hundreds
of air strikes and thousands of casualties. Enfolded in secrecy,
a complex, increasingly codified panoply of national security processes
(including "terror Tuesday" meetings to decide just who
to kill), the president has turned himself into our first assassin-in-chief.
As the Washington
Post recently
reported in a three-part series, he has also overseen a process
by which ad hoc killing has morphed into a codified, bureaucratic,
normalized killing machine deeply embedded in the White House, a
"disposal
matrix" or "kill
list" that will be handed off to future presidents in a
"war" (once known as the Global War on Terror) with at
least "a decade" to go and possibly no end in sight. In
a language that used to be left to Hollywood's version of the Mafia,
the White House, as judge, jury, and executioner, now regularly
puts out hits around the world, while discussing "the designation
of who should pull the trigger when a killing is warranted."
In one Post
piece focused on Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti as the key base for
presidential war in Africa, a detail caught my eye. It seemed to
capture the ever-darkening nature of this war-making moment. Speaking
of the hundreds of elite special operations forces there, Craig
Whitlock wrote,
"Most of the commandos work incognito, concealing their names
even from conventional troops on the base." Put another way,
this new form of warfare is far enough into the shadows that the
names of a major part of the U.S. military, tens
of thousands of elite troops whose command has just gotten its
own "secret targeting center" in Washington 15
minutes from the White House, can't even be known to other U.S.
military personnel who work with them.
Imagine, then,
what our world might be like once future techno-versions of presidential
war now being developed come online. What will it mean when, in
the third decade of this century, in pursuit of the same Global
War on Terror, drone war has morphed into a "triple canopy
space shield" and "robotic information system," as
described today in chilling detail by Alfred McCoy, TomDispatch
regular and lead author of the new book Endless
Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline?
Imagine when, from outer space to the spreading Camp Lemonniers
of planet Earth, the White House can make secret war in a myriad
of high-tech and robotic ways without even a nod to you and me.
By then, in at least one possible future, our whole world may lie
in those shadows. ~ Tom
Beyond
Bayonets and Battleships
Space Warfare and the Future of U.S. Global Power
By Alfred
W. McCoy
It's 2025 and
an American "triple canopy" of advanced surveillance and
armed drones fills the heavens from the lower- to the exo-atmosphere.
A wonder of the modern age, it can deliver its weaponry anywhere
on the planet with staggering speed, knock out an enemy's satellite
communications system, or follow individuals biometrically for great
distances. Along with the country's advanced cyberwar capacity,
it's also the most sophisticated militarized information system
ever created and an insurance policy for U.S. global dominion deep
into the twenty-first century. It's the future as the Pentagon imagines
it; it's under development; and Americans know nothing about it.
They are still
operating in another age. "Our Navy is smaller now than at
any time since 1917," complained
Republican candidate Mitt Romney during the last presidential debate.
With words
of withering mockery, President Obama shot back: "Well, Governor,
we also have fewer horses and bayonets, because the nature of our
military's changed... the question is not a game of Battleship,
where we're counting ships. It's what are our capabilities."
Obama later
offered just a hint of what those capabilities might be: "What
I did was work with our joint chiefs of staff to think about, what
are we going to need in the future to make sure that we are safe?...
We need to be thinking about cyber security. We need to be talking
about space."
Amid all the
post-debate media chatter, however, not a single commentator seemed
to have a clue when it came to the profound strategic changes encoded
in the president's sparse words. Yet for the past four years, working
in silence and secrecy, the Obama administration has presided over
a technological revolution in defense planning, moving the nation
far beyond bayonets and battleships to cyberwarfare and the full-scale
weaponization of space. In the face of waning economic influence,
this bold new breakthrough in what's called "information warfare"
may prove significantly responsible should U.S. global dominion
somehow continue far into the twenty-first century.
While the technological
changes involved are nothing less than revolutionary, they have
deep historical roots in a distinctive style of American global
power. It's been evident from the moment this nation first stepped
onto the world stage with its conquest of the Philippines in 1898.
Over the span of a century, plunged into three Asian crucibles of
counterinsurgency in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Afghanistan
the U.S. military has repeatedly been pushed to the breaking
point. It has repeatedly responded by fusing the nation's most advanced
technologies into new information infrastructures of unprecedented
power.
That military
first created a manual information regime for Philippine pacification,
then a computerized apparatus to fight communist guerrillas in Vietnam.
Finally, during its decade-plus in Afghanistan (and its years in
Iraq), the Pentagon has begun to fuse biometrics, cyberwarfare,
and a potential future triple canopy aerospace shield into a robotic
information regime that could produce a platform of unprecedented
power for the exercise of global dominion or for future military
disaster.
America's
First Information Revolution
This distinctive
U.S. system of imperial information gathering (and the surveillance
and war-making practices that go with it) traces its origins to
some brilliant American innovations in the management of textual,
statistical, and visual data. Their sum was nothing less than a
new information infrastructure with an unprecedented capacity for
mass surveillance.
During two
extraordinary decades, American inventions like Thomas Alva Edison's
quadruplex telegraph (1874), Philo Remington's commercial typewriter
(1874), Melvil Dewey's library decimal system (1876), and Herman
Hollerith's patented punch card (1889) created synergies that led
to the militarized application of America's first information revolution.
To pacify a determined guerrilla resistance that persisted in the
Philippines for a decade after 1898, the U.S. colonial regime
unlike European empires with their cultural studies of "Oriental
civilizations" used these advanced information technologies
to amass detailed empirical data on Philippine society. In this
way, they forged an Argus-eyed security apparatus that played a
major role in crushing the Filipino nationalist movement. The resulting
colonial policing and surveillance system would also leave a lasting
institutional imprint on the emerging American state.
When the U.S.
entered World War I in 1917, the "father of U.S. military intelligence"
Colonel Ralph Van Deman drew upon security methods he had developed
years before in the Philippines to found the Army's Military Intelligence
Division. He recruited a staff that quickly grew from one (himself)
to 1,700, deployed some 300,000 citizen-operatives to compile more
than a million pages of surveillance reports on American citizens,
and laid the foundations for a permanent domestic surveillance apparatus.
A version of
this system rose to unparalleled success during World War II when
Washington established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as
the nation's first worldwide espionage agency. Among its nine branches,
Research & Analysis recruited a staff of nearly 2,000 academics
who amassed 300,000 photographs, a million maps, and three million
file cards, which they deployed in an information system via "indexing,
cross-indexing, and counter-indexing" to answer countless tactical
questions.
Yet by early
1944, the OSS found itself, in the words of historian Robin Winks,
"drowning under the flow of information." Many of the
materials it had so carefully collected were left to molder in storage,
unread and unprocessed. Despite its ambitious global reach, this
first U.S. information regime, absent technological change, might
well have collapsed under its own weight, slowing the flow of foreign
intelligence that would prove so crucial for America's exercise
of global dominion after World War II.
Computerizing
Vietnam
Under the pressures
of a never-ending war in Vietnam, those running the U.S. information
infrastructure turned to computerized data management, launching
a second American information regime. Powered by the most advanced
IBM mainframe computers, the U.S. military compiled monthly tabulations
of security in all of South Vietnam's 12,000 villages and filed
the three million enemy documents its soldiers captured annually
on giant reels of bar-coded film. At the same time, the CIA collated
and computerized diverse data on the communist civilian infrastructure
as part of its infamous Phoenix Program. This, in turn, became the
basis for its systematic tortures and 41,000 "extra-judicial
executions" (which, based on disinformation from petty local
grudges and communist counterintelligence, killed many but failed
to capture more than a handfull of top communist cadres).
Most ambitiously,
the U.S. Air Force spent $800 million a year to lace southern Laos
with a network of 20,000 acoustic, seismic, thermal, and ammonia-sensitive
sensors to pinpoint Hanoi's truck convoys coming down the Ho Chi
Minh Trail under a heavy jungle canopy. The information
these provided was then gathered on computerized systems for the
targeting of incessant bombing runs. After 100,000 North Vietnamese
troops passed right through this electronic grid undetected with
trucks, tanks, and heavy artillery to launch the Nguyen Hue Offensive
in 1972, the U.S. Pacific Air Force pronounced this bold attempt
to build an "electronic battlefield" an unqualified failure.
In this pressure
cooker of what became history's largest air war, the Air Force also
accelerated the transformation of a new information system that
would rise to significance three decades later: the Firebee target
drone. By war's end, it had morphed into an increasingly agile unmanned
aircraft that would make 3,500 top-secret surveillance sorties over
China, North Vietnam, and Laos. By 1972, the SC/TV drone, with a
camera in its nose, was capable of flying 2,400 miles while navigating
via a low-resolution television image.
On balance,
all this computerized data helped foster the illusion that American
"pacification" programs in the countryside were winning
over the inhabitants of Vietnam's villages, and the delusion that
the air war was successfully destroying North Vietnam's supply effort.
Despite a dismal succession of short-term failures that helped deliver
a soul-searing blow to American power, all this computerized data-gathering
proved a seminal experiment, even if its advances would not become
evident for another 30 years until the U.S. began creating a third
robotic information regime.
The
Global War on Terror
As it found
itself at the edge of defeat in the attempted pacification of two
complex societies, Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington responded in
part by adapting new technologies of electronic surveillance, biometric
identification, and drone warfare all of which are now melding
into what may become an information regime far more powerful and
destructive than anything that has come before.
After six years
of a failing counterinsurgency effort in Iraq, the Pentagon discovered
the power of biometric identification and electronic surveillance
to pacify the country's sprawling cities. It then built
a biometric database with more than a million Iraqi fingerprints
and iris scans that U.S. patrols on the streets of Baghdad could
access instantaneously by satellite link to a computer center in
West Virginia.
When President
Obama took office and launched his "surge,"
escalating the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, that country became
a new frontier for testing and perfecting such biometric databases,
as well as for full-scale drone war in both that country and the
Pakistani tribal borderlands, the latest wrinkle in a technowar
already loosed by the Bush administration. This meant accelerating
technological developments in drone warfare that had largely been
suspended for two decades after the Vietnam War.
Launched as
an experimental, unarmed surveillance aircraft in 1994, the Predator
drone was first deployed in 2000 for combat surveillance under the
CIA's "Operation Afghan Eyes." By 2011, the advanced MQ-9
Reaper drone, with "persistent hunter killer" capabilities,
was heavily
armed with missiles and bombs as well as sensors that could
read disturbed dirt at 5,000 feet and track footprints back to enemy
installations. Indicating the torrid pace of drone development,
between 2004 and 2010 total flying time for all unmanned vehicles
rose
from just 71 hours to 250,000 hours.
By 2009, the
Air Force and the CIA were already deploying
a drone armada of at least 195 Predators and 28 Reapers inside Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Pakistan and it's only grown since. These collected
and transmitted 16,000 hours of video daily, and from 2006-2012
fired hundreds of Hellfire missiles that killed an
estimated 2,600 supposed insurgents inside Pakistan's tribal
areas. Though the second-generation Reaper drones might seem stunningly
sophisticated, one defense analyst has called
them "very much Model T Fords." Beyond the battlefield,
there are now some 7,000 drones in the U.S. armada of unmanned aircraft,
including
800 larger missile-firing drones. By funding its own fleet of 35
drones and borrowing others from the Air Force, the CIA has moved
beyond passive intelligence collection to build a permanent robotic
paramilitary capacity.
In the same
years, another form of information warfare came, quite literally,
online. Over two administrations, there has been continuity in the
development of a cyberwarfare
capability at home and abroad. Starting in 2002, President George
W. Bush illegally
authorized the National Security Agency to scan countless
millions of electronic messages with its top-secret "Pinwale"
database. Similarly, the FBI started
an Investigative Data Warehouse that, by 2009, held a billion individual
records.
Under Presidents
Bush and Obama, defensive digital surveillance has grown into an
offensive "cyberwarfare" capacity, which has already been
deployed against Iran in history's first significant cyberwar. In
2009, the Pentagon formed U.S.
Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), with headquarters at Ft. Meade, Maryland,
and a cyberwarfare center at Lackland Air Base in Texas, staffed
by 7,000 Air Force employees. Two years later, it declared
cyberspace an "operational domain" like air, land, or
sea, and began putting its energy into developing a cadre of cyber-warriors
capable of launching offensive operations, such as a variety
of attacks on the computerized centrifuges in Iran's nuclear
facilities and Middle
Eastern banks handling Iranian money.
A Robotic
Information Regime
As with the
Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnam War, the occupations of
Iraq and Afghanistan have served as the catalyst for a new information
regime, fusing aerospace, cyberspace, biometrics, and robotics into
an apparatus of potentially unprecedented power. In 2012, after
years of ground warfare in both countries and the continuous expansion
of the Pentagon budget, the Obama administration announced
a leaner future defense strategy. It included a 14% cut in future
infantry strength to be compensated for by an increased emphasis
on investments in the dominions of outer space and cyberspace, particularly
in what the administration calls "critical space-based capabilities."
By 2020, this
new defense architecture should theoretically be able to integrate
space, cyberspace, and terrestrial combat through robotics for
so the claims go the delivery of seamless information for
lethal action. Significantly, both space and cyberspace are new,
unregulated domains of military conflict, largely beyond international
law. And Washington hopes to use both, without limitation, as Archimedean
levers to exercise new forms of global dominion far into the twenty-first
century, just as the British Empire once ruled from the seas and
the Cold War American imperium exercised its global reach via airpower.
As Washington
seeks to surveil the globe from space, the world might well ask:
Just how high is national sovereignty? Absent any international
agreement about the vertical extent of sovereign airspace (since
a conference on international air law, convened in Paris in 1910,
failed), some puckish Pentagon lawyer might reply: only as high
as you can enforce it. And Washington has filled
this legal void with a secret executive matrix operated
by the CIA and the clandestine Special Operations Command
that assigns names arbitrarily, without any judicial oversight,
to a classified "kill list" that means silent, sudden
death from the sky for terror suspects across the Muslim world.
Although U.S.
plans for space warfare remain highly classified, it is possible
to assemble the pieces of this aerospace puzzle by trolling the
Pentagon's websites, and finding many of the key components in technical
descriptions at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
As early as 2020, the Pentagon hopes to patrol the entire globe
ceaselessly, relentlessly via a triple canopy space shield reaching
from stratosphere to exosphere, driven by drones armed with agile
missiles, linked by a resilient modular satellite system, monitored
through a telescopic panopticon, and operated by robotic controls.
At the lowest
tier of this emerging U.S. aerospace shield, within striking distance
of Earth in the lower stratosphere, the Pentagon is building an
armada of 99 Global Hawk drones equipped with high-resolution cameras
capable of surveilling all terrain within a 100-mile radius, electronic
sensors to intercept communications, efficient engines for continuous
24-hour flights, and eventually Triple
Terminator missiles to destroy targets below. By late 2011,
the Air Force and the CIA had already ringed
the Eurasian land mass with a network of 60 bases for drones armed
with Hellfire missiles and GBU-30 bombs, allowing air strikes against
targets just about anywhere in Europe, Africa, or Asia.
The sophistication
of the technology at this level was exposed
in December 2011 when one of the CIA's RQ-170 Sentinels came down
in Iran. Revealed was a bat-winged drone equipped with radar-evading
stealth capacity, active electronically scanned array radar, and
advanced
optics "that allow operators to positively identify terror
suspects from tens of thousands of feet in the air."
If things go
according to plan, in this same lower tier at altitudes up to 12
miles unmanned aircraft such as the
"Vulture," with solar panels covering its massive
400-foot wingspan, will be patrolling the globe ceaselessly for
up to five years at a time with sensors for "unblinking"
surveillance, and possibly missiles for lethal strikes. Establishing
the viability of this new technology, NASA's solar-powered aircraft
Pathfinder, with a 100-foot wingspan, reached
an altitude of 71,500 feet altitude in 1997, and its fourth-generation
successor the "Helios" flew at 97,000 feet with a 247-foot
wingspan in 2001, two miles higher than any previous aircraft.
For the next
tier above the Earth, in the upper stratosphere, DARPA and the Air
Force are collaborating
in the development of the Falcon Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle. Flying
at an altitude of 20 miles, it is expected to "deliver 12,000
pounds of payload at a distance of 9,000 nautical miles from the
continental United States in less than two hours." Although
the first test launches in April 2010 and August 2011 crashed midflight,
they did reach
an amazing 13,000 miles per hour, 22 times the speed of sound, and
sent
back "unique data" that should help resolve remaining
aerodynamic problems.
At the outer
level of this triple-tier aerospace canopy, the age of space warfare
dawned in April 2010 when the Pentagon quietly launched
the X-37B space drone, an unmanned craft just 29 feet long, into
an orbit 250 miles above the Earth. By the time its second prototype
landed
at Vandenberg Air Force Base in June 2012 after a 15-month flight,
this classified mission represented
a successful test of "robotically controlled reusable spacecraft"
and established the viability of unmanned space drones in the exosphere.
At this apex
of the triple canopy, 200 miles above Earth where the space drones
will soon roam, orbital satellites are the prime targets, a vulnerability
that became obvious in 2007 when China used a ground-to-air missile
to shoot
down one of its own satellites. In response, the Pentagon is
now developing
the F-6 satellite system that will "decompose a large monolithic
spacecraft into a group of wirelessly linked elements, or nodes
[that increases] resistance to... a bad part breaking or an adversary
attacking." And keep in mind that the X-37B has a capacious
cargo bay to carry missiles or future laser weaponry to knock out
enemy satellites in other words, the potential capability
to cripple the communications of a future military rival like China,
which will have its own global satellite system operational by 2020.
Ultimately,
the impact of this third information regime will be shaped by the
ability of the U.S. military to integrate its array of global aerospace
weaponry into a robotic command structure that would be capable
of coordinating operations across all combat domains: space, cyberspace,
sky, sea, and land. To manage the surging torrent of information
within this delicately balanced triple canopy, the system would,
in the end, have to become self-maintaining through "robotic
manipulator technologies," such as the Pentagon's FREND
system that someday could potentially deliver fuel, provide
repairs, or reposition satellites.
For a new global
optic, DARPA is building
the wide-angle Space Surveillance Telescope (SST), which could be
sited at bases ringing the globe for a quantum leap in "space surveillance."
The system would allow future space warriors to see the whole sky
wrapped around the entire planet while seated before a single screen,
making it possible to track every object in Earth orbit.
Operation of
this complex worldwide apparatus will require, as one DARPA official
explained
in 2007, "an integrated collection of space surveillance systems
an architecture that is leak-proof." Thus, by 2010,
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency had
16,000 employees, a $5 billion budget, and a massive $2 billion
headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, with 8,500 staffers wrapped
in electronic security all aimed at coordinating
the flood of surveillance data pouring in from Predators, Reapers,
U-2 spy planes, Global Hawks, X-37B space drones, Google Earth,
Space Surveillance Telescopes, and orbiting satellites. By 2020
or thereafter such a complex techno-system is unlikely to
respect schedules this triple canopy should be able to atomize
a single "terrorist" with a missile strike after tracking
his eyeball, facial image, or heat signature for hundreds of miles
through field and favela, or blind an entire army by knocking out
all ground communications, avionics, and naval navigation.
Technological
Dominion or Techno-Disaster?
Peering into
the future, a still uncertain balance of forces offers two competing
scenarios for the continuation of U.S. global power. If all or much
goes according to plan, sometime in the third decade of this century
the Pentagon will complete a comprehensive global surveillance system
for Earth, sky, and space using robotics to coordinate a veritable
flood of data from biometric street-level monitoring, cyber-data
mining, a worldwide network of Space Surveillance Telescopes, and
triple canopy aeronautic patrols. Through agile data management
of exceptional power, this system might allow the United States
a veto of global lethality, an equalizer for any further loss of
economic strength.
However,
as in Vietnam, history offers some pessimistic parallels when it
comes to the U.S. preserving its global hegemony by militarized
technology alone. Even if this robotic information regime could
somehow check China's growing military power, the U.S. might still
have the same chance of controlling wider geopolitical forces with
aerospace technology as the Third Reich had of winning World War
II with its "super weapons" V-2 rockets that rained
death on London and Messerschmitt Me-262 jets that blasted allied
bombers from Europe's skies. Complicating the future further, the
illusion of information omniscience might incline Washington to
more military misadventures akin to Vietnam or Iraq, creating the
possibility of yet more expensive, draining conflicts, from Iran
to the South China Sea.
If the future
of America's world power is shaped by actual events rather than
long-term economic trends, then its fate might well be determined
by which comes first in this century-long cycle: military debacle
from the illusion of technological mastery, or a new technological
regime powerful enough to perpetuate U.S. global dominion.
This article
originally appeared at TomDispatch.com.
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November
9, 2012
Tom
Engelhardt [send him mail]
co-founder
of the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com, is the co-founder of
the American Empire
Project. His book, The
End of Victory Culture, has recently been updated in a newly
issued edition. He edited, and his work appears in, the first best
of TomDispatch book, The
World According to TomDispatch: America in the New Age of Empire
(Verso), an alternative history of the mad Bush years. He is also
the author of The
American Way of War: How Bush’s Wars Became Obama’s and The
United States of Fear. His latest book is Terminator
Planet: The First History of Drone Warfare, 2001-2050 (with
Nick Turse). Alfred W. McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor
of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. A TomDispatch
regular, he is the lead author of Endless
Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline
(University of Wisconsin, 2012), which is the source for much
of the material in this essay.
Copyright
© 2012 Alfred W. McCoy
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