Freedom
and the Free City
by
Daniel McCarthy
Liberty
is perhaps the oldest tradition of the Western world. The first
historian of the West, Herodotus, makes clear the cardinal importance
of this tradition in his Histories,
where he attributes the victory of the Greeks over their Persian
enemies in no small part to the freedom that the Greeks enjoyed.
They were fighting for hearth and home – for their own independence.
The Persians fought because they were slaves to their king, and
he would kill them if they didn’t fight.
Freedom
for the Greeks was not the same thing as modern freedom, of course.
For starters, the Greeks had slaves. Greek freedom was also characterized
more by the free city than by the free individual. Benjamin Constant,
one of the founding fathers of classical liberalism, gave a famous
speech on "The
Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns,"
in which he found modern liberty, on the whole, more agreeable.
There is no need to quarrel with his judgment, although a case can
be made for Athenian
liberty, at least, even in modern terms. What is more important
is to examine Greek liberty for lessons about a kind of freedom
that has been largely forgotten today, the freedom that derives
from man’s right to form associations and that culminates in the
free city.
When
Aristotle called man a political animal, he did not have parties
and elections in mind. Man is a zoon politikon in the sense
that the polis, the "city-state," is the natural
culmination of man’s nature; it is his end, as far as social organization
goes. Not that all men live in cities. First comes the family, which
arises out of biological necessity; next the tribal village in which
man may more easily obtain the necessities of life than in the family
alone. The city may come into being thereafter, so that man may
pursue, in leisure, his highest nature. As Aristotle says in at
the beginning of his Politics,
"every city is a kind of association, and every association is joined
together for the sake of some good."* And further, one good on account
of which cities are established is justice – "for rules of
justice are the organizing principle of political (i.e., city-based)
association."*
Modern
translators of Aristotle tend to render polis as "state."
This is misleading, just as thinking of man as a "political"
animal in the partisan or statist sense is not quite right. "City-state"
is a fair translation for polis, but the basic, dictionary
definition of the word is simply "city." You get translations
with very different apparent meanings depending on whether you render
polis as "state" or "city." Aristotle
was no anarchist, but neither was he the statist that English translations
make him out to be. Moreover, when Aristotle says that every city
is a kind of association, we should bear in mind that this can include
free associations. This is historically valid – Athens itself seems
to have had its origins in the voluntary association of tribal fishing,
farming and shepherd communities who came together for trade, mutual
defense, and religious purposes. Or, for a modern example, think
of the origins of colonial settlements in North America, which were
often established on a voluntary basis and in pursuit of some good,
usually a good conceived of in religious terms. Cities and communities
need not originate in conquest.
Many
Greek cities also began as colonies established for economic or
political reasons. Such colonies dotted the Mediterranean coast
from modern Turkey (Byzantium, now Istanbul) to modern France (Massilia,
now Marseille). Often these colonies were begun by people who, like
our own colonial forbears, held different values from those of their
native city or country. In these cases, rather than two or more
factions fighting for control of the mother city, in order that
one might impose its values – its sense of the good – upon the other,
the two separated, one group leaving to found a colony, so that
each community could pursue whatever it understood to be the good.
These separations could take place voluntary or on account of one
faction being banished.
For
the ancient Greeks freedom meant above all the freedom of the city,
its autonomy and independence. Some Greek cities, most notably Athens,
went further, extending freedom to the individual as well as the
city. But the free individual presupposed the free city, for if
your city were ruled by an external power whatever liberties you
may personally enjoy would not be secure. To be sure, tyranny could
come from within the city as well as from the outside, but foreign
rule entailed coercion, while home rule meant less or virtually
none. Citizens
of free cities usually paid no direct taxes; subject peoples,
on the other hand, could be compelled to pay tribute.
Greek
liberty, in both theory and practice, was particularistic. Different
cities might pursue different ideas of the good and employ different
codes of justice. The formation of colonies allowed sub-groups within
a city that held different values to find their own way. Compare
that with the winner-take-all approach to liberty in America today.
On questions like abortion there are irreconcilable differences
– different beliefs about what a person’s rights are, who counts
as a person, and what constitutes the good. Rather than the two
sides separating, each to live according to its values in its own
communities, all are forced to abide by the dominant power, the
federal government. Separation is the best solution to intractable
conflict, but the modern State does not permit such separation.
Secession is the ultimate expression of political separation, but
there are intermediate forms such as home rule and federalism of
the sort that prevailed prior to the Civil War. Today however the
federal government does not tolerate free associations governing
themselves locally, except in isolated cases such as the Amish.
The
Greek experience is not as remote from our reality as we might imagine.
Aristotle was not writing prescriptively when he called man a political
(city-based) animal. Man still today lives in what Aristotle would
have called poleis (cities), for the small, medium and large
towns in which most of us live are just that. The Greek city was
considerably smaller than modern megalopolises and was usually closer
in size to a large town – in some cases even to small town. What
makes our world so different is that our cities are not free, they
are all subordinate to the overarching power of state and federal
government. Some who consider themselves defenders of freedom rejoice
in this, since it means that one standard of liberty prevails everywhere,
at least within the bounds of the United States. (Note that logically
there’s no reason why this liberty shouldn’t be extended beyond
American borders – even if it means bombing foreigners into freedom,
as the "liberventionists"
desire.) But what does it mean when an individual finds himself
bound to a system of justice with which he does not agree? When,
further, free associations in which he is a member are forbidden
from assuming independence and asserting, even on a voluntary basis
among their own members, their own code of justice? For whenever
the sense of liberty and justice of a "lower" unit is
found to be in disagreement with federal or state authorities, it
is the more general power that prevails. This despite the fact that
surely there is less likelihood of a consensus on liberty and justice
emerging from a "community" of 290 million people, as
we have in the United States today, than among the small number
in a local community or city. What makes some libertarians think
that a heterogenous collection of 290 million strangers cares more
about the individual and his rights than a local community of his
friends, family and neighbors would? Not to mention that the less
consensus there is, the more the coercion there must be.
Greek
liberty, the freedom of the city that arises out of the freedom
of association and separation, is something of a lost tradition
today. It is not however a tradition alien to our own, simply one
which has been obscured by the rise of the universalistic and highly
centralized welfare state. An analogue to the Greek liberty described
above is to be found in the American traditions of federalism and
secession, and is related to the principles behind the Catholic
doctrine of subsidiarity and the federalism of the great Protestant
thinker Johannes
Althusius. The roots are to be found in Jerusalem as well as
Athens. Professor Chandras Kukathas of the University of New South
Wales has also explored related ideas in his essay "Two
Constructions of Libertarianism," in which he compares
a universalistic "Union of Liberty" with an heterogeneous
"Federation of Liberty" that preserves the freedom of
localities (for both better and worse). Recovery of these traditions,
and integrating them with modern, individual liberty, is a task
to be undertaken seriously by freedom-loving individuals and associations.
It is not less the task of those who want to conserve civilization,
given that civilization is itself the product of the city-association,
which is another lesson the Greeks can impart to us. However dormant
the old liberty may be today, we may expect that it is never lost
forever, given that man’s nature has not changed since the time
of Aristotle. He is still a "political" animal.
*The
phrases cited are from section 1252a
and 1253a
in the Aristotelian corpus. The translations are my own. Several
English translations of the Politics are available on-line,
include those by Rackham
and Jowett.
August
6, 2002
Daniel
McCarthy [send him mail]
is a graduate student in classics at Washington University in St.
Louis.
Copyright
© 2002 LewRockwell.com
Daniel
McCarthy Archives
|