Do We Need Another ‘New Deal’?
by
Sean Corrigan
You
know things are bad when people start writing about fixing
capitalism.
Since
the only thing that ever really goes wrong in the market is the
result of government interference and in that we include
the actions of the central bank – you might think that somebody,
somewhere, would make the connection that a lot less government
and a deal more honest money would be all the fix we needed.
But,
sadly, no!
Even
that bastion of Wall Street, CBS Marketwatch, got in on the act,
posing the question, Do we need a New, New Deal?
Given
that the last one managed to destroy the vestiges of the free republic
of the Founding Fathers – as well as keeping anything up to 11 million
people out selling apples on street corners for the best part of
nine long years – you’d think what we needed was more of a New Repeal,
not a New Deal.
Go
on! Be radical and advocate a root and branch reform to abolish
all the harmful agencies left over from the first New Deal – the
FDIC, Fannie Mae, the HUD, and all the other alphabet soup wealth
destroyers. Scrap all the egalitarian redistribution and welfarism,
all the regulations and restrictions, and re-institute a proper
gold standard, while closing the Fed and scrapping the unconstitutional
income withholding taxes.
Now
that would be not so much a New Deal as a Great Deal!
But,
no, that snooty old Lefty patrician, John Galbraith – unrepentant
at being on the wrong side of just about every economic argument
for the better part of a century – whined peevishly:
If
we simply wait for the private sector to recover from this rather
enormous shock to its system, we are going to be waiting for a long
time and a lot of people are going to be without jobs.
What
we found in the late 1990s is that we have nothing to fear from
full employment (Oh,Keynes, though art truly blessed!). Government
policy, working with the private sector, ought to be able to deliver
a high level of employment. We do have a huge number of unmet public
needs in this country and we could meet them.
Well,
sorry JK, but if they really were such pressing needs,
you could rest assured the private sector would already be meeting
them, that is unless the Fed and Congress were, between them, wastefully
misdirecting effort into Telecom bubbles, Nasdaqmania, the housing
boom and the War on Terra.
At
the very least, the federal government could come together in a
bipartisan way to fill the budget gap that's forcing state and local
governments to raise taxes, cut services or lay off workers,
Galbraith concluded.
If
you remember the caveat that bipartisan only means that
the Ins and the Outs in temporary agreement on the whys and wherefores
of keeping themselves in power are picking both your pockets at
the same time, this should occasion a shiver down the spine of any
right thinking individual.
But,
it gets worse!
While
decrying the current move for ever more regulations, the supposed
doyen of free markets, Milton Friedman – who, as Murray Rothbard
pointed out is only different to the rest in that he wants a mandatory
limit to central bank inflation – sprang to the Fed’s defence, saying
Greenspan did what he could to warn the public of 'irrational
exuberance' and, moreover, Sir Alan has been the most
effective chairman in the history of the Federal Reserve.
Milton
didn’t expand, unfortunately on quite what Greenspan was effective
at, but I’m sure it would have been at odds with what any less blinkered
observer might adduce.
Friedman
then went on to praise Greenspan's Fed for taking unusual pre-emptive
measures to cut rates even before the recession began. It's
a major explanation of why the recession was so mild.
Those
whom the Gods would destroy, they first drive mad, indeed!
Then,
the same article consulted another velvet-cushioned socialist, ex-Fed
Vice Chairman Alan Blinder, who told the online magazine that Greenspan
could have pricked the bubble by raising interest rates, but that
would have destroyed the economy.
Phew!
That was close! And we thought the astronomical loss of wealth and
the frustration of so many dreams which we’ve suffered thanks to
the Fed’s criminal laxity and Greenspan’s obsessive promotion of
the Cargo Cult of technology was almost too much to bear – but obviously,
it would have been a whole lot worse had he actually throttled back
on the monetary fuel at any stage.
Speculative
markets tend to go to extremes, Blinder said, ignoring the
critical role of money and credit in these. There's both a
dark side, which we are seeing now; and a bright side to those excesses.
Just
as well the Empire is about to strike back, O Jedi master.
Blinder,
however, could see the silver lining in this very non-golden cloud:
For
example, the great railroad speculation at the end of the 19th century
wound up with stocks falling to earth just as Internet stocks did
recently, but left us with lots of railroads.
Newt
Gingrich Remember him? The Revolutionary-turned-Neocon
hawk who was going to give us small government for oh, all
of about 100 days or so, back in the days of Clinton I cited
the same analogy.
More
people kept travelling by rail and fewer people travelled by stagecoach
and that happened without regard to the stock market.
As
usual, Ludwig von Mises had anticipated these arguments – and utterly
refuted them long before, in his magnum opus, Human Action
Advocates
of credit expansion have furthermore emphasized that some of the
malinvestments made in the boom later become profitable. These investments,
they say, were made too early, i.e., at a date when the state of
the supply of capital goods and the valuations of the consumers
did not yet allow their construction. However, the havoc caused
was not too bad, as these projects would have been executed anyway
at a later date.
It
may be admitted that this description is adequate with regard to
some instances of malinvestment induced by a boom. But nobody would
dare to assert that the statement is correct with regard to all
projects whose execution has been encouraged by the illusions created
by the easy money policy.
However
this may be, it cannot influence the consequences of the boom and
cannot undo or deaden the ensuing depression. The effects of the
malinvestment appear without regard to whether or not these malinvestments
will appear as sound investments at a later time under changed conditions.
When,
in 1845, a railroad was constructed in England which would not have
been constructed in the absence of credit expansion, conditions
in the following years were not affected by the prospect that, in
1870 or 1880, the capital goods required for its construction would
be available.
The
gain which later resulted from the fact that the railroad concerned
did nrot have to be built by a fresh expenditure of capital and
labour, was, in 1847, no compensation for the losses incurred by
its premature construction.
But
then, as Sir Al told us a week or two back, we can’t be expected
to learn from musty old books, can we, not when there
are so many exciting new technological developments to keep abreast
of... ?
September
14, 2002
Sean
Corrigan [send him mail]
writes from London on the financial markets, and edits the daily
Capital Letter
and the Website Capital
Insight.
Copyright
© 2002 LewRockwell.com
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Corrigan Archives
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