Attaining
Both Security and Liberty
by
Dmitry Chernikov
by Dmitry Chernikov
We are often
told that during an emergency we must sacrifice our liberties for
security. The first thing to realize is that this is not the real
trade-off. Security is inconvenient and costly, but it does not
take away one’s liberty. Security, like everything else, is an economic
good and is bought at the expense of pleasure or utility. Suppose
that you want to protect yourself from life’s little irritations
by wearing knight’s armor. You are still as free as before; you
are not constrained by any human being the way that you had not
been before you put on the chainmail. But you are probably less
comfortable than before and your wallet is thinner, because you
had to spend money to buy the armor.
Similarly,
locking your apartment door when you leave does not decrease your
liberty, but it does force you to spend time and effort on security.
Nor do usernames and passwords to computer resources and websites
make you less free; but they do entail the inconvenience of having
to remember them or to buy an application such as Password
Agent. Or, again, when a mountain climber checks his gear to
ensure that it is in working order, he is not exchanging any liberty
for safety.
In other words,
the money you spend on protection you cannot spend in other ways,
as a result of which your happiness is lower than it would be if
no dangers existed.
Increased spending
on security does not therefore limit liberty; only violence and
threat of violence can do so. Further, the government is supposed
to secure our very freedom. Thus greater security, according
to the government's own logic, should increase liberty. The
idea here is that, as senator Pat Roberts from Kansas recently
put it, "you have no civil liberties if you are dead."
So a curtailment of certain liberties will allegedly bring about
greater liberty overall. Government’s spying on us, for example,
though it may coerce or intimidate certain people, will make everybody
on the net freer, as will holding prisoners without trial, torture,
and so on.
One problem
with this argument is that the threats to our lives and property
can occur not only from foreign terrorists or domestic criminals
but from the US government, as well. People have lost sight of that.
Remember the great libertarian insight that governments can be likened
to organized gangs of thieves and murderers. It is true that it
certainly pays for them to control their rapacious instincts somewhat
in order to prevent overexploitation of the populace and thus killing
the proverbial goose. Then one can channel one's cunning mind and
iron willpower into ruling the world. The more wealth is out there,
in other words, the more there is to steal. Many so-called economists
concentrate precisely on instructing the government thieves on how
best to manage society. Hence, for example, the supply-siders’ emphasis
on the Laffer curve. The state, whose purpose is, again, the control
of violence in order to prevent overexploitation, should understand
precisely how this is to be done. This is a crucial part of the
"art of statecraft." By setting the taxes just right,
they can maximize revenues, and with a lot of money they can crush
or buy off other bases of authority. (In contrast, the rulers of
Third World nations are too savage. Like wild animals they
aim to destroy, not to control. God bless America where our war
leaders are wise and possess the ruthless self-control necessary
in their single-minded pursuit of power. But every so often they
need help. This is where "economists" come in.)
So the US federal
government presents its own threats to liberty. Its claims of promoting
greater total liberty – that the threats from one’s own government
are less than the threats from the "outside" – are just
that – unsubstantiated and, in my judgment, invalid. It is, on the
contrary, the biggest aggressor on person and property, both of
its own "subjects" and foreigners.
The second
difficulty is whether government protects us well. The key to high-quality
security is the ability to prohibit access to a resource or property
by unauthorized users and, once an authorized user is in the system,
to limit his access privileges appropriately. But – look! – this
is precisely what the regime of private property and freedom of
contract does for all members of society. The owners decide who
gets invited onto their properties and, for those who do, what they
are allowed to do with or on it. (Thus, for instance, it would be
best if only law-abiding citizens could freely carry guns into airplanes,
while potentially dangerous individuals would be prohibited from
doing so.) They have both the requisite incentives and knowledge
to protect themselves effectively. Governments have neither. To
continue with our example of airports, they are either politically
correct by being random and not homing in on the truly suspicious
fellows or are ridiculously paranoid when the security bureaucrats
target and sometimes imprison those who clearly present no risk.
Further, since security is an economic good, it is best if each
individual or company could decide for oneself what kind of protection
and how much of it to purchase. Yet here the government imposes
uniformity without a good reason. And it is far from clear if these
uniform security measures are any good anyway.
Another illustration
might be the FDA. This monopoly consumer protection agency is at
the same time too conservative in not allowing beneficial drugs
and technologies to reach the market quickly enough (thereby being
complicit in the deaths of thousands – what is known as "statistical
murder"), and very much remiss in its duties to monitor the
well-established companies (which it essentially protects against
the newcomers) for outrageous claims. Fully privatized consumer
protection would do its job vastly better. The same thing is true
for most other agencies. Whether the costs of their actions are
explicit, as in the death toll and destruction in wars, or unseen
as in the economic improvement that does not take place because
of taxation, regulations, business cycles, and so on, the government’s
security provision is less than optimal.
With privately
provided security there would be competition among firms specializing
in protection. Companies would struggle to differentiate themselves
from the rest in the industry by offering better quality of safety
and security and lower prices. Those that failed to serve their
customers would be eliminated, unlike the government for which the
only response to failure is an increase in funding to the offending
agency. Innovation would be the rule not the exception. Thus, for
instance, security is often bought through insurance. Insurance
companies would insist that (say) airlines invest into security
measures in order to lower their premiums. And security would be
married to courtesy, such that customers are inconvenienced as little
as possible. Consumers, not bureaucrats, would rule.
In
sum, then, (1) security and liberty are perfectly compatible with
each other; (2) the state is a danger in its own right; and (3)
it is only minimally competent as a provider of protection.
July
29, 2006
Dmitry
Chernikov [send him
mail] is a graduate student in philosophy at Kent State University.
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© 2006 LewRockwell.com
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