Signs Of Intelligenceby
Dmitry Chernikov
The world, though containing things, contains also signs of things. If we don’t have the thing itself, often we have to be content with its sign. There are in this world traces and signs of the workings of nature, human art, the divine, and even the demonic. One of the most interesting scientific advances in the past few years has been the emerging science of detecting signs of intelligence in nature; in particular, in biological organisms. The mainstream view is that the only causal agents in the natural world are chance and necessity. This naturalistic position is being challenged by the burgeoning intelligent design movement which says that the most probable explanation for the complexity and information-richness of the cellular molecular machines, as well as of individual organs, is that they were designed by an intelligent agent. Although the design argument for the existence of God is ancient, and detection of design is a well-established practice in forensics, archeology, cryptography, the SETI program, and the like, it is only recently that a rigorous mathematical apparatus for detecting design has been developed. And it is also novel (and controversial) that detection of design has been applied to biological systems. In brief, the design argument for the existence of God tries to deduce the existence and properties of the divine intelligence. The design inference, on the other hand, is a general algorithm for detecting the effects of intelligent causes without any presuppositions as to what kind of causes they are. While Darwinism in effect rules out an intelligent cause behind biological organisms a priori, ID neither requires it nor eliminates it from consideration in this way. Rather, it lets the evidence of biology decide whether the design inference in any given case is fitting. We can describe the Darwinian problem as follows: there is a contradiction between its contention that science cannot test the proposition that biological features are designed and its explanation of the appearance of design in biology not as actual design but as the product of natural selection and random variation. If it is able to claim that the design of all biological structures is only apparent, then it must do so according to some set of rules. The correctness of Darwinism therefore depends on the existence of a reliable way of detecting design. It must at once be understood that intelligent design does not mean "optimal design" or "perfect design." Design that is "intelligent" can mean simply the outcome of actions of an intelligent agent, even one who does not act with perfect acumen or whose purpose it is, for one reason or another, to design an imperfect (from some point of view) object. (Intelligent design must also be distinguished from merely apparent design; that is, a seemingly intelligently designed system that in fact came into being thanks to chance or necessity.) It turns out that there really is no such thing as perfect design. All systems require a kind of constrained optimization, in which a compromise is made between the various desired features. Without knowing the intentions of the designer it is impossible to know whether the compromise chosen is in any way the "right" one. Of course, the optimality of biological systems is an interesting question in itself and one that is a legitimate object of study for design theorists. And in fact the critique of ID from point of view of the alleged suboptimality of design has not been due to a great deal of research done on creatures to show that they are suboptimal. The chief stumbling point for the Darwinists is the theological problem of evil. Why would a good God design us "imperfectly"? That is obviously a very important problem, and philosophy and theology have ways of dealing with it (e.g., "do not give in to evil, but proceed ever more boldly against it"), but it is not a scientific problem. As William Dembski points out, "A torture chamber replete with implements of torture is designed, and the evil of its designer does nothing to undercut the torture chamber’s design. The existence of design is distinct from the morality, esthetics, goodness, optimality, or perfection of design" (Dembski 2002, 10). It is also important that ID studies only the effects of intelligence rather than the intelligence itself. Who the designer is is only one of the many questions that are asked within the design-theoretic research program, and science as such can simply ignore the identity of the designer, as well as metaphysical questions such as "Who designed the designer?" As Michael Behe writes, "the example of the Big Bang theory shows that scientific theories with supernatural ramifications can be quite fruitful" (Behe 2003, 251). In other words, we need not be afraid that the supernatural will be used frequently to explain other things. All such explanations will have to be made on a case-by-case basis. And at any rate, no amount of evidence can compel belief in God. A determined atheist can always find an escape hatch. Further, it is not true that ID theorists propose that Darwinian evolution is to be replaced with ID altogether. For in nature the effects of intelligence are mixed with the effects of the natural laws. Design may not have occurred recently; thus natural forces could have acted on creatures for a long time and degraded design such that organisms exhibit signs of both design and evolution, as well as natural "wear and tear" which is evidence for age. Not all biological systems show evidence for design; indeed, the cell contains systems that span the range from obviously designed to no apparent design. In fact, ID is just one branch of the great science which can be termed "the theory of grace." Unreconstructed and unaided nature is just "not enough." Grace from an intelligent being is needed to direct and form natural objects. This science, when fully elaborated (if such a thing is possible), would answer the questions of when, where, how, and for what purposes grace was imparted into nature. ID’s very modest claims is that someone, perhaps even the Author of nature, has uplifted nature in times past in certain specific ways. Gene Callahan objects to this science by saying that "The picture that arises is of God sporadically entering into biological evolution to tinker with it – a picture I find unattractive." But all grace is given "sporadically" at the time and in the manner of God’s own choosing. Why single out engineering improvements in creatures as "unattractive"? (And since when is beauty a transcendental that is perfectly convertible with truth?) How is design detected? It is certainly possible that every natural system can be explained in terms of purely natural causes. But is it really so? Is there a way to tell whether a system is or is not designed? ID proponents think that there is. In general, three properties need to hold for a system in order to for design to be inferred from it: contingency, complexity, and specificity. Contingency means that the object did not necessarily have to come into being, that is was one of several possibilities and was not the result of automatic and therefore unintelligent process. Complexity means that the system is not so simple as to admit an explanation of coming into being by chance. Specificity is the property that demands that an object conforms to a pattern that signals an intelligent cause. An event is contingent if it is not due to natural laws. A snowstorm is purely the result of natural laws governing the formation of snowflakes, gravity, and weather in general. But the arrangement of books on my bookshelf is irreducible to the laws of physics that permit them to stand in the order in which they are put. Similarly, the number resulting from a spin of a fair roulette wheel is due to both necessity and chance. The number of apples I have on my dinner table, on the contrary, cannot be accounted for by any natural forces. Complexity is necessary if an object is to qualify for design inference, because it is not improbable that a simple system could have come into being by chance. Suppose that we are presented with a sequence 0, 1, 1, 2, 3. These are the first five Fibonacci numbers. Suppose that we want to know if they are in fact meant to be the beginning of a Fibonacci sequence. Can we be sure? The answer is no, because the system is not complex enough. If we are receiving these numbers, they could simply be noise. They could be five random numbers that just happened to be arranged in a meaningful pattern but are in fact nothing of the sort. If, however, we have a row of one hundred Fibonacci numbers, then the probability of the sequence being random is negligible. Of course, if we have a computer program generate random sequences for a very long time, then the probability of a desirable sequence occurring increases. Also, if many sequences are equally suitable, then the probability of at least one such sequence being printed out by the program increases still. For a chance hypothesis to hold, then, this total probability must not be too low. Dembski further defines what he calls a "universal probability bound," which he calculates to be 1 in 10150 or the Planck time × the number of atoms in the universe × the age of the universe in seconds. The idea is that "any specification of an event within the known physical universe requires at least one elementary particle to specify it and that such specifications cannot be generated any faster than the Planck time… Thus any specified event of probability less than 1 in 10150 will remain improbable even after all conceivable probabilistic resources from the observable universe have been factored in" (Dembski 2004, 85). Specificity demands that a system conform to a meaningful and conditionally independent pattern that suggests an intelligence behind it. Suppose that we toss a coin 1,000 times. The outcome, whatever it is, will be wildly improbable but no one will be deceived into calling it designed. This is because the pattern needs to be specified before examining the system; the pattern must not be imposed after the fact. Further, the simpler the pattern (specificational complexity), the more reliable the design inference is. If all 1,000 coin tosses turn out to be heads, then it is clear that this outcome was designed beforehand.
Specified complexity lies on the boundary between order and chaos (Dembski 2004, 84). Pure order is completely orderly but predictable; pure chaos is unpredictable but completely disorderly. Thus only on the boundary do interesting patterns arise. Given specified complexity, further, we arrive at Dembski’s "explanatory filter." An event would have to be contingent, complex, and specified in order for a design inference to be plausible. How reliable is this complexity-specification criterion? Does it permit either false positives or false negatives? It turns out that because intelligent agents can sometimes mimic the behavior of natural causes, the explanatory filter does allow false negatives. That means that it sometimes fails to detect design where design is actually present. This is especially so in cases where the designer deliberately seeks to conceal himself. However, the complexity-specification criterion will not result in false positives. In other words, it is a sufficient principle for detecting design though not a necessary one. It is not appropriate for eliminating design but only for detecting it. "Indeed, to attribute specified complexity to something is to say that the specification to which it conforms corresponds to an event that is vastly improbable with respect to all material mechanisms that might give rise to an event. So take your pick – treat the item in question as inexplicable in terms of all material mechanisms, or treat it as designed. But since design is uniformly associated with specified complexity when the underlying causal story is known, induction counsels attributing design in cases where the underlying causal story is not known" (Dembski 2004, 96). We can know that an object is designed, even if we have never seen it being designed or built. It is entirely reasonable to conclude from seeing a watch that the watch has an intelligent maker. Similarly, because both watches and biological organisms exhibit specified complexity and high information content, we deduce that the latter, too, are designed by an intelligence, as there has never been a case of specified complexity being created by blind material mechanisms. The key here is to have the deduction arise from the shared properties. Now but what of the argument that we must have seen the designer at work before concluding that something is designed? Here we can say that the ability to make design inferences is "hard-wired" in us. Our ability to recognize signs of intelligence through its effects s not due to experience but is a part of our very rationality. At any rate, "Modern biochemistry routinely designs biochemical systems… Therefore we do have experience in observing the intelligent design of components of life" (Behe 2003, 219). Let us see how specified complexity applies to biology. Neo-Darwinism, established as orthodoxy in mid-20th century did not know about biochemistry. Now that the secrets of the cell are being unraveled, Darwinism is confronted with powerful evidence for which it cannot account, at least in its present form. Michael Behe, in his Darwin’s Black Box (by which he means a cell), proposes a derivative criterion: irreducible complexity.
It is clear that IC presents enormous difficulties for Darwinism. For no direct evolutionary pathway is possible, and purely random evolution is highly improbable. What’s more, "In order to be a candidate for natural selection a system must have minimal function: the ability to accomplish a task in physically realistic circumstances" (Behe 2003, 45). This is an additional requirement to IC, which merely lists the parts that are jointly necessary for any function, even that below minimal. Minimal function demands that, even if all the parts are present, they be such as to 1. enable the molecular machine to do its job with at least minimal competence; 2. make the machine be not less efficient than can be achieved with simpler means. The proper function is one that requires "the greatest amount of the system's internal complexity. … The function of a system is determined from the system's internal logic: the function is not necessarily the same thing as the purpose to which the designer wished to apply the system" (Behe 2003, 196). The need for minimal function makes unintelligent evolution of molecular machines even more implausible. Behe considers three types of systems that warrant a design inference. 1. An IC system whose parts act all at the same time ("the components simultaneously exert force against each other"); 2. an IC system that acts like a cascade; i.e., "it is composed of separate pieces each acting in turn, one after the other, to accomplish its function"; 3. non-IC systems that require at least that many improbable and unrelated events happen in a precise order one after another. (Behe's analogy is a groundhog trying to cross a heavily trafficked 800-lane highway with its eyes closed: possible but come on.) The examples Behe gives of the first type system are the cilium, a structure on the backs of some bacteria that allows them to swim, and the antibody defense. The examples of the second type system are the blood-clotting cascade and garbage collection within a cell. And the example of the third type system is protein assembly. But there are many other IC systems. Behe talks about the outward manifestations of life within a cell: "synthesis, degradation, energy generation, replication, maintenance of cell architecture, mobility, regulation, repair, communication – …and each function itself requires the interaction of numerous parts" (Behe 2003, 46). "Other examples of irreducible complexity abound, including aspects of DNA replication, electron transport, telomere synthesis, photosynthesis, transcription regulation, and more" (Behe 2003, 160). Behe continues: "Vesicular transport is a mind-boggling process, no less complex than the completely automated delivery of vaccine from a storage area to a clinic a thousand miles away" (Behe 2003, 115). The interesting thing to note is that there is, of course, no such thing as a "completely automated delivery of vaccine from a storage area to a clinic a thousand miles away." Such a system is utterly beyond the power of modern engineering. Yet there it is, working very well on the molecular level. Even if such a system could be built (something that I sincerely doubt; people do not seem to grasp the enormous difficulties with AI), it would surely function differently than the cellular mechanism. Is it reasonable to believe that natural undirected forces could create machines that human intelligence cannot now and never may be able to duplicate? Also relevant here is the difference between conceptual and physical precursors. Thus a bicycle is a conceptual precursor of a motorcycle, but not a physical one. "No motorcycle in history, not even the first, was made simply by modifying a bicycle in a stepwise fashion." It is possible to modify one to get the other, but that only shows us that humans can build IC systems. "To be a precursor in Darwin's sense we must show that a motorcycle can be built from ‘numerous, successive, slight modifications’ to a bicycle" (Behe 2003, 43). Behe then tries to "evolve" one from the other and concludes that it can't be done. "A rock and a gun can both be used for defense, but a rock cannot be turned into a gun by a series of small steps. … In Darwinian evolution, only physical precursors count" (Behe 2003, 118). Thus, for example, skin, although an important part of the body's defense, is not a physical precursor of the immune system. What about indirect pathways to IC systems? The idea is that evolution can adapt existing systems used for other purposes for novel functions. Then an evolutionary biologist can argue that some future research can discover the processes that naturally led to the emergence of complex biological systems. Does it follow that ID theorists must end up blaming evolutionary biologists for ignoring evidence for design, while evolutionary biologists must end up blaming the ID folks for not sufficiently trusting their naturalistic procedures? The answer is no. For, first, a scientist ought to evaluate current evidence rather than wait in joyful hope for some future revelation. If the evidence points to design, then that’s what the conclusion should be. The design inference is not an argument from ignorance. It is an inference to best explanation. Unknown undirected material mechanisms are ruled out because intelligent causes are reliably correlated with specified complexity. It would be absurd to try to find the natural laws according to which the computer I am writing on came into being. It would be just as absurd to keep on searching for natural explanation of biological systems, especially given that up until now no such explanations have been found despite the admirable determination of so many evolutionists. Second, "there is now mounting evidence of biological systems for which any slight modification does not merely destroy the system’s existing function but also destroys the possibility of any function of the system whatsoever" (Dembski 2004, 113). Further, the complexity of the cilium and many other systems is "enormously greater" than is described by Behe. There are "dozens or even hundreds of precisely tailored parts. … All the reasons for such complexity are not yet clear and await further experimental investigation. … New research on the roles of the auxiliary proteins cannot simplify the irreducibly complex system. The intransigence of the problem cannot be alleviated; it will only get worse" (Behe 2003, 72ff). Finally, as Behe concludes, "There has never been a meeting, or a book, or a paper on details of the evolution of complex biochemical systems." Molecular evolution is based neither on experiment nor on scientific authority. "In effect, the theory of Darwinian molecular evolution has not published, and so it should perish" (Behe 2003, 179). The global failure of evolutionists to come up with detailed testable step-by-step proposals of how creatures evolved signals that design theory is here to stay. Further, organisms are alive and not like machines, even though their mechanical aspect is very important. Biological organisms have souls of varying perfection (nutritive, sensitive, emotional, intellectual, etc.) We can say that "everything loves itself with a love that holds it together." The soul then at the very least unifies the body, and the unity of a life form is greater than that of any machine, such that the former is more coordinated, in the sense that all of its parts, though all different and unique, work harmoniously as one. (This is just one difference; I'm sure there are others, such as that even a cell strives for its own happiness, rather than, like a machine, being only a tool of man.) ID focuses on biochemical machines because they are scientifically tractable and sufficient for a design inference. Still, whatever the soul actually is, it is a mistake to neglect it. Biology is irreducible to chemistry or physics. Perhaps design can be inferred from that, as well. How is the design actualized? In my previous article I mentioned that the designer need not move particles of matter or impart energy into them but can inform matter or produce novel information within the universe. ID seeks to answer the question "At what point do signs of intelligence become evident?" It is not strictly speaking concerned with when, where, and how the designing intelligence intervened, if at all, into the course of history. Once again Gene Callahan objects that God, given His infinite power, could have designed the world in such a way that unintelligent evolution could create all the diverse species on earth. Two questions immediately arise: (1) Could He? and (2) Did He? Let us go back to grace bestowed on men and ask whether God could have created man in such a way that he by his own natural powers could merit eternal life or see the essence of God. Aquinas, for example, says no to both. Why then assume that God could create nature that was self-sufficient and full of such remarkable creative powers? Even God cannot do the impossible. But suppose that God could create such a nature. The design theorists claim precisely that He did not! Callahan is further concerned with the meaning of the design being "front-loaded" into the universe from the beginning. He writes: "But then, it seems to me, Darwinism would offer a satisfactory account of everything that has happened since the Big Bang… and ID would be relevant only in explaining evolution’s kickoff." But by "front-loading" I understand Dembski to mean that grace is given to nature to perfect it, as it were, "automatically" and in such a way that its desired consequences might not (perhaps) be apparent for aeons. Thus the time and manner of inventively sublating biological systems would be foreordained with the Big Bang. A common criticism of ID is that it is not testable. But isn’t it? Let us consider four aspects of testability: falsifiability, confirmation, predictability, and explanatory power (Dembski 2004, 280). As for falsifiability, the idea here is that a good scientific theory should be refutable in principle (that is, there must be a test such that if it is applied to the theory, must be able to prove it wrong), but resist actual refutation in practice. The greater the number of tests to which a theory has been subjected and successfully escaped, the more solid the theory is. ID is falsifiable, because it is a possibility that it can be demonstrated that purely material mechanisms, such as variation and natural selection, are responsible for the specified complexity, elegance, and tight integration of multiple parts of biological systems. Darwinism, on the other hand, is not so falsifiable, as evolutionary biologists can always claim that some unknown physical forces were responsible for the diversity of creatures and their information-rich systems. No matter how much evidence we present against the theory, it is saved from being refuted by an appeal to ignorance. Confirmation demands positive evidence for a theory. All that Darwinism has going for it are examples such as finch beak variations and the development of antibiotic resistance in bacteria. The extrapolation from these to how finches and bacteria themselves actually came into being is wholly unwarranted. On the contrary, the evidence for design is everywhere. There are numerous systems exhibiting specified complexity in nature. It is true, we don’t know how they got there. But that they were designed we know with a good deal of certainty. Darwinism makes no predictions. "A species will either die out or it will not die out" is not a prediction but a logical truth that can be reasoned without any reference to the particulars of Darwinism. But that is the best that Darwinism can do. It cannot even do "retrodictions," by which a theory accounts for past events. The fossil record, for example, gives evidence for the "Cambrian explosion" of new species during as little as 10 million years. Yet Darwin himself thought that evolution must take much more time. In general, Darwinism says nothing about which fossils would be compatible with evolution. Once again, the crucial problem with the established theory is that it cannot account for specified complexity, and the fossil record says nothing about that. It is therefore perfectly compatible with both Darwinism and design. The last component of testability is explanatory power. It is the claims of the design theorists that ID can explain more data than non-teleological theories such as Darwinism. ID does not, like its competitor, exclude intelligent causes in favor of pure chance and necessity due to metaphysical presuppositions. It asks scientists to go where the evidence leads rather than postulate neat little boxes into which to place reality. There are more things in heaven and earth, we may say, than are dreamt of in the Darwinian philosophy. Finally, the most ridiculous consequence of Darwinism is what I call evolutionary imperialism. As David Berlinski writes,
Facts such as that human intelligence is suited for the contemplation of the truth and judgment of good and evil, or that charity is the mother of all virtues, or that human beings actually seek happiness rather then vast numbers of children, or that it is not, contrary to Richard Dawkins, in the interest of the mother that her children be adopted, are also creatively "explained" by Darwinism as genes using us somehow to enhance their survival and reproduction. Still, if Darwinism is true, evolutionary imperialism or something very much like it has to be correct, despite the seeming absurdities that it perpetuates about our species. A theological aside. Nature is full of structures that just scream "Design!" These constitute signs of intelligence. They are effects of the handiwork of a very powerful and wise being who made the whole world work as a (global) unity in variety and variety in (local) unities. They confirm St. Paul’s observation that "Ever since the creation of the world, his invisible attributes of eternal power and divinity have been able to be understood and perceived in what he has made." (Rom 1:20) Now none of this should be taken to mean that the signs of (divine) intelligence that ID has picked up on are the only such signs in nature. On the contrary, there are many arguments for the existence of God. For example, Peter Kreeft’s Handbook of Christian Apologetics lists twenty such arguments. Most of them are based on some aspect of the natural world. As St. Thomas writes, "we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion" (ST, I, 13, 1). (Once again, that ID has theological implication is no obstacle to its scientific status.) To take the Peirce’s model of the sign, we find in the world icons, since all beings resemble God and try to imitate Him; indexes, since God is the efficient cause of the world; and symbols in the names we use to speak of God. We encounter even signs of the Trinity, though we cannot know this doctrine by natural reason. (The idea is that although signs of the Trinity exist in human beings as Augustine supposed, multiple explanations can account for these signs. It is only when the nature of the Trinity is revealed to us that we can settle on the right explanation.)
References
January 20, 2006 Dmitry Chernikov [send him mail] is a graduate student in philosophy at Kent State University. Copyright © 2006 LewRockwell.com |
Finally,
design theorists should not worry about the hostility of the mainstream
evolutionists to their work. All new radical ideas are treated in
this way by the orthodoxy. For them it is about power, not truth.
But truth, whatever it turns out to be, will win out in the end.