Picture
yourself wandering into a hall within which a large, all-male
crowd has assembled, each man present anxious to argue his position
on the subject of wife beating. Some attendees defend their
right to beat their spouse whenever she has been annoying. Others
regard that stance as too permissive, asserting that wives should
only be assaulted over more important matters such as, for example,
family finances. Yet a third faction holds that spousal abuse
is only justified in the most vital cases and only if no less
onerous means can guarantee the desirable outcome: for instance,
when one’s wife will not contribute as much as one believes
she ought to the family’s security.
You find
the proceedings quite disturbing, as you consider assaulting
any other person to be immoral, even if it appears to be the
only way to achieve some important and otherwise desirable end.
Violence directed at another, you hold, is only just in self-defense,
and then only to the extent necessary to thwart one’s assailant.
Imagine
your surprise if the members of the group that advocates wife
beating only in extreme circumstances declares that they are
your natural allies, proclaiming that the difference between
your position and theirs is a trifling matter when contrasted
with the large gap separating the minimalist beaters from those
more enthusiastic about the practice.
Surely,
you would demur, noting that what the minimalists have in common
with the rest of the assembly, the willingness to assault one’s
spouse if the end it promotes is seen as being sufficiently
valuable, is of far more significance than is the fact that
the amount of actual beating in which the minimalists engage
(say, five beatings a year) is closer to your total (zero) than
it is to that of the most aggressive abusers (who might launch
an assault per day).
The above
situation is analogous to the one I find myself in when, for
example, I am at a conference and I hear a minarchist libertarian
asserting that minarchists and anarchists are separated by a
narrow divide that is almost undetectable if one takes a bird’s-eye
perspective on the whole gamut of political positions currently
being forwarded, saying, for example: "Once we reduce the
scope of the state to providing defense and protecting life
and property, then we minarchists and you anarchists will have
plenty of time to argue about getting rid of the state completely."
While I
am perfectly willing to cooperate with anyone who shares a political
objective with me, I believe the above conception, that minarchists
and anarchists are practically indistinguishable aside from
a minor and practically irrelevant disagreement is profoundly
mistaken. In fact, when it comes to what I regard as the most
vital political question of them all, the gulf between minarchists
and anarchists is immense, whereas that separating minarchists
and, say, Stalinists is relatively small: Anarchists reject
the notion that it is permissible to employ violence against
someone who has not themselves committed an act of aggression,
no matter how much one wants to get that innocent person to
cooperate in forwarding one’s desired ends, and no matter how
important one believes that end to be. Minarchists, to the contrary,
defend their right to initiate aggression in any circumstance
where they see the use of coercion as being really, really
useful. The difference between minarchists and totalitarians
is one of degree: the totalitarian just sees many more of his
political goals as being important enough to justify threatening
innocent but recalcitrant people into contributing to their
achievement than does the minimal-state libertarian. A socialist
may argue that providing every citizen with free medical care
is so valuable a project that it calls for the use of the State’s
unequaled power to coerce cooperation, while the minarchist
finds no end shy of the provision of defense against non-state
or foreign-state aggressors prompts him to call for compelling
others to support his aims.
Nevertheless,
both of them agree that, if one regards the achievement of some
goal as being sufficiently worthwhile, then it is acceptable
to initiate violence against those of one’s fellow citizens
who don’t embrace it voluntarily, and even against those who
merely value it less highly than oneself. (That the latter is
true can be seen by considering that, even if two people agree
that the State should maintain an army to defend against possible
invasion, they still may differ about how much wealth to devote
to that end. Then the one who supports greater military expenditures
must be willing to employ force against the other fellow simply
to compel him to increase his contribution beyond the level
he would freely choose, absent any threat.)
Nothing
I’ve said above implies that a minarchist, or anyone else who
supports the existence of the State, is therefore necessarily
a bad person. Rather, I think that for the most part probably
they are basically quite decent people who simply happen to
hold a mistaken idea. Indeed, some particular anarchist may
be in every other respect an all-together more miserable instance
of a human being than is some particular statist, despite the
fact that the former happens to be right on the one issue of
the State’s right to exist.
Nevertheless,
I see the anarchist/statist distinction as the most fundamental
political divide. Once one accepts the notion that initiating
aggression is OK under some circumstances, then the case for
human liberty has been abandoned, and all that remains is to
argue over what degree of enslavement is acceptable. Having
ventured down that road, minarchist libertarians should not
be surprised at the difficulties they encounter in resisting
the expansion of their night-watchman state.