The recent
revelations of serious misbehavior on the part of American personnel
manning the Abu Ghraib prison have prompted a wide range of
reactions. Some, such as Rush Limbaugh's equating
the abuses to a "fraternity prank," have served chiefly
to place the person forwarding them beyond the scope of civilized
discourse. (Even some of the participants in the National
Review Online blog, which is one of the most hawkish forums
around, were disturbed by Rush's remarks.)
Aside from
such outlandish views, my sense without having performed
any sort of systematic survey, I admit is that the reaction
of most Americans can be placed into one of three main currents
of opinion. The first of them is characterized by President
Bush's statement that, while the prison photos show actions
that are inexcusable, the root of the problem is simply "a few
bad apples" in the US military. That handful of soldiers will
be punished therefore, the problem has been addressed and
the subject should be dropped, and will be dropped by
everyone except the leftists determined to undermine the morale
of our troops and the determination of the American public.
I think
the above view is untenable, adopted from either naïveté or
political expediency. The military is not a place abounding
in privacy or opportunities to "do one's own thing." Even if
only seven Americans at Abu Ghraib directly took part in the
abuse of prisoners, it still would be nearly inevitable that
almost all of the personnel at the site would have become aware
of it. I don't know enough details about what occurred to decide
if higher-ranking individuals explicitly ordered the grunts
to "soften up" the prisoners for interrogation (as contended
by Sy Hersh, among others), implicitly encouraged them to
do so with a "wink and a nudge," or merely chose to tolerate
the abuses. But it is just not believable that only seven American
soldiers had any idea of what was going on.
Often
accompanying the "few bad apples" explanation, appearing in
both administration statements and pundits' commentary, is the
notion that the Abu Ghraib crimes should not be taken too seriously
because other governments have presided over even worse violations
of prisoners' rights. While it is true that the ugliness we
have seen revealed from Abu Ghraib pales next to the horrors
of the Holocaust or the Soviet Gulag, treating it as a minor
faux pas based on such comparisons plumbs the depths of moral
relativism, as sagely noted
by Arthur Silber.
A second
broad strain of reaction contends that the crimes committed
at Abu Ghraib are just the sort of thing we should expect from
Americans. Interestingly, it appears in both a left-wing and
a right-wing variety. From the left, we can find voices claiming
that, after all, American society is consumed by greed, steered
by the whims of heartless capitalists, permeated by racism and
jingoism, and imperialist to the core. We should expect that
the peons serving in the military of such a power will stomp
their jackboots into the face of sub-human foreigners if given
half a chance. From the right, others shout that modern America
is a society consumed by lust and awash in pornography, its
traditional values battered by feminists, homosexuals, and perverts
of all stripes. Of course, they say, today's American soldiers
will indulge in sadomasochistic orgies if given half a chance.
But I don't
believe that the wellspring of the Abu Ghraib crimes was some
uniquely American moral flaw. I have met, worked with, and lived
with many people from many countries during my life. Nothing
I have experienced has led me to believe that any nation has
any special propensity to produce an extraordinary proportion
of good or evil people. If I see Americans behaving in an especially
repugnant fashion, I look to the circumstances in which they
have found themselves, rather than to some uniquely "American"
sort of evil.
Attempting
to explain how a person's actions reflect his situation, as
he perceives it to be, in no way implies that his evil deeds
should be excused because he was faced with difficult
circumstances. There are individuals who, even in the most torturous
situation imaginable, will resist the urge to do wrong, just
as there are individuals who will succumb to a mere whiff of
temptation. Nevertheless, an analysis of various situations
into typical categories, based on the presence or absence of
certain factors deemed to be especially salient, may help to
explain why people in general are more likely to behave
badly in some situations than they are in others.
And, of
course, the culture of a specific wrongdoer might strongly influence
the particular form in which his wrongdoing appears. Since that
is so, it is possible that proponents of the "America is to
blame" view might be pointing to cultural factors helping
to shape that form, even while being mistaken in regarding them
as the "cause" of Abu Ghraib.
But let's
move on to the last grouping of reactions composing my tripartite
division, characterized by views that, on the whole, I find
more thoughtful and nuanced than the views typifying the other
two groups. These folk acknowledge that the crimes committed
by Americans at Abu Ghraib were not merely a matter of some
young soldiers, under stress and far from home, "blowing off
some steam." They admit that the abuses could not have occurred
without those in command being guilty, at the very least, of
egregious neglect of their fundamental responsibilities. They
are even willing to entertain the notion that a pervasive disregard
for the rights of suspected terrorists, emanating from the very
top of our current administration, led low-level personnel to
believe that abusing such suspects was approved and expected.
Their proposed
remedy, besides appropriate punishment for anyone proven to
bear significant responsibility for the crimes that took place
at Abu Ghraib, is some serious "soul searching" on the part
of the American military, policy makers, and citizens in general.
Somehow, as a nation, we appear to have stumbled into a moral
swamp. Perhaps if we can find our proper course again, we can
avoid such barbarism in the future.
While the
"soul searchers" are engaging the revelations from Abu Ghraib
more intelligently than the people who have adopted either of
the other two viewpoints described above, I contend that they
are not addressing a fundamental aspect of the abuses, namely,
the institutional setting in which they took place. The criminals
working at that prison were there at the behest of a State.
I contend that the essential nature of the State itself, which
lies at the core of any state across all times and places, is
a crucial element in understanding what went on at that prison.
Individual
states undertake a wide variety of different tasks, and garner
support from various factions within their jurisdiction for
a wide variety of different reasons. But what is it that makes
every one of them a state, and sets them apart from all of the
other social institutions that are not states? To help answer
that question, I will suggest that the products of human action
generally have a proper function. A style of building,
a type of tool or machine, an institutional form, a custom,
a science, or an artistic genre may be employed to serve a variety
of needs: for example, a hammer can be used, quite successfully,
as a paperweight. But whether the product was intentionally
created or arose as the unintended consequence of actions aiming
at some other end, there is usually some role in human life
for which it is particularly suited. In the case of the hammer,
although it can serve as a paperweight, ballast in a ship, or
a meat tenderizer, its proper function is to drive nails into
wood.
So what
is the role for which the State is uniquely suited, which sets
states apart from non-states? A variety of answers have been
suggested at various times. Plato held that the
State exists to bring out the best in human nature. Aristotle
held
a similar view, although the two philosophers differed sharply
as to what sort of state would best achieve that goal. Hobbes
contended that the rationale for the State's existence was that
without it, all humans would be in a perpetual state of war
with each other, even if for some time they were not actively
doing battle. More optimistic than Hobbes, Locke
thought that social cooperation could occur in the "state
of nature," but that the State would enhance "natural" society
by providing a stable body of law, by designating official,
impartial judges to resolve disputes, and by giving the law
teeth through its overwhelming preponderance of force compared
to any individual miscreant. The American Declaration
of Independence claimed that "Governments are instituted
among Men" to secure "certain unalienable Rights" possessed
by every human being, including the rights to "Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness." More recently, political philosophers
such as John
Rawls have agreed with the American founders that the State's
primary purpose is to protect the rights of its citizens, while
significantly expanding the set of rights in question by including,
for example, a right to a particular, minimum level of material
well being.
Although
a thorough examination of even one of the above ideas could
fill a book, I will now offer my one paragraph survey of the
history of political philosophy, indicating briefly why I think
each of them misses the mark. Far from promoting human virtue,
the State, and especially holding the reins of government power,
has tended to bring out the worst in people, as they descend
to lobbying for their special interests, bullying their neighbors
into acceding to their will through politics, and employing
whatever political power they hold to satisfy their personal
desires. Far from bringing peace to human society, states have
engaged in almost ceaseless warfare. Rather than protecting
the rights of their citizens, states have been the foremost
violators of those rights.
Furthermore,
each of the roles listed above has been filled successfully
by institutions other than the State. Philosophers and spiritual
leaders have had better luck promoting human virtue than have
government officials. Peace has more often come about when the
citizens of warring states became so war weary that their governments
could no longer persuade or compel sufficient numbers of them
to fight. Rights have done far better by individuals and private
organizations who resisted the power of the State than they
have by governments. Even the social safety net beloved by modern
political thinkers has been provided successfully by non-governmental
means.
What role,
then, can the State fill better than any alternative institution?
I believe it is the following: Humans have hit upon no social
arrangement that is superior to the State as a means by which
a powerful elite can routinely and systematically plunder the
rest of their society in order to acquire wealth and status
for themselves. Furthermore, the continued existence of any
particular state ultimately depends on how well it performs
that function, since it is the flow of personal benefits it
directs to those who hold power that keeps them at work enhancing
the scope of government and developing and promoting ideologies
that justify the existence of the State.
A defender
of the State might dispute my analysis of its proper function
in any number of ways, many of which I may not have considered
yet. But three likely objections spring immediately to my mind,
so, in keeping with America's new doctrine of preemptive strikes,
I will attempt to answer them before they have even been put
forward. I do so by noting that each objection relies on pointing
out the falsehood of some notion that is actually not implied
by my thesis:
1) My suggestion
does not imply that there aren't many decent, honest people
working for the State. They believe that the essence of the
State consists in its unique ability to achieve some laudable
goal, for example, one of the ones listed above. They are honest,
but wrong: all of those goals can be achieved better without
a State. The one thing that the State alone can best achieve
is the systematic, organized exploitation of the mass of people
in a society for the benefit of an elite class controlling the
reigns of state power. And it is the efforts of the beneficiaries
of that activity that sustains its existence.
2) It does
not imply that only those in the service of the State will engage
in systematic or frequent brutality. Just as there are exemplary
individuals who happen to be government employees, so there
are despicable worms out there committing free-lance evil. However,
when a large number of apparently "ordinary" folk, liked and
respected, as the news will report, by their friends and neighbors,
take part in some extremely wicked activity, a little investigation
will quite often reveal that they felt released from the strictures
of ordinary morality because they bore some authority from the
State.
3) It does
not imply that the State does not engage in, and to some extent
succeed at, the activities that are traditionally put forward
to justify its existence. A criminal gang is seeking financial
gain when it seizes control of some neighborhood. Nevertheless,
if it has any sense, it will provide various services to the
people in the area. For example, it certainly should prevent
anyone else from entering the neighborhood and robbing the residents.
It would probably be wise to distribute some of its stolen loot
to the poorest people in the area. If a natural disaster strikes,
the gangsters might benefit from providing relief, as conspicuously
as possible, to the victims. The gang's control ultimately relies
on plausible threats or effective acts of violence directed
against anyone who challenges its dominion. But violence is
usually expensive; to whatever extent the mobsters can sell
themselves as benefactors to the people they exploit, they can
reduce the cost of maintaining control of the area. Offering
any or all of the above "services" might prove to be less expensive
than merely beating up the recalcitrant; indeed, historically,
criminal organizations that have achieved extensive control
over an area have typically engaged in such activities.
If my analysis
of the essential nature of the State is correct, then even the
most sincere "soul searching" over Abu Ghraib or over the
Gulag, or Auschwitz, or the fire bombing of Dresden, or the
Cambodian killing fields, or Hiroshima while obviously better
than either blithely accepting or nonchalantly shrugging off
such events, is superficial unless the search extends far enough
to reveal what lies at the heart of the State. If I am right,
then such blatant recourses to force come about when a state
feels threatened enough to risk exposing its continual reliance
on violence.
The view
I put forward here does not deny that the agents of some states
are better behaved than the agents of others, nor does it imply
that the differences between various states are insignificant.
No one in his right mind would prefer living in Pol Pot's Cambodia
to George W. Bush's America, unless he was a moral monster who
anticipated that Pol Pot's Cambodia would allow him greater
latitude for committing evil. But such a distinction is not
very different from the fact that some slave-owners were far
more decent to their slaves than others. Similarly, if you knew
that your neighborhood was bound to be taken over by one of
a pair of mobsters, no doubt you would rather Sammy "The Prudent"
Giamboni won his gang war against Jimmy "Mad Dog" O'Sullivan.
But the fact that the behavior of some slave owners or mob bosses
is less onerous than that of others does not obviate the immoral
nature of slavery and protection rackets. Nor can any state
justify its existence or its actions by noting that the some
other state is even more despicable than it is.
The fact
that the soldiers involved were operating with the authority
of a state behind them ought to figure prominently in any analysis
of what occurred at that prison. They had been taught, most
likely from childhood and certainly since joining the military,
that loyalty to the state ruling over them is a sacred obligation.
They were told, again and again, that the vital interests of
the State can negate any limits that traditional moral strictures
might place on their behavior.
The individuals
at Abu Ghraib who were the immediate source of the abuse suffered
by the prisoners certainly should have known that their actions
were immoral. The nature of the institutional setting in which
they found themselves does not relieve them of responsibility
for the crimes they committed. Nevertheless, that setting helps
make their evil deeds more comprehensible.