Obama's
War?
by
Patrick
J. Buchanan
by
Patrick J. Buchanan
DIGG THIS
"We have to
be as careful getting out as we were careless getting in," says
Barack Obama of the U.S. war in Iraq. Wise counsel.
But is
Barack taking his own advice? For he pledges to shift two U.S. combat
brigades, 10,000 troops, out of Iraq and into Afghanistan, raising
American forces in that country from 33,000 to 43,000.
Why does
Barack think a surge of 10,000 troops will succeed in winning a
war in which we have failed to prevail after seven years of fighting?
How many more troops is he prepared to commit? Is the Obama commitment
open-ended?
For, without
any visible strategy for victory, Barack is recommending the same
course LBJ took after the death of JFK. Johnson bombed North Vietnam
in 1964, landed Marines in 1965 and built U.S. forces from 16,000
advisers on Nov. 22, 1963, to 525,000 troops in January of 1969.
Gradual
escalation, which is exactly what Barack is recommending.
LBJ never
thought through to the end game: how to break Hanoi, withdraw and
leave a South peaceful, prosperous and pro-American.
Has Barack
thought his way through to how this war ends in victory and we withdraw
all U.S. ground troops from Afghanistan? For this writer cannot
see anywhere on the horizon any such ending.
If the
old rule applies – the guerrilla wins if he does not lose – the
United States, about to enter its eighth year of combat, is losing.
And, using the old 10-to-one ratio of regular troops needed to defeat
guerrillas, if the Taliban can recruit 1,000 new fighters, they
can see Obama's two-brigade bet, and raise him. Just as Uncle Ho
raised LBJ again and again.
What does
President Obama do then? Send in 10,000 more?
The Soviet
Union, whose 115,000-man army in Afghanistan reached more than twice
the size of U.S.-NATO forces, even with the Obama surge, went home
defeated in 1988. The Soviet Empire did not survive that humiliation.
Obama –
and John McCain, who has endorsed the build-up – should, before
committing any more combat brigades, explain how and when this war
ends in an American victory. For as of today, the Afghan war resembles
Vietnam far more than Iraq ever did.
Consider.
Taliban attacks are up 40 percent this year. U.S. casualties in
May and June exceeded those in Iraq. Gen. Petraeus says al-Qaida
is moving assets from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan. President
Karzai's writ still does not extend beyond the capital. He is mocked
as the "Mayor of Kabul." Security in the capital is deteriorating.
For the
sixth straight year, the poppy crop, primary source of the world's
heroin, has set a new record. The Taliban eradicated the crop when
in power, but are now collaborating with farmers to extort cash
to keep fighting.
Most critically,
Pakistan has become for the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida
the same sanctuary that North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia provided
for the Viet Cong and NVA, with this critical difference: We cannot
bomb or invade Pakistan.
The new
Islamabad regime is exhibiting no enthusiasm for fighting the Taliban
who dominate the border regions and North-West Frontier province
and have sympathizers in Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies.
Air strikes,
to which we have begun to resort, have resulted in wedding parties
and families wiped out in their homes on both sides of the border.
President Musharraf has even threatened to retaliate against U.S.
forces if more of his people become victims.
Anti-Americanism,
pandemic in Pakistan, is rising.
As for
Afghanistan, how do we win a war in a nation of 27 million, the
size of Texas, with only 50,000 U.S.-NATO troops? How long will
it take us to train, equip and arm an Afghan army that is both loyal
to the regime and an effective fighting force against its Pashtun
brothers?
How, ever,
can victory be achieved, if the enemy can retire every winter to
Pakistan to rest, rearm and prepare new attacks?
If the
Pakistani army will not clean out the border regions, how can we
accomplish it with pinprick strikes by Special Forces, or Predators
and F-16s, which invariably cause civilian casualties?
Afghanistan,
in and of itself, is of no strategic importance, if it is not a
base camp for al-Qaida. Loss of Pakistan to Islamism, however, a
nation of 170 million Muslims with atomic bombs, would be a calamity
for the Near East and United States.
Under
the (Colin) Powell Doctrine for fighting wars, questions must be
asked and answered affirmatively before committing U.S. troops:
Is a vital
U.S. interest imperiled here? Do we have a defined and attainable
objective? Have the risks and costs been fully weighed? Is there
an exit strategy? Is the war supported by a united nation?
How many
of these questions did Obama ask himself before pledging 10,000
more U.S combat troops to what will surely become, should he win,
"Obama's war" even as Iraq has become "Bush's war"?
July
29, 2008
Patrick
J. Buchanan [send
him mail] is co-founder and editor of The
American Conservative. He is also the author of seven books,
including Where
the Right Went Wrong, and A
Republic Not An Empire. His latest book is Churchill,
Hitler, and the Unnecessary War.
Copyright
© 2008 Creators Syndicate
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J. Buchanan Archives
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