Little
Big Bubbles
by
Bill Bonner
by Bill Bonner
DIGG THIS
On November
27th, a story appeared in the Financial Times telling readers
that rich investors were having to resort to "underhanded"
means and special favors in order to get into the best hedge funds.
Somewhere in
the dark mush of our own brain came a flicker of light...and the
ringing of a bell. We recalled how hard it was to get in on the
Initial Public Offers of the late '90s. All a fellow had to do was
to put together a plausible dot.com story and take it to the financial
wizards of Wall Street or the City. A few months later, actual shares
of this hypothetical business would hit the streets. And since managers
found it convenient for the shares to rise quickly following their
release, they were normally priced at a level where they were bound
to go up, even though they were already selling for far more than
they were worth. This meant that getting in on the early stages
of the IPO was almost guaranteed money-in-the-bank. And it is why
Barbara Streisand, to cite a famous example, would send tickets
to her shows to IPO managers, hoping for more than a round of applause.
Of course,
the dot.coms blew up in January 2000...and investment bankers stopped
getting the free tickets. Now, they're going to hedge fund managers.
But the average
fund has not been doing well; so far in 2006 you could have done
better by accident than by hedge fund. The typical fund is up only
about 7%. The FTSE has risen 9% and the Dow is up 15%. This seems
only to have made investors desperate to get into the tiny group
of funds that are doing well.
Well-established
and top performing funds are often "closed." They already
have plenty of money. And smart managers know that they cannot accept
more without degrading their returns. When too much money chases
a limited number of good investment ideas, investments regress to
the mean. Still, "people are quite flabbergasted, especially very
wealthy people, when you send their money back," said the FT source.
Last week,
another bit of news reached us: the derivatives market, in which
hedge funds tend to speculate, has reached a face value of $480
trillion...30 times the size of the U.S. economy...and 12 times
the size of the entire world economy. Trading in derivatives has
become not merely a huge boom or even a large bubble – but the mother
of a whole tribe of bubbles...dripping little big bubbles throughout
the entire financial sector.
And now our
friend Simon Nixon reports that the hedge fund industry is transforming
the "social geography of Britain. Fortunes have been created on
a scale and in a timeframe that we have not witnessed for 100 years,
if ever before. According to the Daily Telegraph, the average
age of buyers of old rectories – those quaint country houses favored
by the new-moneyed classes – in Britain has fallen by ten years
to people in their early 30s."
Societies go
through major trends and minor ones; small fads and big ones; cute
little peccadilloes and major public spectacles. Before the Renaissance,
societies were besotted with religion – a passion that burned itself
out in the crusades, the wars of religion, and the inquisition.
Then, they took up politics – and became so wrapped up in "isms"
that, by the 20th century, they were killing each other at the fastest
pace in history. More than 100 million people died in the 20th century
– victims of bolshevism, national socialism, communism, nationalism
or some other excess of political enthusiasm.
And now it
is finance that has the world's attention. China says it is a "communist"
country. But it seems not to care. Nor does anyone else care what
the Chinese call themselves. The only thing anyone seems to care
about is that China is open for business. They could throw vestal
virgins into Vesuvius or tear the beating hearts out of their enemies
so long as their economy grew at 10% per year. The Chinese are the
envy of the entire world. Politics has yielded to money.
The fashion
for politics peaked out in the United States during the Kennedy
Administration. Kennedy's inaugural remarks – "ask not what
your country can do for you...ask what you can do for your country"
– marked the all-time high. That was before the war in Vietnam came
a cropper, and before the war on poverty and the war on drugs were
launched. People believed in those wars and were sorely disappointed
when victories weren't forthcoming. Now of course, we have a war
on terror...but few people talk about it at all...and no thinking-person
mentions it without an ironic smirk. In fact, the war on terror
is hardly a political war at all – but a campaign designed to protect
the flanks of the great financial empire. If it were discovered
that it diminished consumer spending or raised mortgage rates, for
example, it would be stopped tomorrow.
Now, it is
money that counts. And mommas now want their babies to grow up to
be hedge fund managers. They know where the money is. There's no
money in religion – unless you're a TV evangelist...and those slots
are hard to get. Besides, they are more business than religion,
anyway. A good politician, meanwhile, even if he is slick, can only
skim off a certain amount without getting caught with his pants
down. The Clintons, for example, were only able to pull off a shady
land deal...and operate a penny-ante cattle-trading account – besides
the book contracts, of course. It might have been serious money,
but it took a whole career of sordid dissembling to pull it off.
The Bushes have done better, but it has taken them a couple of generations
and a few CIA contracts. And in any case, it is nothing compared
to the kind of loot a hedge fund manager takes in while he is still
young enough to enjoy it.
In this late,
degenerate imperial age, no one gets richer faster than hedge fund
managers. Last year, Edward Lampert, of ESL Investments (a hedge
fund business), set the pace with $1.02 billion in compensation.
Compared to him, James Simons of Renaissance Technologies Corp.
must have felt like a charity case, with only a bit more than $600
million in take-home. But he still did better than Bruce Kovner,
at Caxton Associates, who earned $550 million.
The New York
Times provides a list: Steven Cohen of SAC Capital Advisors, $450
million; David Tepper of Appaloosa Management, $420 million; George
Soros of Soros Fund Management, $305 million (Soros was number one
in 2003, with $750 million); Paul Tudor Jones II of Tudor Investment
Corp., $300 million; Kenneth Griffin of Citadel Investment Group,
$240 million; Raymond Dalio of Bridgewater Associates, $225 million;
and Israel Englander of Millennium Partners, $205 million. Poor
Richard Fuld; the man earned only a paltry $35,257,099 for his work
running Lehman Brothers. And E. Stanley O'Neal, at Merrill Lynch
got even less: a miserly $32,134,673.
We do not report
those figures out of jealousy, but simply puzzlement and amusement.
Every penny had to come from somewhere. And every penny had to come
from clients' money. Investors in leading hedge funds must be among
the richest, smartest people in the world. Still, with no gun to
their heads, they turned over billions of dollars' worth of earnings
to slick hedge fund promoters.
What do you
need to do to get that kind of work? Well, it helps to be good with
complicated math. Then, you can join other hedge fund managers who
trade derivative contracts that the clients cannot understand, such
as the recently launched CPDO, the Constant Proportion Debt Obligation.
According to Grant's Interest Rate Observer, the CPDO may be an
innovation, but it is hardly a new idea. It is remarkably similar
to the CPPI, or Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance, which made
its debut 20 years earlier.
The CPDO is
meant to protect investors against the risk of investment-grade
credit defaults. CPPI was meant to protect investors from a stock
market crash, using a complex formula that clients also couldn't
quite understand. Then in 1987, only about a year after the CPPI
was introduced, the stock market crashed and investors finally figured
out how they worked. Sifting through the debris, analysts determined
that CPPI had not protected investors; instead its fancy programmed
trading features actually magnified the losses.
We don't know
how the CPDO will hold up under pressure, but we can barely wait
to find out. Whenever the higher math and the greater greed come
together, there are bound to be thrills.
The twitty
quants at big investment firms invent the complex derivative contracts...give
them a jolt of juice...and then the abominations spring to life.
The next thing you know, the hedge fund whizzes are building big
houses in Greenwich, Connecticut – and there are billions of dollars...no
trillions...in CPDO and other contracts, in the hands of buyers
who don't quite understand the elaborate equations behind the contract...and
(here we are just guessing) who will be surprised when they find
out.
If you are
good with figures, you can at least partially protect your own investments.
But it usually means taking a position on the opposite side of the
great weight of investment capital. You can also find ways to make
more money than your slower-moving peers, again, by doing things
a bit differently. But neither financial wizardry...nor any complex
instrument...can protect a whole market. The whole market can't
protect itself from itself. The more people climb onto an investment
platform – whether it is derivatives, dot.coms, dollars or dirigibles
– the more it creaks and cracks, and the more damage it does when
it finally gives way.
But buyers
of CME (the Chicago Mercantile Exchange) don't seem to notice. Google,
the newest, hottest technology stock of late 2006, trades at a forward
P/E of 36...CME trades at an astounding 51. CME is where futures
and derivatives trade. The stock came out three years ago at $39.
Since then it's gone up 14 times, to more than $550. In New York,
meanwhile, the NYSE gets half its daily volume from hedge fund trading.
Its stock too, has been on a roll, now trading at 10 times sales,
119 times trailing earnings, and 46 times forward earnings.
If you want
to profit from hedge funds, the best way is to become a hedge fund
manager. Or, if you want really want to get into hedge funds, but
wish to retain your dignity, you could consider investing in a hedge
fund company. At least two hedge fund companies have sold shares
to the public on the London market.
But
hedge funds are supposed to be able to produce superior returns
for both investors and managers. If they could do so, why would
they wish to trade their shares for cash? What will they do with
the money; invest it in someone else's hedge fund? But with returns
falling...and customers beginning to ask questions...more hedge
fund impresarios are likely to want to get out while the getting
is good. As the funds become less profitable, in other words, more
will probably be sold to strangers who don't know any better.
And
then, someday – perhaps someday soon – a peak in the credit cycle
will come. The mother of all bubbles will finally pop and then the
"little big bubbles" in the financial industry will pop.
The Dow will come down – the dollar too. Junk bonds will sink. Builders
in Greenwich will notice that their phones aren't ringing as often.
NYX and CME will crash. And 5,000 hedge fund managers will be on
the streets...looking for the next big thing. When will it happen?
How? We don't know. But our guess is that when the history of this
bubble cycle is finally written, derivatives will get a special
"tipping point" place...like the Hindenburg in the history
of the Zeppelin business...or the Little Big Horn in the life of
George Armstrong Custer.
December
4, 2006
Bill
Bonner [send
him mail] is the author, with Addison Wiggin, of Financial
Reckoning Day: Surviving the Soft Depression of The 21st
Century and
Empire of Debt: The Rise Of An Epic Financial Crisis.
Copyright
© 2006 Bill Bonner
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