Real Bills, Phony Wealth
Part 1: Christmas with the Cranks
by
Robert Blumen
by Robert Blumen
The
masses are misled by the assertions of the pseudo-experts,"
wrote Mises, "that cheap money can make them prosperous at
no expense whatever." The damage that the inflationary fallacy
has done to our monetary institutions cannot be over-estimated.
In spite of efforts by classical and Austrian economists to refute
it, it refuses to die. It has been resurrected under many guises,
but all with the same error at its core: that printing money can
create real wealth.
The
"monetary crank," wrote Mises, is one who "suggests
a method for making everybody prosperous by monetary measures."
All variants of monetary crankism suffer from the same error: The
printing press cannot create actual goods. The arguments for the
RBD (Real Bills Doctrine) will be seen to be variants of monetary
crankism. An
article (by a libertarian writer on a gold site, no less) proposing
a revival of the Real Bills Doctrine is a recent addition to this
literature.
The
RBD has a long and controversial history. Many of the key concepts
originated with the monetary crank John Law. In 19th-century
England, controversy over the issues around the doctrine raged between
two schools of monetary thought, the Currency
School and the Banking
School. In the United States, the RBD
was a key plank in the platform of the first
generation of US Federal Reserve bankers.
The
Doctrine concerns debts contracted by business firms for the shipment
of goods in process, as when a firm purchases raw materials or partially
finished goods on credit.. The goods in question might be for use
in the purchasing firm’s own manufacturing processes. The receiver
promises to pay the supplier in cash plus interest at some future
date. (See the definition
from Mises Made
Easier for more detail).
As
an example, a manufacturer of chairs purchases wood from his supplier
and, instead of paying cash, pays with a bill of exchange due in
30 days. Two weeks later, finding himself short on cash to make
payroll, the wood supplier takes the bill to his local bank, which
purchases the note from him for 98% of its face value. The discount
rate (here 2% for 14 days) annualized, would be the bank rate of
interest on the transaction.
Suppose
that the holder of a real bill needs cash before the bill falls
due. (Perhaps he needs to pay off his own bills to his own suppliers
further down the line before their bills fall due). He would then
present the bill to a bank. If the bank purchased the bill for cash,
then all would be well and good. However, the banker, having been
persuaded by some clever monetary theorist to adopt the RBD, "discounts"
the bill, that is, prints the money with which to purchase the loan.
The "discount" is the purchase price paid by the bank,
an amount less than the principal value of the loan.
No
special banking doctrine is required to justify an ordinary loan
transaction. This is simply transfer
credit. Nor is any new monetary theory required when firms wish
to resell their paper assets to buyers for cash on the commercial
paper market. This is merely the resale of existing credit. In the
workings of RBD, bills are to be funded not with the bank’s own
equity capital, nor with savings loaned to the bank by its creditors.
According
to the Doctrine, banks would monetize short-term business debt.
Monetization of debt means to create paper credit out of nothing
and then to loan this credit as money. The money exists either in
the form of bank notes or checking account balances. The purchase
of the bill is therefore a kind of loan from the bank, but a curious
sort of loan in which the funds were not previously loaned to the
bank by anyone. This is called credit
expansion.
Hultberg
and Fekete present a series of arguments for the adoption of this
kind of discounting mechanism. This series
of articles addresses some, but not all, of their arguments.
The current article responds to a series of arguments advanced against
transfer credit and in favor of credit expansion. Hultberg and Fekete
suggest that transfer credit without expansion is not "elastic;"
transfer credit by itself is "too rigid;" the limitation
of total borrowing to total saving will reduce economic growth (the
term "contractionist" means essentially the same thing).
Equivalently, they argue that expanding credit beyond savings enables
more goods to be produced; in the absence of paper credit, business
firms will not be able to obtain a sufficient amount of short-term
credit; similarly a "liquidity shortage" will prevail
without money printing.
To
understand the mechanics of inflation, the difference between transfer
credit and credit
expansion must be explained. Transfer credit is extended when
a borrower borrows money that someone saved. When a bank is involved
in this type of transaction, the bank brokers the exchange and takes
on some of the risk. The bank locates borrowers and savers who wish
to participate but might not otherwise know each other. When a bank
is involved in this type of transaction, the bank brokers the exchange
and takes on some of the risk. The bank first borrows from
the saver and then loans the money to the creditor.
Credit
expansion is an entirely different type of transaction. When banks
expand credit there is no saver anywhere involved. For a bank to
expand credit, it creates new paper claims to money bank notes
or fractional reserve checking deposits out of nothing at all and
loans them as if they were money. These paper money substitutes
"give to somebody the means of purchasing goods without at
the same time diminishing the money spending power of somebody else,"
explained
Hayek. He adds, "This is most obviously the case when the
creditor receives a bill of exchange which he may pass on in payment
for other goods," (p. 114). Paper claims of this type were
are called fiduciary
media by Mises, meaning, media of exchange that circulated at
parity with real money but came into existence as the result of
credit expansion.
Bullionist
writer and opponent of fiduciary media Charles Holt Carroll clarifies
the distinction between cash either gold or fully redeemable paper and
fiduciary media. Carroll aptly termed
the latter "debt organized into currency" (p 234):
Some
writers have placed promissory notes and bills of exchange in
the category of currency, but it is altogether a mistake; their
affinity is with circulating property, not with money… They are,
however, neither money, nor currency, nor property, but more records
of an unfinished bargain; the purchase money is not paid, and
these are memoranda or written evidences of what the debtor is
to do to complete the contract. One species of property exchanges
for another; this is barter, the fundamental principle of trade;
and when promissory notes and bills of exchange are exchanged
for money, they take the position of property as essentially different
from money as the goods that were delivered for them, or for the
fund upon which they are drawn.
Opponents
of RBD are not attacking debt as such (either businesses-to-business
or between banks and bank customers). Lending transactions are a
crucial mechanism for the allocation of savings within a monetary
economy. It is the distinction between debt by itself and the "organization
of debt into currency" that turns debt into money that makes
all the difference.
Cash
is the commodity that can be most readily exchanged for any other
good on the market. Rent, raw materials, payroll, or office supplies
are often needed on short notice. Without credit expansion, liquidity
could only be supplied by someone who is willing to reduce their
own consumption.
Chief
among the rationalizations for paper credit is the claim that requiring
someone to save before someone else can borrow is too onerous a
condition. Allegations against the gold coin system are "insufficient
liquidity," an excessively rigid credit system, and an inelastic
monetary system. We are told that the magic elixir of paper credit
will solve these problems by "creating liquidity" and
"providing elasticity".
There
is always insufficient quantity of any good to meet all possible
uses of a good at that time. Scarcity is the quality that defines
what it is for something to be an economic good. Liquidity, another
economic good, is no different. Hülsmann writes,
"one has always to remember that money is a present good. It
can be used now. No present good is available in a quantity that
would satisfy all demands. This is precisely why it is a good. Hence,
there is always demand for some more money to secure hitherto less
important (submarginal) satisfactions."
A
motivated borrower in search of liquidity could always obtain a
loan at some rate of interest, as there would always be someone
holding cash that would part with it at a sufficiently high rate
of interest. As in all markets, a price for bank loans will emerge
in credit markets through supply and demand. Even without adding
to the supply through credit expansion, firms that need funds could
attempt to borrow at the market rate of interest.
Prices
ration resources. Prices by their nature exclude. The interest rate
is a price that is formed in credit markets. The market rate of
interest is always higher than some potential borrowers are willing
to pay that is what makes it a price.
But
to call this state of affairs "insufficient liquidity"
is to say that a particular amount of credit supplied and demanded
at the market price is the wrong amount and rate of interest determined
on the market is too high. Anyone who says that the market is getting
it wrong must have some other criteria for evaluating what
is enough of the good, outside of the ability of market participants
themselves to supply it and demand it. But what other criteria could
there be? Modern economics calls this situation "market failure,"
a term that substitutes the learned judgment of expert economists
for the preferences of market participants.
A
business that pays expenses by issuing bills to its supplier instead
of cash is taking on credit risk. Suppose that the cash receivable
does not arrive at the time that it was promised, or that the firm’s
goods may not be sold as expected. Even if the time structure of
assets and liabilities match on the firm’s balance sheet, a credit
crunch is always a real possibility. Faced with such a situation,
if the firm could not raise cash by obtaining more credit immediately,
it would be insolvent.
Yet
this is a problem for that firm, not a problem with the monetary
system as a whole. A firm cannot obtain employees and office space
because some other firm already is hiring the employees and leasing
the office space that it wants. The problem is that goods are scarce,
not money. Owners of business firms must evaluate the supply of
things that they need to buy, the marketability of their goods,
and the credit-worthiness of their customers.
It
is the firm, not the monetary system that has made an error. "What
may hurt the interests of the producer of a definite commodity,"
Mises observed,
"is his failure to anticipate correctly the state of the market.
He has overrated the public's demand for his commodity and underrated
its demand for other commodities. Consumers have no use for such
a bungling entrepreneur; they buy his products only at prices which
make him incur losses, and they force him, if he does not in time
correct his mistakes, to go out of business."
It
might be objected here that the problem is really liquidity, not
insolvency: A firm that cannot obtain credit is not really insolvent,
it only has a
teeny-weeny liquidity problem, and if the banks were allowed
to discount the bills in its possession that would solve the liquidity
problem. The pain of bankruptcy is not necessary. However, the distinction
is bogus: The inability of a business to pay its creditors on
time is the definition of insolvency. To this it might be
objected that firms only need a bit more time, such as is provided
to them when a bank is willing to discount their bills. However,
to say so would be to ignore the role of time in production. Present
goods are scarce in the present as Hülsmann clearly
explains:
If
we always disposed of just a little bit more time we could be
sure to have reached nirvana. With always just a little bit more
time one could provide all the money in the world. Unfortunately,
every means in the mundane life of the human race is limited.
Time, therefore, plays a crucial role for the success of action.
In every place outside nirvana one has to pay for the time-saving
means called goods. There is no possibility of providing "liquidity
to the market only." One cannot pay with liquidity; one can only
pay with goods.
A
market, as Mises argued in his seminal critique
of economic calculation under socialism, can only bring about
a rational allocation of productive factors under the clear light
of profit-and-loss accounting. The definition of making a
loss is to consume more scarce factors of production (labor, real
estate, machinery, energy, etc.) than are produced. Bankruptcy redistributes
factors of production away from wasteful uses toward productive
ones. It is a critical part of the market process.
Having
a "liquidity problem" is the definition of insolvency.
An illiquid firm is a bankrupt firm, if it cannot pay its bills.
Insolvent businesses should be taken over by their creditors, not
allowed to stay on life support with phony paper credit. Firms are
not insolvent because of some general shortage of money but because
their judgments about supply and demand were incorrect. Loss-making
firms sustained through the issue of fiduciary media are artificial
forms of life. They consume accumulated savings, and impoverish
society.
When
the smoke and mirrors are cleared away, the Real Bills Doctrine
is in essence the idea that credit by itself can create wealth.
But credit as such does not fund productive activity because any
productive activity consumes goods and services. What the RBD theorists
wrongly identify as an insufficient quantity of credit is in reality
the scarcity of goods in the world. Credit expansion is an attempt
to paper over this problem.
Businesses
usually do not borrow solely to increase their cash holdings without
the intention of spending the borrowed money. They need to earn
a return that will be sufficient to eventually repay the loan. They
can only do this by producing something at a profit. The demand
for credit by businesses is a demand for office space, computers,
machinery, employees, and raw materials. The scarcity of the real
things that business firms need in order to produce goods for consumption
is what limits the their ability to produce more. Mises explains
this clearly:
An
entrepreneur who wishes to acquire command over capital goods
and labor in order to begin a process of production must first
of all have money with which to purchase them. For a long time
now it has not been usual to transfer capital goods by way of
direct exchange. The capitalists advance money to the producers,
who then use it for buying means of production and for paying
wages. Those entrepreneurs who have not enough of their own capital
at their disposal do not demand production goods, but money. The
demand for capital takes on the form of a demand for money. But
this must not deceive us as to the nature of the phenomenon. What
is usually called plentifulness of money and scarcity of money
is really plentifulness of capital and scarcity of capital.
Issuing
more paper claims to the existing stock of goods is not the same
as producing more goods. Only goods fund the production of goods,
not credit. Bank credit expansion does not fund production because
it does not transfer savings; it only creates new claims to the
same amount of savings. In order for goods to be used to produce
other goods, the original owners must set them aside, then transfer
them to the producers who will use them up while creating something
new and more valuable. This is why only
savings can fund investment. As Mises
explains,
[the
masses do] not realize that investment can be expanded only to
the extent that more capital is accumulated by saving. They are
deceived by the fairy tales of monetary cranks. Yet what counts
in reality is not fairy tales, but people's conduct. If men are
not prepared to save more by cutting down their current consumption,
the means for a substantial expansion of investment are lacking.
Those means cannot be provided by printing banknotes and by credit
on the bank books.
Antal
Fekete (cited by Hultberg) denies
this fact: "the real bill will do the miracle of financing
production and distribution spontaneously, without taking one
penny out of the piggy-banks of the savers." It would indeed
be miraculous even violating the laws of physics if the production
of some goods could be financed without the consumption of any
other goods merely by printing paper. A simple objection to
Fekete’s view is to note that the employees of manufacturing firms
will eat, wear clothes, drive to work, and turn on the lights at
their factory. If credit could fund real productive activity, why
have savings at all? Why not fund all production through credit
expansion, not just short-term goods in process?
Economists
have used the somewhat obscure term "forced savings" to
describe the shift in the expenditure of savings set in motion by
credit expansion. This term can be explained as follows. In the
market, purchasing power comes from the ability to supply goods
to others who demand them. When fiduciary media are created, new
purchasing power is obtained, not by supplying but, by diluting
the purchasing power of existing money. While the immediate recipients
of the new credit have more purchasing power, they have only obtained
this power at the expense of other money holders. The business firms
that have borrowed fiduciary media obtain the ability to outbid
other holders of money. By shifting those goods away from others
who might have consumed them toward production, they exclude others
who might have purchased them for consumption. That is, they save-and-invest
the goods. The savings is "forced" in the sense that the
loss of purchasing power by the rest of the community is not made
willingly, as would be the case if the others had chosen to save
and invest by loaning their funds.
Mises
was overly optimistic when he wrote, "The absurdity of [inflationists’]
arguments is so manifest that their refutation and exposure is easy
indeed." In fact it has not been easy. Inflationism has been
the most enduring and harmful fallacy of monetary economics. The
progress of sound economics against this doctrine has not been without
setbacks. The fantasy of wealth creation through paper inflation
never loses its appeal. Each new generation of monetary cranks has
rekindled hope for the long-awaited Christmas Day when the Santa
Claus of money creation arrives. Only when the distinction between
real savings and empty paper promises is understood will economics
drive a stake through the heart of this fallacy for all time.
July
18, 2005
Robert
Blumen [send him mail]
is an independent software developer based in San Francisco.
An earlier
version of this article appeared on the web site of the Ludwig
von Mises Institute.
Copyright
© 2005 LewRockwell.com
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