Not Ron Paul, though self-appointed web strategists from both sides of the political aisle would like you to think otherwise, likely because the most memorable event of the 2004 campaign was Howard Dean’s complete implosion at the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary. Who wants to be associated with such a spectacular crash and burn?

Ron Paul 2008’s similarity with the Dean campaign begins and ends with the fact that MeetUp is a factor in the way supporters organize and the campaign website has a blog. In fact, Barack Obama’s campaign has many more parallels with the Dean campaign than Ron Paul’s.Let’s go back to early 2003 and 2004 and dig up some fun facts about Dean’s campaign and see just who is similar today.

Dean broke records in fundraising not only in the amounts he raised, but for the fact that so much of it was over the internet and from many small donors. Likewise Obama.

Dean’s original campaign manager, Joe Trippi, set out to run an internet campaign. Time magazine wrote in July, 2003, “Dean’s chain of websites, run mainly by tech-savvy campaign manager Joe Trippi and the campaign’s four Internet-dedicated staff members, has a sense of fun that rivals old-time political carnivals.” So did Obama, setting up his Facebook and buying an existing MySpace page early on among other stunts, like this one.. Ron Paul barely had a campaign staff when he announced for president and only added an eCampaign person a few months ago.

In August of 2003, Dean was consistently polling in the top 3 Dem candidates, as is Obama now. Ron Paul is just now starting to poll 3% consistently.

Consider this, by a Dean supporter, just after Dean’s primary catastrophe:

One big reason I thought Dean was going to win quickly was that the polls said he had a huge lead. So, the question isn’t simply “Why did Deaniacs think Dean would win easily?” but also “Why did the electorate favor him on clipboards but not in voting booths?” The answers to that question are not pleasant for any Dean supporter to contemplate.

And it wasn’t just the polls that led us to believe he was a happenin’ guy. In August, crowds of unprecedented size — 5,000, 10,000 — showed up to hear Dean speak. I traveled on the press bus for one leg of the “Sleepless Summer” tour and heard two well-known, hard-bitten journalists for major media outlets whispering to one another: “Have you ever seen anything like this?” “No, and so early in the campaign!” Those crowds weren’t an Internet phenomenon, but they had a lot to do with convincing me that Dean’s support was wider spread than it has so far turned out to be. (Sure, I was naive, but it wasn’t an Internet naivete.)

So, I find myself agreeing with Clay’s warnings about how a candidate’s Internet campaign can create an unfounded perception of electoral strength, yet also worried that readers will come away with an exaggerated view of the Internet’s role in that perception. It wasn’t just the Internet that led us into false optimism.

None of that pertains to Ron Paul’s campaign. Its does apply to another candidate, though.

The paradox for the Web 2.0 people in 2007 is: how do you promote web-powered campaigns without 1) being Howard Dean or 2) talking about Ron Paul? Apparently the answer is that you stick the Paul campaign with all the negative aspects of the Dean campaign, while praising the web successes of the guys you root for, while hoping no one remembers what really happened to the Dean campaign.

So what did happen to the Dean campaign? There is still debate about that. Here is PR Watch, writing just after the Dean campaign folded:

“Howard Dean had the best-funded, best-publicized bid to be the Democratic nominee; he was so widely understood to be in the lead that the inevitability of his victory was a broad topic of discussion,” observed Internet consultant and writer Clay Shirky. Nevertheless, his campaign suffered a devastating blow in the Iowa caucuses, which represented the first votes cast in primary season. According to polls, Dean had been a strong contender in Iowa in the weeks leading up to the primary, but he actually finished third in Iowa, trailing behind John Kerry and John Edwards.”

Does that sound like Ron Paul’s campaign? How about this, from January 2004, just after the NH primary:

Dean is broke. The news is shocking, but the campaign is reportedly at $0. $40 million reduced to $3 million on hand, and $3 million in debts (the campaign disputes those figures, but paychecks have been deferred). The campaign won’t air ads in any Feb. 3 state, saving its dough for Washington, Michigan and Wisconsin. It’s not a bad strategy, given the campaign’s dire straits. But its further evidence of a campaign in crisis.

Shades of McCain 2008. Contrast that with Ron Paul’s proven approach:

During his tenure in the House of Representatives, Paul developed a reputation of being notoriously frugal, paying his staff less than their counterparts in other congressional offices in an effort to return money to the U.S. Treasury every year.

This frugality has carried over to his campaign headquarters, which until two weeks ago was housed in an office approximately the size of an average living room. Now it’s in a larger but still nondescript building on Washington Boulevard in Arlington, Va., above a vacant dry cleaning business and next to a store called Casual Adventure that sells sleeping bags and backpacks.

On the second floor of that building, Paul’s “eCampaign Director” Justine Lam shares an office with at least two other staffers that overlooks a Giant supermarket across the street.

Who is running the Dean campaign? Not Ron Paul.