Landsburg
on Crime
by
Walter
Block
by Walter Block
Steven
E. Landsburg, political economic maverick extraordinaire, and
supposed advocate of free enterprise, has written a paper
on theft and externalities entitled "Property
Is Theft: When protecting your own property is stealing from others."
In it, he calls for greater government intervention into the economy,
more taxing, regulating and subsidizing; and he does so on the ground
that only in this way may we become more economically efficient.
Where was he when the Politburo needed commissars?
In
his view, there are several ways to protect your home or car from
theft. One is to do so in an ostentatious way. For example a burglar
alarm with a sign posted on your front door, advertising its presence;
or the "Club,"
which is fastened to the steering wheel, making it impossible for
the robber to turn the vehicle. While this might turn some criminals
onto the paths of righteousness, the dedicated member of this "profession"
is more likely to seek easier, softer targets, that is, houses and
autos without such visible protection.
States
Landsburg, "When your neighbor installs a burglar alarm, thoughtful
burglars are encouraged to choose a different target like
your house, for example. It's rather as if your neighbor
had hired an exterminator to drive all the vermin next door."
In
contrast, there are hidden protections against break-ins and theft.
If the robber does not know which cars or houses are defended against
his depredations, but knows for sure that a significant number of
them are, then he is more inclined to leave this field entirely.
Here, each potential victim who protects himself protects his neighbors,
and indeed, all others, as well.
Landsburg
explains:
"The
‘Lojack’ is a hidden radio transmitter that can be activated after
your car is stolen, to lead police to the thief (or, better yet,
to the chop shop that employs the thief). The transmitter is hidden
randomly within the car, so thieves cannot easily find it and
deactivate it. The Lojack is completely hidden. There's no way
to look at a car and know whether it has a Lojack installed. So
unlike, say, the Club, a Lojack will never prevent any particular
car from being stolen; it will only increase the chance of its
being recovered. But from a social point of view, the Lojack has
the huge advantage of helping your neighbors rather than
hurting them. The Club convinces thieves to steal someone else's
car instead; the Lojack convinces thieves not to steal."
From
this, our author concludes that unseen safety devices are not only
a vast improvement over flamboyant ones, but that the former are
to be supported by law, the latter condemned and legally penalized.
He not only says, in effect, "Lojack, good, the Club, bad;"
he also maintains that we should subsidize the Lojack, and tax the
Club.
But
this, splutter, splutter, amounts to socialism, okay, okay, to fascism
(Socialism is outright government ownership; fascism, stylistically
different only, favors heavy government regulation, as does Landsburg).
He does so for the oft-used reason on the part of neoclassical economists,
"market failure." It is only a slight exaggeration to
define successful mainstream economists as those who have, more
cleverly than their peers, discerned more and more "market
failures" in more and more obscure places. If Landsburg were
just an ordinary economist, this would not really bother me too
much. But, as he is widely seen as a free enterpriser, I find this
perturbing in the extreme.
What
are the specifics? Let us allow Landsburg to tell the grisly tale
himself:
"By
the criteria that economists usually employ, this suggests that
Lojacks should be heavily subsidized, just as visible security systems
like my neighbor's home burglar alarm or the Club
should be taxed. When you're doing something that makes strangers
better off, you should be encouraged to do more of it.
"If
we all used the same insurance company, you might expect that company
to supply the appropriate subsidy. As long as your Lojack reduces
the number of insurance claims, the company should be willing to
pay you to install it. But with multiple insurance companies, that
doesn't work so well: A company that insures only 10 percent of
the populace will reap only 10 percent of the Lojack's benefits,
and so will undersubsidize them. Worse yet, large insurance discounts
are illegal in many states.
"The
media have recently paid a lot of attention to research on other
kinds of self-protection, most notably the work of John Lott and
David Mustard on concealed handguns. But the Lojack research is
in many ways more informative, because the authors were able to
do a thorough job of distinguishing between benefits to the purchaser
of a Lojack and benefits to the community at large. That discrepancy
is the sort of thing that leads markets to fail in this
case by providing too many Clubs and not enough Lojacks."
Now
for the (long overdue) criticisms of Landsburg.
First,
minor point, he ought to change the title of his paper. As he has
it: "Property Is Theft: When protecting your own property is
stealing from others." In saying that "property is theft"
Landsburg is provocatively putting himself on the side of the avowed
enemies of civilization.
For
example, according to Proudhon, (Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. 1966 [1840].
What Is Property? New York: Howard Fertig. p. 131. Quoted
from Stewart Edwards (ed.) 1969. Selected
Writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. New York: Anchor Books.
p. 124.) :
"If
I had to answer the question ‘What is slavery?’ and if I were
to answer in one word, ‘Murder,’ I would immediately be understood.
I would not need to use a lengthy argument to demonstrate that
the power to deprive a man of his thoughts, his will and his personality
is a power of life and death, and that to enslave a man is to
murder him. Why, then, to the question ‘What is property?’ may
I not likewise reply ‘theft,’ without knowing that I am certain
to be misunderstood, even though the second proposition is simply
a transformation of the first?"
Second,
there is that bit about "When protecting your own property
is stealing from others." Surely, when Jones installs a Club
he is not exactly stealing from his neighbors. Rather, at
worst, he is deflecting the attention of car thieves from
himself to others. But the same can be said about anyone who locks
his bicycle or the front door of his house when his neighbors do
not.
Third,
his attack on The Club is totally unwarranted. With it, one piece
of property that might have been looted is saved. It is hardly the
Club owner's fault that the monster then turns around and rips off
somebody else's car. Further, the example set by The Club is socially
useful; more people will protect themselves. A more reasonable way
to look at the Club is as a totally innocent attempt to safeguard
private property.
Fourth,
the analogy with "vermin" is highly problematic. The neighbor
is just as free to employ the services of an exterminator. A better
way to look at the matter is this: suppose everyone utilized
the Club. Then, there would be no shifting about of criminal attentions
from one victim to another. Cars, all cars, would be better protected.
The problem, here, lies not with those who utilize exterminators
and the Club; rather, it lies with those who do not.
But
what of this charge of "market failure?" This false indictment
of free enterprise stems from the fact that Landsburg has not read
and digested Hazlitt’s most famous
book, where he admonishes us to trace the effects of a given
policy or phenomenon as far as possible; not only in the short run,
but also in the long run; not as it affects only some people, but
all. Why, then, can the market not ensure that people use the Lojack
instead of the Club (assuming roughly equal costs between them;
if these are radically different, then all bets are off)? It is
because the relevant market has been already preempted by the government.
It has not been allowed to operate. It has been nationalized (or
statized or municipalized). It has disappeared. There can be no
"market failure" here because this simply is no "market."
I
refer, of course, to roads, streets, highways, avenues, lanes, and
all other vehicular thoroughfares where automobiles are to be found.
Not a one of them is a part of the market. Suppose streets were
all privately owned. Let us posit, arguendo, that Landsburg is totally
correct in his comparative analysis of the Lojack and the Club,
and that these two protective devices are equally costly. Is there
any doubt that the road owner would either compel the former and
forbid the latter, or, at the very least, charge people in such
a way for street use to bring about the same state of affairs? That
is, do exactly what Landsburg is calling upon the government to
do: subsidize the Lojack and penalize the Club. Nor is there any
doubt that if the road owner did not pursue precisely this policy,
he would lose out in the competition between different firms in
his industry.
So,
of course the market can internalize the externality about which
Landsburg is (properly) concerned. That is, if a market is
allowed in the first place. If not, it is a bit much on Landsburg’s
part to blame the market ("market failure") for something
the government has forbidden to it. For more on this see my article
Block, Walter. 1983. "Public
Goods and Externalities: The Case of Roads," The Journal
of Libertarian Studies: An Interdisciplinary Review, Vol. VII,
No. 1, Spring, pp. 134.
I
have often written about the problem of road socialism over the
years. See here,
here,
here,
here,
here,
here, here,
here,
here,
here,
here,
here and
here.
As it happens, I have a book forthcoming with the Mellen Press on
this topic. Its title: Privatize Roads and Highways, Now! The book
is based on several of these previous publications of mine, and
will include much new material in it as well.
October
19, 2005
Dr.
Block [send him mail]
is a professor of economics at Loyola University New Orleans. Currently
he is the Steven Berger Visiting Professor at the Ludwig von Mises
Institute. He is the author of Defending
the Undefendable.
Copyright
© 2005 LewRockwell.com
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