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Y2K
and the Banks
The
Y2K computer bug isn't like a natural disaster or mass disease.
It is a technical problem with a technical fix that can be overcome
with work and time. However, and without speculating about the ultimate
fallout from the problem, the bug has exposed a very real and deep
infraction that has long plagued the U.S. banking system.
Thanks
to long-ago government interventions that redefined a bank deposit
as a loan, modern banks only hold a fraction of the demand deposits
in people's cash accounts. The rest is used as the basis for extending
and pyramiding loans. If too many depositors demand their cash at
once, which is their right, it would trigger a bank run, which in
turn would lead to the so-called contagion effect, and runs on other
banks.
Under
this scenario, since most banks these days are considered "too big
to fail," the Fed would have to run the printing press full time
or they would go belly-up immediately. The result would be a dramatic
deflation followed by hyperinflation.
Banks
genuinely fear that this will be the result of public nervousness
over Y2K. In February, a Southern California office of GTE suggested
that its customers hold a month's salary in cash during the transition
to the new millennium. The banking industry went bonkers, denouncing
GTE for breaking silence on the question and attempting to reassure
the public that extra cash holdings were unnecessary.
The
point is this: whether or not it is prudent to withdraw money from
the bank, why should the suggestion alone be enough to drive the
industry into paroxysms of fright? It is one thing to desire someone's
business. It is quite another to regard the perfectly reasonable
actions of your customers as a mortal and systemic threat to the
well-being of society as a whole. To understand why takes us to
the heart of the great secret of modern banking.
Under
genuinely sound banking, in which the money you deposit at the bank
is held for safekeeping while you draw down your funds as you see
fit, it wouldn't matter at all how many people withdrew funds or
when. The analogy here is the grain elevator which is used solely
for storage. Every customer of the elevator is free
to withdraw the full quantity of his grain at any time because the
proprietor must keep 100-pereent reserves on penalty of fraud.
So
it is under the gold standard, in which sound banking could be divided
into two kinds. With deposit banking, you retain full title to your
gold and only use the bank as a storage warehouse. Paper money was
a ticket that acknowledged your ownership of the gold. The tickets
were accepted because the bank was trusted. Free-market competition
ensured that reputable banks would not fudge their holdings and
loan out what did not belong to them; indeed, banks would hold 100
percent reserves. With loan banking, on the other hand, the depositor
surrenders his right to withdraw his money at any time and instead
transfers title to the bank itself, which is then free to extend
loans and earn (and pay) interest on the money.
Under
today's fiat money, fractional-reserve system, all banking is treated
as loan banking, and, with some accounts, banks hold no reserves
whatsoever. As Murray N. Rothbard frequently reminded us, under
the old rules of accounting, all modern banks are technically bankrupt
all the time.
The
only factor that suppresses that fundamental reality is consumer
confidence. Deposit insurance, an institution designed to shore
up a bankrupt system, contributes to the sense of confidence. Even
small depositors' actions, like withdrawing a bit more cash, undermine
that confidence.
Despite
the appearance of stability and soundness, then, the foundations
of modern banking are actually extremely precarious. It would only
take the right kind of crisis, or perceived crisis, to throw the
entire system into chaos.
Bank
runs and the threat of bank runs serve a heroic function in a free
society. They spur banks on to be more careful in the conduct of
their business. We need more, not fewer, of them. The right to withdraw
one's funds from the bank is not only an essential part of freedom;
it is a way of reminding banks that they are part of the matrix
of voluntary exchange in a market economy, even if they do benefit
from huge subsidies from the Federal Reserve.
FURTHER
READING: Murray N. Rothbard, The
Case Against the Fed (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1996)
and The Case
for a 10O Percent GoIdDollar (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute,
1991).
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