Ignorance of Money and the Rejection of Austrian Economics
by
William L. Anderson
by William L. Anderson
DIGG THIS
As the traditional
Thanksgiving Day shopping weekend is upon us, we hear the usual
canards of hope – hope that consumers will "stimulate"
the economy, or we read from people like Karl
Rove that President-elect Barack Obama’s "economic team"
is "first-rate," and will have the "answers"
for the economy. Paul Krugman, who already had advocated trillion-dollar
deficits as a way to bring the economy into recovery, says that
this new government can "fix
the financial system" by even more regulation, thus avoiding
the next recession (if we ever recover from this one).
The spate of
bad advice and outright ignorance of what actually is happening
will continue into the Obama presidency, which has promised "green
jobs" as a means of bringing the economy back into balance.
(What Obama means is that his administration plans to destroy the
relatively-healthy energy industries and replace them with unreliable
substitutes like wind power and corn-based ethanol, thus destroying
millions of jobs in order to create a few thousand "new"
ones.) Moreover, the vaunted "economic team" so lavishly
praised by the former Bush political officer Rove so far has offered
nothing but more Keynesian "solutions" of massive debt
and inflation.
Instead of
simply attacking the newest Keynesian nonsense, however, I will
note that the eternal default position on economic crises – the
Keynesian one – arises because academic economists foolishly have
rejected Austrian Economics and the wise counsel it provides. This
hardly is an accident or a problem that can be "solved"
by being more aggressive in promoting the Austrian position. Instead,
the failure of economists to embrace Austrianism comes both from
ignorance about the economy in general and the fact that
Austrian "solutions" do not provide a central role for
economists to be seen as heroes or "fixers" of the economy.
Robert Murphy,
in a recent "open
letter" to the famed Nobel-winning economist Gary Becker,
writes the following:
Mainstream
economists often have a hard time grasping the Austrian theory
of the business cycle because it relies on a theory of the complex
capital structure in a modern economy. Most mainstream economists,
in contrast, usually think of the "capital stock" encapsulated
by a single value, K. Relying on the framework of the
Solow growth model, mainstream economists usually interpret the
Austrian theory as one of "overinvestment" during the boom.
As Murphy continues,
it is clear that modern neoclassical economists are clueless in
general about capital:
In order
to even comprehend the Austrian claim, the mainstream economist
needs to discard the simplistic homogeneous notion of the capital
stock, and seek a richer framework that reflects the time structure
of production. In a modern economy, if we picked a random consumer
good off the store shelf, it would probably have a "life history"
going back many years, and involving thousands of workers handling
resources originating in dozens of countries. (Leonard Read's
wonderful essay "I,
Pencil" is apposite.)
Indeed, if
one were to ask a typical economist how an economy grows, he or
she might reply: "Aggregate demand has been increased."
(The so-called Supply-Siders might say that "aggregate supply
has increased," but neither statement really makes any sense.
There really is no such thing as "aggregate demand" or
"aggregate supply"; they are figments of economists’ imaginations.)
For now, it seems that economists, no matter if they are of the
"free market" variety or if they are disciples of Keynes
and Krugman, all are calling for the government to become involved
in schemes to "jump start" the economy. The blind are
leading the blind.
Furthermore,
as Murphy points out in his "open letter," even accomplished
economic thinkers like Becker seem incapable of understanding the
basic Austrian notion of "malinvestment," instead mistakenly
calling it "overinvestment." (Krugman refers to it as
the "Hangover Theory,"
but presents a caricature not only of the theory itself, but also
in his portrayal of Austrian economists as people who revel in the
economic misery of others.)
Murphy and
others of the Austrian School are correct in pointing out that typical
academic economists really don’t understand capital very well, and
their few attempts at formulating a theory of capital have been
failures. Yet, I believe that the mainstream failure of capital
theory is due to the greater failure of economists to understand
that simple good: money.
About 30 years
ago, I read The
Biggest Con by Irwin Schiff, and I have not forgotten his
opening statement that money in the United States had "disappeared."
I was taken aback when first reading those words, but as I read
his book and then read the Austrian economists, I realized that
Schiff was right: money has disappeared in this country,
and has been gone for a long time. In fact, almost all modern
economists have grown up in a time when fiat "money"
has been the norm. Few economists (and I include myself) ever have
seen real money in circulation. The closest thing that most
of us have seen was the silver (or part-silver) coinage that existed
in the United States until 1965, but was replaced by government
tokens.
Thus, few,
if any, of us have experience in dealing with what historically
has been termed "money," and that situation only adds
to the overall ignorance that economists have of this subject. Furthermore,
because of the artificial division of economics into "microeconomics"
and "macroeconomics," economists who choose the more-popular
"micro" fields have almost no contact at all with monetary
theory, save a class or two from graduate school in which a near-pure
quantity theory prevails.
Economists
can speak of "money supply" or "price levels,"
but very few understand the very nature of the money economy and
what happens when governments predictably abuse their monopolies
of "money creation." Even the "free market"
economists often stumble over the issue of money, even when they
"specialize" in it, as did Milton Friedman.
This state
of affairs was made clear to me in
an exchange of articles by Joseph Salerno and Richard Timberlake
in The Freeman nearly a decade ago. Salerno argued the Austrian
position while Timberlake followed the Monetarist view. Timberlake,
for example, could not understand Salerno’s contention that the
1920s was an era of Federal Reserve-induced inflation in this country
because the consumer price index fell slightly during that decade.
Timberlake’s reasoning was that if the government index was falling,
then the 1920s had to be a time of deflation, not inflation.
Yet, Salerno
and Timberlake were arguing past each other because each man was
defining money in very different terms. Salerno was defining money
as a good used for exchange that had all the properties of any individual
good, and if the amount of money in circulation increases, the marginal
utility of money falls, with inflation being the decrease of the
value of money relative to the goods it is used to purchase.
Timberlake,
on the other hand, defined money in the more typical neoclassical
fashion of being a quantity variable monopolized by government and
manipulated by the central bank as a means of influencing economic
activity. The difference between the two points is crucial not only
in understanding the current economic crisis, but also in understanding
Austrian Capital Theory and the Austrian Theory of the Business
Cycle. If one cannot understand money and capital, then one cannot
understand the whole issue of malinvestments and what causes the
boom and bust cycle.
The consequences
of this ignorance are not esoteric. This is not a parlor discussion
among economists on how many spirits of George Stigler can dance
on the head of a pin. Instead, it is about understanding how this
current crisis came to being, what to do about it, and, just as
important, what not to do.
The upshot
is that economists are creating crude models of imaginary "aggregate
demand and aggregate supply," throwing in government spending
and expansion of fiat currency, and calling it a "solution."
However, one applies these "solutions" the same way that
one pours gasoline on a house fire to extinguish the flames. The
Keynesian "solution" is a disaster which is made worse
because most academically-trained economists are ignorant of the
causes of the problem and, thus, are not intellectually equipped
to recommend the needed steps to put the economy back into balance.
Austrian economists
and the intellectual tools they bring to the table are needed more
than ever, yet the response of the economics profession has been
to be even more aggressive in denouncing Austrians as "quacks"
and "charlatans" and making sure that they are excluded
from any academic and political discussions about this crisis. However,
if one wishes to see just how superior the Austrian position has
been, the best proof is to watch
clips of Peter Schiff (Irwin’s son), who is a well-known investor
and fund manager, debate mainstream economists and other "financial
experts" by using the Austrian analysis against their viewpoints.
Schiff clearly understands the nature of the crisis and how to stop
the bleeding and cure the "patient"; the others blindly
stumble about, citing the "expertise" of economic theories
that lead to nowhere.
For
years, economists from the University of Chicago and others influenced
by them have claimed that Austrian Economics is rejected by the
mainstream because it "fails the market test." Their logic
goes like this: (a) Mainstream economists accept good theory and
reject bad theory; (b) Austrian Economics is rejected by the mainstream;
(c) Therefore, Austrian Economics is bad economics.
This is circular
reasoning, not economic logic. The Chicago economists never deal
with the actual Austrian arguments or if they attempt to do so,
they usually
get them wrong. In my view, the reason they get them wrong is
because most economists do not have a clue as to understanding money.
The consequences for this ignorance are serious. We have a financial
and economic crisis that is going to turn into a major depression
because the economic mainstream is intellectually incapable of understanding
causes and solutions, and when the Austrians speak up, the other
economists close their ears, start screaming, and continue to lead
everyone else down the same path of destruction.
November
29, 2008
William
L. Anderson, Ph.D. [send him
mail], teaches economics at Frostburg State University in Maryland,
and is an adjunct scholar of the Ludwig
von Mises Institute. He also is a consultant
with American Economic Services.
Copyright
© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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