Altruism: True or False?
by Wilton D. Alston
by Wilton D. Alston
DIGG THIS
"Anyone
who has the power to make you believe absurdities has the power
to make you commit injustices." ~ Voltaire
As I continue
this odyssey of libertarian philosophy, I often come up against
a premise or belief or point of view that: a) has a long history
in mainstream thought; b) carries with it a substantial amount of
mystical cultural value; and c) tends to not be unanimously perceived
even within libertarian circles.
Somewhat surprisingly,
a belief in the existence of altruism seems to be such a concept.
For the record, and despite any flak I might get for sounding like
an objectivist, I posit that altruism does not exist. (Calling
me an objectivist would be rather ironic, since I’ve
not read enough Ayn Rand to have arrived at this conclusion
via any Randian dogma.) Furthermore, I don’t think we are any the
worse if altruism does not exist. I suspect that the number of heroes
in society or the amount of good works done via charity will remain
unchanged no matter how we chose to characterize such behavior and
no matter how much our culture wants to celebrate something that
simply does not exist.
For the purposes
of this discussion, I’ll define altruism
in two ways; both fully descriptive of the general consensus of
what altruism would be if it existed.
Altruism:
Selfless concern for the welfare of others; the commission of
a selfless act in relation to another.
Or:
Altruism:
The act of willingly, purposefully, exchanging one item of value
(say, your own life) for another item of ostensibly less or at
best equal value (say, the life of someone else).
To analyze
altruism, and determine whether it exists or not, I will confine
the discussion to a simple set of conditions. The only assumption
I will make is that altruism is "about" action,
that is, without purposeful action, altruism cannot exist via any
rubric. The table below defines these simple conditions.
|
Did the
Actor act?
|
Yes
|
No
|
|
Did the
Actor have a choice?
|
Yes
|
No
|
If you didn’t
have a choice, your action can’t be called altruistic. (Let us,
for the time being, dispense with any circular, mind-bending, pseudo-nihilistic
discussions of determinism and whether or not one ever has
a choice!) Our base assumption rules out instinctive behavior, and
with it, the behavior of animals. (How can we ascribe "selfless"
action to instinctive behavior? That is, of course, a non-sequitur.)
It would seem
as if our simple two-by-two table has been cut in half. The only
cases of merit in our analysis are the ones where the actor had
a choice and acted as well. Simply put, in order to be acting altruistically,
an actor has to act when he has a choice not to act, and in doing
so, offer in trade that which he believes is of greater value than
that which he receives.
Basic Austrian
Value Theory (AVT) posits that the perceived value received
by the participants in an exchange cannot be determined a priori.
That is, no one outside a transaction can determine what those involved
in a transaction will want to spend or receive in exchange. Only
the actor can make those decisions, generally at the time of action.
Of course AVT is applying these insights to "goods" and
the exchange of value – generally money – for them. In this essay,
I extend this premise to include choices where no literal "good",
i.e., object, is actually exchanged, but where value is obviously
still derived. This is, in fact, the heart of my argument that altruism
does not exist.
In the typical
application of AVT it is taken as axiomatic that no one outside
the transaction can determine a priori from viewing the transaction
how much value a participant will place on a transaction. That is,
any person voluntarily making an exchange must be assumed to be
receiving at least a slightly greater value than that which
he provides or he would not act. He may, in fact, be receiving a
huge "bargain" in his view. Either way, only he can decide.
Already we begin to see that an external observer is required to
make a value judgment that flies directly in the face of praxeological
truth in order to ascribe altruism to an action – we readily see
this error – and as a result we should also begin to see the flaw
in the larger concept.
Even with that
simple analysis, I would be surprised if there did not continue
to be more questions and beliefs about altruism, so let’s take a
bunch of hypothetical situations and categorize them as altruistic
behavior or not, just to see where it takes us.
To start, let’s
assume that a bunch of us are walking down some trail in Iraq, "on
patrol" or some such. At an unexpected moment, a grenade lands
directly in front of us. Without question, this grenade’s explosion
will kill most of us, unless someone shields us from the blast with
his body. (For the record, "Myth
Busters" verified that this action will indeed, save people
from the shrapnel of a grenade. I’ll assume for the time being,
that Discovery
Channel is as good a reference as any!) With this as a backdrop,
which of the following actions are examples of altruism, on the
part of the "person" falling on the grenade only?
- One of our
group members pushes someone onto the grenade, and that person’s
body saves us all.
- In the mad
rush to get away, someone trips and falls onto the grenade, and
that person’s body saves us all.
- One of our
group members [willingly, purposefully] jumps on the grenade,
and uses his body to saves us all.
- Just after
the grenade lands, a hunter nearby shoots a large bird. The bird
falls onto the grenade and, in a miracle of physics, his body
shields us from the blast.
- Unbeknownst
to us, one of our group members is a Vulcan.
The night before, he has mind-melded with one of our party and
told him that if a grenade falls in front of us, he is to jump
on it. At the appointed time, he does so, and his action saves
us all.
Which of these
situations provides an example of altruism? Based upon the assumptions
and definitions already covered, we can strike items 1, 2, 4, and
5 immediately, since not one of them illustrates purposeful action
by the savior. (Accidental behavior cannot be altruistic.)
Clearly there is no purposeful action by our shrapnel-stopper in
any of those cases.
Case 3, however,
might be a little more problematic. In fact, I figure many
folks would immediately suggest that our hero was acting with altruism.
If he was a "believer" in the rhetoric which suggests
that giving one’s life for a cause is a worthy exploit, then of
course he would be altruistic, right? No. Anyone who believes that
the trade of his life is appropriate in exchange for some higher
goal is, by definition, valuing that higher goal more than his life!
This is Misesian splendor revealed. He acts, on purpose, to achieve
more of what he likes, in exchange for less of what he does not.
The trade is in his favor or he would not have taken the action.
No other logical assessment is possible, unless he takes the action
accidentally, or randomly, or unless we cannot predict that people
follow praxeology
with all purposeful actions. I agree with Mises.
Try though
I may, I can find no scenario where similar logic does not hold.
Unless people act randomly, without purpose – and if they do, then
ascribing praise that should be reserved for a purposeful action
seems specious – they cannot be thought to perform any action, even
a "heroic" one, without regard to what they "receive"
in exchange. I realize that conclusion carries with it the danger
that many actions have, at their root, an ego component, albeit
a possibly non-obvious one. So what? If I’m alive because a guy
wanted to get on TV, thought he’d be rewarded in the afterlife,
or wanted to impress his girlfriend, who cares? Am I not just as
alive?
Conclusion
So there you
have it, no altruism to be found. While that analysis was relatively
straightforward, I have left for the conclusion the larger, and
frankly, more important question. Why is the existence or lack thereof,
of altruism a big deal? What’s the danger? It is in the answer to
this query that the Voltaire quote becomes germane. If people act
randomly, without holding to the laws of praxeology, prediction
becomes difficult. Furthermore, if people can be depended upon to
act in "self-less" non-personally-interested ways, then
a whole panorama of other conclusions follow. Civil servants who
sacrifice of themselves for the benefit of the masses could be a
reality. With these people at the helm, the awesome power of the
state could be used for good! In fact, if is because of: a) the
supposed unpredictability of human action; and, b) the ostensive
existence of self-sacrificial souls that legitimizes the state’s
very existence.
Count
me out. I’ll take my chances with everyone operating in their own
best interest, and the peaceful, predictable, dare I say it, "spontaneously-ordered"
society it brings.
August
8, 2007
Wilt
Alston [send him
mail] lives in Rochester, NY, with his wife and three
children. When he’s not training for a marathon or furthering his
part-time study of libertarian philosophy, he works as a principal
research scientist in transportation safety, focusing primarily
on the safety of subway and freight train control systems.
Copyright
© 2007 LewRockwell.com
Wilton
D. Alston Archives
|