Looking Back on the Greatest Depression

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On average,
world trade fell 31 percent in January 2009. To varying degrees,
recession and depression gripped globally.

outlook for global consumption remains bleak. Exports are likely
to remain lackluster until global consumers regain their appetite
for consumption,” wrote Jing Ulrich, managing director at
JPMorgan in Hong Kong, in response to the dire data.

To track
and make practical use of trends requires critical analysis of
not only the data but also of the interpretations arising from
the data. This becomes particularly essential when interpretations
express a virtual media consensus. “Whenever you find that
you are on the side of the majority, it is time to pause and reflect,”
advised Mark Twain.

A case in
point: On the surface, Ms. Ulrich’s assessment above does
not seem unreasonable. It is a theme expressed, with minor variations,
by a majority of economic analysts reported by the media. But
that assessment rests upon a set of false or questionable assumptions.

The first
assumption was that all consumers need to do is “regain their
appetites” for exports. But it has nothing to do with “appetites.”
Consumers were broke. They were no less hungry for products –
they just didn’t have the money to buy them.

The second
assumption was that once consumers started consuming again exports
would regain luster. Implicit in this statement was that as exports
grew, economies would rebound and everything would go back to
normal. This “normal” refrain was endlessly repeated,
not only by economic analysts, but by politicians and business

was not only the inevitability, but also the virtue and desirability
of a return to “normal.” What was normal?

Normal, prior
to “The Greatest Depression,” meant unchecked over-consumption
and over-development made possible by the availability of cheap
money and easy credit.

On the consumer
end, “normal” was a death wish, “shop 'til you
drop” – an obsessive compulsion by the profligate many
to spend money they didn’t have but had to borrow. The spending
spree extended to buying expensive new cars rather than affordable
used ones. It had people building extensions and making home improvements
when neither were necessary. It meant buying a McMansion when
a Cape Cod would do. Splurging on expensive vacations, elaborate
weddings and extravagant bar-mitzvahs to impress family and friends.

money financed a major lifestyle upgrade that otherwise could
not have ever been imagined, but that corresponded to what most
people considered the “American Dream.” Borrow to the
limit now, and pay sooner or later was “normal.”

On the commercial/financial
end, “normal” was also the obsessive compulsion to endlessly
acquire, not merely upgrade. Borrowed billions, lots of leverage
and little collateral provided financiers and developers with
the power to acquire ever more money, assets and prestige –
through mergers and acquisitions, building developments, equity
market speculation and predatory business practices that gobbled
up or drove out the competition.

Give or take
a bit of regulation and self-restraint, this was the “normal”
the popular new President promised to return to.

Which brings
us to the third assumption, and arguably the most important, which
was that the crisis – inability of banks to lend and businesses
to borrow – was mainly responsible for the economic disaster.
As President Obama put it, “Our goal is to quicken the day
when we restart lending to the American people and American business,
and end this crisis once and for all.”

He said,
“You see, the flow of credit is the lifeblood of our economy.
The ability to get a loan is how you finance the purchase of everything
from a home to a car to a college education; how stores stock
their shelves, farms buy equipment, and businesses make payroll.”

Sounds positive,
doesn’t it? Ease the “flow of credit.” Make it
easier “to get a loan.”

But what
the President meant and did not say was … take on more debt,
borrow more money.

Sound familiar?
Turn back the clock. Remember the advertisements at the start
of the decade encouraging Americans to take out home equity loans,
to buy new cars, to move up from a starter home into the dream
house? With interest rates at 46-year lows and credit flowing,
the public were suckered into betting on their futures with borrowed
money they could only pay back as long as they had jobs, could
make payments and the economy didn’t collapse.

But when
they lost their jobs, they couldn’t make payments and the
economy began to collapse. Total unemployment (including discouraged
workers and those with part time jobs looking for full time) was
nearing 15 percent. In the fourth quarter of 2008, the net worth
of American households fell by the largest amount in more than
a half-century of record keeping. By February 2009, the foreclosure
rate was up 30 percent from February 2008.

What Mr.
Obama promised as the solution was, and had been, the problem.
The country was already overwhelmed with debt … debt that
it couldn’t pay back. In what way could incurring more debt
“end this crisis once and for all”?

It was a
plain fact; the flow of easy credit produced a torrent of debt.
In 2009, private sector credit market debt was 174 percent of
GDP. Household debt-service ratio was at an all-time high. US
households had 39 percent more debt than income. (In 1962, consumers
had 37 percent less debt than income.) To promote policies encouraging
people to take out more loans and sink still deeper into debt
was abnormal, not “normal.” The abnormal had been renamed
the normal.

Instead of
encouraging people to live within their means, cut back, save
money, and distinguish between “wants” and real needs,
the official policy was to turn on the credit tap and flood the
world with more debt.

The sanity
of the policy was never in question. Arguments raged only over
the quickest and most effective way to turn on the money spigot.

was looking for someone, somewhere, for rescue, and most eyes
were turned to the United States. Even though the US was blamed
for the flagrant economic abuses that brought on the crisis, given
its economic clout and Superpower status, America was still looked
to for the leadership needed to pave the way to recovery.

With its
globally popular new president, hopes ran high that American know-how
would know how to fix the problem … as though it were an
intellectual exercise that could be solved by applying the correct
economic formula.

No such formula
existed. Yet so desperate was the world that it placed its hopes
on the very people responsible for the deregulation of the financial
industry largely blamed for the crisis. The deregulators now occupied
key positions within the cabinet of that globally popular new

investor Warren Buffett added a military dimension, dubbing the
meltdown an “economic Pearl Harbor.” Buffett called
on Congress to unite behind President Barack Obama, comparing
the economic crisis to a military conflict that needed a commander-in-chief.
“Patriotic Americans will realize this is a war,” he

If it was
an economic Pearl Harbor, the enemies were Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, A.I.G., Countrywide, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup,
Bear Stearns, and all the other banks, brokerages, speculators,
insurance companies, hedge funds and leverage buyout specialists
that had launched the sneak attack on the American economy.

It had nothing
to do with patriotism, unless being a “Patriotic American”
meant appeasing and rewarding the enemy with trillions of dollars
of taxpayer money and not being allowed to know where the money

Refuses to Release Bank Data,
Insists on Secrecy

5, 2009 (Bloomberg) – The Federal Reserve Board of Governors
receives daily reports on bailout loans to financial institutions
and won’t make the information public, the central bank
said in a reply in a Bloomberg News lawsuit.

Fed refused yesterday to disclose the names of the borrowers
and the loans, alleging that it would cast “a stigmau201D on
recipients of more than $1.9 trillion of emergency credit from
US taxpayers and the assets the central bank is accepting as

The public
had been cozened into believing:

  • That disclosing the identities of the recipients would poorly
    reflect upon their public image and therefore their ability
    to function. Secrecy, on the other hand, allowed them to continue
    making disastrous decisions, while bamboozling clients who would
    not know they were dealing with incompetents – who stayed
    in business only because of huge taxpayer-financed infusions
    of corporate welfare.

  • The
    “too big to fail” had to be bailed out by taxpayers
    in order to keep “the credit markets from seizing up.”
    But the consequences of seized up credit were rarely if ever
    spelled out.

Many financial
analysts no less “expert” than those pushing through
the bailouts were convinced that allowing the credit markets to
seize up would, in the long run, prove far less costly than endlessly
printing money and pouring it down a plush-lined sink hole. Buffett
was wrong. It wasn’t a “war” at all. It was a criminal
case, or should have been, but the accused took a financial Fifth
Amendment – the right to remain silent, since any statement
made could be used as evidence against them – and got away
with it.

When, at
a hearing before the Senate Budget Committee, Fed Chairman Ben
Bernanke was asked, “Will you tell the American people to
whom you lent $2.2 trillion of their dollars?” He answered,

7, 2009

Gerald Celente
is founder and director of The Trends Research Institute, author
of Trends
and Trend
(Warner Books), and publisher of The Trends
Journal. He has been forecasting trends since 1980, and recently
called “The Collapse of '09.”

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