A new book
entitled The
Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable by George
Victor and published by Potomac Books Inc. of Washington, D.C.
is well researched and gives a very clear picture of how and why
the Pearl Harbor myth was created. This "patriotic political
myth" states that the attack by the Japanese was unprovoked
and was a surprise to the Roosevelt administration, as well as,
the key military personnel in Washington; but the commanders of
Pearl Harbor were at fault for not being ready. Based on a good
summary of the up-to-date research the author, who is an approving
admirer of Roosevelt, concludes that Roosevelt deliberately provoked
the attack and that he and his key military and administrative
advisers clearly knew, well in advance, that the Japanese were
going to attack both Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. Roosevelt
wanted to get into the European War but he had been unsuccessful
in provoking Germany; therefore, he considered the sacrifice of
Pearl Harbor and the Philippines as the best way to get into the
European War through the back door of Japan. The cover-up of this
strategy started immediately after the attack and continues to
this day. The author concludes that this information of the coming
attack was intentionally withheld from the military commanders
because it was known that the Japanese were depending upon the
element of surprise and if warnings had been sent to the commanders
of Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, their preparation for the
attack would have caused the Japanese to cancel their plans.
The losses
and damages at Pearl Harbor are described by Victor as follows:
"In
the Pearl Harbor attack, the United States lost twenty-four
hundred troops along with a quarter of her fleet. Many military
leaders and Knox, Hull, and Roosevelt had underestimated the
harm Japan could do, even by a surprise attack. And U.S. losses
were much increased by two unlikely events. A Japanese bomb
penetrated the battleship Arizona's armor at an odd
angle, reaching her magazine and causing her to explode. And
the torpedoed battleship Oklahoma capsized. The explosion
of the Arizona and the capsizing of the Oklahoma
resulted in the drowning of sixteen hundred sailors."
The tremendous
losses in the Philippines have been virtually hidden from the
American public but they were mostly the native soldiers and civilians.
Victor states:
"The
Philippines suffered widespread destruction and was captured.
Twenty-four hundred troops and seventy civilians were lost in
Hawaii. In the Philippines, one hundred forty thousand troops
were lost and civilian deaths — still unreported — are estimated
to have been as high as three million. Nonetheless, the defeat
at Pearl Harbor became a wrenching tragedy, and the administration
sacrificed the commanders there to restore public confidence,
while the defeat in the Philippines became a noble defense.
Despite devastation and loss of the Philippines, a public relations
operation turned MacArthur into a hero and he was promoted.
The public reaction is not strange, however, when seen in the
light of government control of information — a usual wartime
practice."
The author
states that the most recent Pearl Harbor investigation by Congress
in October, 2000 resulted in a resolution by Congress "calling
on President William Clinton to restore the reputations of Short
and Kimmel. It provoked the flurry of accusations that Congress
was usurping the job of historians, revising history, and reviving
a long-discredited conspiracy theory. Clinton took no action on
the resolution."
The author,
Victor, includes a chapter from the viewpoint of the Japanese.
They were being pressured strongly by Germany to enter the war
by attacking the Soviet Union, thereby creating a two-front war
for the Communist nation. This strategy came within the actual
interests of Japan since they, like Germany, saw Communism as
a great evil and a threat to their respective nations. Furthermore,
Japan had substantial claims to parts of Manchuria as a result
of defeating Russia in the war of 1905. Both Germany and Japan
wanted to avoid a war with America at almost any cost. Roosevelt
was well aware of this pressure on Japan by Germany but he felt
that it was necessary to protect the Soviet Union as being the
best weapon against the Germans, and therefore, he wanted to prevent
Japan from attacking Russia. Roosevelt began extensive provocations
to cause Japan to abandon its attack on Russia and instead attack
America which also served the purpose of giving Roosevelt the
reason to enter the war. Roosevelt launched an eight-point provocation
plan primarily through the cutting off of oil supplies to Japan
so that by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor Japan was virtually
out of oil and on the verge of industrial and military collapse.
The attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines also would provide
Japan with the ability to attack the Dutch interests in the Pacific,
thereby giving them a new supply of oil.
Victor sees
Roosevelt's decisions as being based upon the assumption of the
truth of the following statement: "Hitler's plan to conquer
and enslave most of the world was hardly a secret." The author
cites no authority for this plan of Hitler to conquer the world
and you will not find this in the two books that Hitler wrote
nor in any of his speeches. His intentions were well known before
and during the war. He stated from the beginning, before he took
power, as well as thereafter, that he was against the harsh and
unfair Versailles Treaty which virtually disarmed Germany and
it included the inequities created for Germany in Poland and Czechoslovakia,
which he intended to correct either through negotiation or, if
necessary, by force. He stated and wrote that the only war he
wanted was to fight Communism and to regain some of the living
space that Germany had acquired in their treaty with Russia during
World War I, which was abrogated by the Versailles Treaty. Nevertheless,
the defeat of Hitler, not Germany, appears to be the premise upon
which the author states that Roosevelt acted so that the end justified
the means. Hitler, the man, must be defeated at all costs and
these costs included the sacrifice of Pearl Harbor and the Philippines
in order to get into the European War via Japan.
I need to
depart from a review of Victor's book momentarily in order to
take issue with his basic assumption that Roosevelt's main interest
was the defeat of Hitler. If his primary end was simply the death
of Hitler, Roosevelt had an excellent opportunity of letting the
key military officers in the regular German army carry out a plan
of assassination.
Allen Dulles
was stationed in Switzerland with the OSS (which preceded the
CIA) and was assigned the primary duty of seeing if there was
a resistance movement in Germany which might overthrow Hitler.
Dulles learned of a very substantial plot to kill Hitler early
in the war in 1942 after Germany's defeat at Stalingrad. While
Stalin had murdered 35,000 to 50,000 of his senior military officers
prior to the war in order to put in his loyal officers, Hitler
had resisted this strategy and did not purge the regular German
army of its senior officers. Early in the war a large number of
these senior officers, including his Chief of Staff, General Ludwig
Beck, built up a strong resistance movement with the purpose of
assassinating Hitler and then surrendering to the American and
British forces. They intended then to continue the war against
Communism and the Soviet Union. A new government was to be created
with Beck at the head and Dr. Carl Goerdeler, former mayor of
Leipzig, to be the two top people. There was originally a large
group who helped draw up the plan which included numerous civilians
who would serve in the new democratic government, so it was not
just to be a military coup. Dulles stated that even after the
resistance movement had been discouraged by Roosevelt's unconditional
surrender policy, nevertheless, a small group of officers who
remained committed to the assassination of Hitler made an unsuccessful
attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944. Hitler rounded up all
of the people who were even suspected of being a part of this
plot and this amounted to over 200,000 Germans who were put in
concentration camps and many were killed. The two principal high-ranking
German officers who took part in the plot met their fate on the
next day after the attempt, with one being shot by a firing squad
and General Beck was allowed to commit suicide in the presence
of the Nazi officers.
When Roosevelt
first learned of this significant resistance movement and the
plan of the Germans to surrender immediately to America and the
British, he unilaterally announced the unconditional surrender
policy which caused much of the resistance movement to dissolve
and their plans to be abandoned. Roosevelt's unconditional surrender
policy was not well received by either Churchill or Stalin. Dulles,
as well as, many key military advisers, were unsuccessful in getting
Roosevelt to abandon or substantially revise this policy. They
pointed out to Roosevelt that it would discourage the assassination
of Hitler. It would make the Germans fight harder, cause the war
to last longer and be more costly than necessary. Roosevelt's
policy required unconditional surrender to the British, the Soviets
and America simultaneously. No surrender would be accepted unless
it was made to all three at the same time. Many of the German
officers decided that they would rather fight against all three
rather than surrender to the Soviet Union. (See Germany's
Underground: The Anti-Nazi Resistance by Allen Dulles
and Unconditional
Surrender by Anne Armstrong.)
One of the
best writers on World War II was Hanson Baldwin, who covered the
war for The New York Times. After the war he wrote a book
entitled Great
Mistakes of the War, which was published in 1949. Baldwin
says the greatest mistake made was the unconditional surrender
policy of Roosevelt. He states that the policy "probably
discouraged the opposition to Hitler" and adds that it "probably
lengthened the war, cost us lives and helped to lead to the present
abortive peace." Baldwin then points out that it also had
a detrimental effect in the war against Japan. The Japanese had
indicated they were willing to surrender if the unconditional
surrender policy was changed so as to allow them to keep their
Emperor but President Roosevelt ignored the offer in January of
1945. After Roosevelt's death, President Truman stated he was
going to continue the unconditional surrender policy and rejected
the offer in July, 1945. The war continued and Truman ordered
the atomic bombs to be dropped in August of 1945 and the surrender
followed in September. The Japanese were allowed to keep their
Emperor after the war, and so in the end, the unconditional surrender
policy was dropped as to Japan, but only after they were bombed
with two atomic bombs. (See The
Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb by Dennis D. Wainstock
and The
Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb by Gar Alperovitz.)
My argument
is that Roosevelt's unconditional surrender policy was designed
to stop the resistance movement because Roosevelt did not want
an early end to the war. He wanted a new chance to create a world
organization, which he may have actually believed would end all
war for the future. President Wilson had made this promise with
the creation of the League of Nations. Roosevelt's plan was to
bring all nations under the cover of the United Nations with America
and the Soviet Union as the remaining two super powers who would
be virtually in control of this new world organization. Roosevelt
had been part of the Woodrow Wilson administration and personally
witnessed the worldwide adulation of President Wilson immediately
after World War I when he came to Europe. Roosevelt saw the admiring
mobs of people who lined the streets in France and Italy to cheer
Wilson and the newspaper reports stated that thousands of people
lined the railroad tracks at night just to watch Wilson's train
go by. Wilson was considered by millions of people as the greatest
man in the world at that time because it was perceived that he
brought peace to the world and had saved Europe. His vision for
the League of Nations was considered by many as the hope of the
future throughout the world to stop all war forever. (See Paris
1919: Six Months that Changed the World by Margaret MacMillan.)
Roosevelt made 800 speeches in his vice presidential campaign
in 1920 praising the League of Nations. Roosevelt felt that America's
entry into World War II would give him a chance to succeed where
his mentor and idol, Woodrow Wilson, had failed when the American
Senate failed to approve the Versailles Treaty which contained
the provision creating the League of Nations.
In August
of 1941, Roosevelt met with Churchill prior to Pearl Harbor and
brought up the United Nations idea to which Churchill objected.
Nevertheless, Churchill went along with it because he needed America
in the war. Stalin also objected to the United Nations idea and
both he and Churchill felt that the postwar settlement should
have separate spheres of influence for each victor rather than
a world organization to which the countries might lose their sovereignty
and also lose control of their special goals.
The best
account of Roosevelt and the United Nations is thoroughly covered
in the book entitled FDR
and the Creation of the U.N. by Townsend Hoopes and Douglas
Brinkley published by the Yale University Press in 1997. Both
authors are admirers of Roosevelt and of his accomplishment in
creating the United Nations. A brief summary of the main points
and several excerpts will tell that story.
"On
November 10, 1939, Pope Pius XII proclaimed the need to establish
u2018a stable international organization' after the war. In a private
response of December 23, President Roosevelt voiced his belief
that, while no spiritual or civic leader could now define a
specific structure for the future, u2018the time for that will surely
come'; meanwhile, the United States would u2018encourage a closer
association between those in every part of the world — those
in religion and those in government — who have a common purpose.'
"
The authors
then point out that extensive planning began to take place by
others in regard to the postwar settlement:
"Into
this planning vacuum stepped the private Council on Foreign
Relations with an offer to study postwar issues secretly and
make its deliberations available to the State Department. The
council was a Northeastern seaboard phenomenon, an elitist mix
of prominent New York bankers and lawyers with European interests
and prominent academics and intellectuals, many of whom had
served as advisers to Woodrow Wilson at the Paris peace conference.
The businessmen provided the money, while the scholars furnished
most of the intellectual leadership. The council operated mainly
through off-the-record conferences, study groups, and small
dinners confined to members, who were addressed by foreign or
American statesmen. It published Foreign Affairs, a
scholarly quarterly that had become the leading American journal
of its kind. In an age when fewer than one thousand Americans
could claim a journeyman's competence, or even a sustained interest,
in foreign affairs, the Council on Foreign Relations was a rare
island of influence and expertise in the body politic."
In less than
one month after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941
and followed immediately by the declaration of war by Congress,
Roosevelt began forming the United Nations into a specific entity:
"On
January 1, 1942, the Soviet and Chinese ambassadors in Washington
joined with Roosevelt and Churchill (who had arrived at the
White House in late December) in signing the Declaration by
United Nations. The following day, representatives of twenty-two
other nations at war with the Axis powers added their signatures
to the document, which created a wartime alliance of states
who promised to wage war with all of their resources and not
sign a separate peace. The president apparently thought up the
name u2018United Nations' and secured the Prime Minister's approval
by bursting into his bedroom at the White House while the doughty
Britain was taking a bath."
Roosevelt
felt that Wilson had been partly to blame for the failure of the
Senate to authorize the signing of the Versailles Treaty, thereby
causing America not to join the League of Nations. Roosevelt felt
that he could be more flexible if he only had a war which would
give him an opportunity to succeed where Wilson had failed. Hoopes
and Brinkley give a quick historical review as follows:
"The
Senate's rejection of the League of Nations treaty on March
19, 1920, was a result of many factors, of which perhaps the
most basic was the enduring fear and contempt for Europe's continual
intrigues and wars. As most Americans saw it, they had sent
their young men to France in 1917 to fight and die for a worthy
cause — to make the world safe for democracy." But they
had recoiled in disgust and disbelief at the spectacle of greed
displayed by the European victors and embodied in the vengeful
Treaty of Versailles. More direct and immediate reasons for
the Senate's rejection of the League were the personal bitterness
between President Wilson and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Massachusetts),
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the
misplaced loyalty of the Democratic Senators to their party
leader in the White House. The primary cause of failure, however,
was the absolute rigidity rooted in moral and intellectual arrogance,
of Woodrow Wilson."
The authors
point out that Roosevelt was much more flexible and willing to
compromise in order to create the United Nations.
After America
entered the war there was a great deal of activity in trying to
help Roosevelt create the United Nations. Hoopes and Brinkley
state the following:
"John
Foster Dulles apparently felt that the Shotwell group was too
secular, for he formed the Commission to Study the Bases of
a Just and Durable Peace, under the auspices of the Federal
Council of Churches. In one of many speeches, he declared, u2018the
sovereignty system is no longer consonant with either peace
or justice,' and said that he was u2018rather appalled' at the lack
of any agreed peace aims u2018to educate and crystalize public opinion.'
Yet he too offered no specific remedies. In a long editorial
in Life magazine entitled u2018The American Century,' publisher
Henry Luce noted the u2018golden opportunity' for world leadership
that the United States had passed up in 1919, and called on
the American people to help Roosevelt succeed where Wilson had
failed. It was now the time, Luce wrote, to accept u2018our duty
and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in
the world.' "
Hoopes and
Brinkley go on to describe Roosevelt's immediate public endorsement
of the United Nations in his State of the Union address as follows:
"The
President's State of the Union address on January 6, 1942 —
just one month after the attack on Pearl Harbor — was praised
by George Orwell on BBC radio as a u2018complete and uncompromising
break . . . with isolationism.' Roosevelt said, u2018the mood of
quiet grim resolution which here prevails bodes ill for those
who conspired and collaborated to murder world peace. The mood
is stronger than any mere desire for revenge. It expresses the
will of the American people to make very certain that the world
will never so suffer again. He referred to the signing of the
Declaration by the United Nations just six days before, and
defined the primary objective of that act to be u2018the consolidation
of the United Nations' total war effort against our common enemies.'
His focus was entirely on the war effort.
But if
the Administration had decided that the public disclosure of
postwar plans were dangerously premature, such inhibitions did
not apply to the press and private sector. Throughout 1942,
there was a steady procession of proposals for shaping the new
world and educating the American people.
The Commission
to Study the Organization of Peace, whose president, Columbia
professor James T. Shotwell, was an occasional adviser to the
State Department planning effort, accepted the need for an u2018Anglo
— American directorate' to run the world in the immediate postwar
period . . .
On March
5, 1942, the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable
Peace, headed by John Foster Dulles, proposed a far more radical
solution. It called specifically for a world government complete
with a parliament, an international court, and appropriate agencies.
The world government would have the power to regulate international
trade, settle disputes between member nations, and control all
military forces, except those needed to maintain domestic order…"
"A
more convincing, more sophisticated argument for realpolitik
was Walter Lippmann's 1943 best-seller, U.S.
Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, a brilliant
essay designed to counter the idealistic one-world internationalism
of which Wendell Willkie was the leading purveyor. It sold nearly
one half million copies. Lippmann, a crusading editor who had
helped Woodrow Wilson prepare his peace program, had been disillusioned
by the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, but
retained the conviction that American leadership in world affairs
was an absolute prerequisite of stability and peace. He thought
Willkie's thesis was founded on sand and that its corollary
— that the United States must undertake to police the world
— was a dangerous doctrine. Lippmann argued that all nations
must balance their commitments with their resources and should
avoid being overextended.
Lippmann's
formula for peace was no new League of Nations but a basic alliance
of the United States, Britain and Russia. No other nations were
serious factors in the world power equation. China and France
were not great powers. Only Britain and Russia were strong enough
to threaten U.S. security, but given America's close ties to
Britain, there was no risk from that quarter. The only real
danger was a falling out with Russia, but peace and stability
required that this be avoided at all costs, for an Anglo-American
alliance against Russia would set the stage u2018inexorably' for
a third world war."
Hoopes and
Brinkley summarize the negotiations between Roosevelt, Churchill
and Stalin, pointing out that Roosevelt suggested the Big Four
World Policeman would be America, Great Britain, Russia and China
and then there would be seven representatives of regional organizations.
However, Roosevelt privately stated to his key advisers that Soviet
Russia and America would be the two remaining super powers and
would be actually in charge of the organization. The authors then
state:
"Also,
he did not believe that Stalin would join an all — embracing
international organization without the protection of an absolute
veto power. . .
While America's
postwar planners were thinking in terms of some synthesis of
regional and global organization to replace the League of Nations,
the British Prime Minister was thinking of authoritative regional
arrangements without a global nexus, and his focus was on Europe.
He was dismissive of China, and uneasy at the idea of sharing
responsibility for the future of Western Europe with the Soviet
Union. In a note to Eden of October 12, 1942, Churchill wrote,
u2018I must admit that my thoughts rest primarily in Europe — the
revival of the glory of Europe, the parent continent of the
modern nations and of civilization.' It would be a u2018measureless
disaster if Russian barbarism overlaid the culture and independence'
of these ancient states. u2018We certainly do not want to be shut
up with the Russians and the Chinese' in Europe. Moreover u2018I
cannot regard the Chungking Government as representing a great
world power.' "
The authors
describe Roosevelt's opinion regarding the necessity of having
Stalin's cooperation for creating and operating the United Nations
as follows:
"Much
depended on Stalin, for the Soviet Union would be the only first-rate
military power on the continents of Europe and Asia after the
war. If the dictator chose cooperation, the foundations of a
peaceful society would be laid with confidence; if he chose
another course, the Western allies would be u2018driven back on
a balance of power system.' "
The authors
also cover the importance of the Yalta Conference in regard to
the creation of the United Nations:
"Calling
the Yalta Conference a turning point — u2018I hope in our history
and therefore in the history of the world' — FDR said that whether
it could bring forth lasting results u2018lies to a great extent
in your hands.' The Senate and the American people would soon
face u2018a great decision that will determine the fate of the United
States — and of the world — for generations to come.' Everyone
should understand there was no middle ground. u2018We shall have
to take responsibility for world collaboration, or we should
have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict.'
The Yalta agreements u2018ought' to spell the end of unilateral
actions, exclusive alliances, spheres of influence, and balances
of power that u2018have been tried for centuries — and have always
failed.' It was time to substitute u2018a universal organization,'
and the President was confident that Congress and the American
people would accept the Yalta agreements as laying the foundations
of u2018a permanent structure of peace . . .' "
The agreement
on Poland was entirely dependant on Stalin's word, for there
was no practical way to confront Russian power in Eastern Europe.
In part, this stance was dictated by the basic need for Russian
military cooperation to finish the war against Germany and then
join the war against Japan; in larger part it reflected FDR's
judgment that establishing the United Nations organization was
the overarching strategic goal, the absolute first priority.
He faced, as he viewed it, a delicate problem of balance. To
prevent a U.S. reversion to isolationism after the war, U.S.
participation in the new world organization was the sine qua
non, but the United Nations could not be brought into
being without genuine Russian cooperation, and that
depended on Western accommodation to unpalatable manifestations
of the Soviet Communist system in Eastern Europe." [Emphasis
supplied]
The authors
then point out that on April 6, 1945 the president authorized
Archibald MacLeish to prepare the speech he intended to make at
the opening session of the San Francisco conference. There had
been some speculation that he might even resign his position as
president in order to be leader of the United Nations. However,
on April 12, he died and the authors state:
"To
internationalists, the fallen leader promptly became a martyr
and symbol of their cause. Intoned the New Republic,
u2018Franklin Roosevelt at rest at Hyde Park is a more powerful
force for America's participation in the world organization
than was President Roosevelt in the White House."
If Roosevelt's
primary aim in World War II was to create the United Nations and
thereby bring world peace forever (in his own mind), and that
he considered the cooperation of Stalin and the Soviet Union as
the essential piece to that puzzle, this helps explain why Roosevelt
was so compromising with Stalin throughout the war. It also helps
explain why he let Harry Hopkins live in the White House and be
his closest adviser. The author, George Victor, in his preface,
addresses the fact that Hopkins was probably a Communist agent
and then he states "there are speculations that Hopkins influenced
U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in 1941, but no evidence of
it." He then defends Hopkins by saying that Hopkins never
did anything without the express direction of Roosevelt, which
may defend Hopkins, but it certainly does not defend Roosevelt.
Roosevelt surely must have been aware of the intercepted cables
which show that Hopkins was an agent of the Soviets. The cables
called "The Venona Cables" were those communications
between Soviet spies in America that were intercepted by American
intelligence forces which were available to Roosevelt. These "Venona
Cables" were released to the public in 1995 and in a sensational
book entitled The
Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America's Traitors
by Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel they show the fact
that Harry Hopkins was a Soviet agent, being number 19. They point
out that the cables revealed that the Soviets were ordering tons
of uranium in March of 1943 and that Major George R. Jordan objected
to sending the uranium since he and General Groves, head of the
Manhattan project, were concerned about Soviet espionage. Major
Jordan testified that he objected to sending the uranium but that
"Harry Hopkins had told him on the phone to expedite the
shipments." Major Jordan later wrote a book claiming that
Hopkins had helped the Soviets against the interests of the United
States.
In conclusion
of my argument, I take issue that the end justified the means,
and therefore disagree with Victor on this point. Roosevelt's
personal ambitions for greatness, obtaining worldwide adulation,
and his desire to create the United Nations could hardly be considered
ends that justified the means he employed.
Getting back
to Victor's book, he states in his last chapter entitled "History
and the Unthinkable" that the disaster in Pearl Harbor "needs
to be remembered, not for anything about Japanese treachery or
U.S. blunders. Its main lessons are about sacrifice, deception
and political considerations as common features of military planning."
He points out that other presidents have caused similar sacrifices
of the lives of soldiers and sailors, as well as civilians, with
similar acts of deception for political considerations. He states:
"Polk,
Lincoln and McKinley confronted dilemmas between what they considered
important U.S. interests and popular opposition to war. Lincoln's
problem was extreme; for years, conflict over slavery had been
tearing the nation apart. As Lincoln saw it, the secession and
the likelihood of further splitting threatened the nation's
existence. u2018However, there was one way out,' according to historian
Richard Hofstadter, u2018the Confederates themselves might bring
matters to a head by attacking Sumter . . . . It was precisely
such an attack that Lincoln's strategy brought about.' Hofstadter
added that u2018the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor did for [Roosevelt]
what the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter had done for Lincoln.'"
Victor carefully
analyses the situation with Abraham Lincoln as being comparable
to Roosevelt in starting their respective wars:
"On
becoming president in 1861, Abraham Lincoln's highest priority
was preserving the Union. To end the secession, he was willing
to guarantee federal noninterference with slavery. He therefore
pushed a constitutional amendment for noninterference through
Congress, and three states quickly ratified it, but the secession
continued. Lincoln was also willing — if necessary for preserving
the Union — to fight a war. But he found his nation — and his
own cabinet — against such a war. Even radical abolitionists
opposed it.
The Confederacy
had taken over most federal installations in its states — installations
surrendered on request by their administrators. Of those remaining
in federal hands, Fort Sumter in South Carolina was exposed
to attack and running out of supplies. Lincoln asked his cabinet's
advice on whether to supply the fort. With one exception, they
opposed it because doing it risked war. Lincoln then sent the
supplies, prompting an attack on the fort which became the incident
he used to start the Civil War.
If known
at the time, Lincoln's deliberate exposure of the fort might
have caused serious political repercussions. Later historical
accounts that imputed to him the intention of fostering an incident
for war in order to preserve the Union have created little stir.
His towering place in history is undamaged by them and he, too,
is viewed as a president with a clear idea of his mission, effective
in carrying it out."
The author,
Victor, also goes into some detail in regard to President Polk
starting the Mexican War:
"On
becoming president in 1845, James Polk told his cabinet that
California would be annexed. (His predecessors had offered to
buy California, but Mexico had refused to sell.) To his consul
in California, Polk suggested fomenting a revolution and promised
U.S. support for residents who rose against Mexico. A tiny uprising
under Capt. John Fremont had no effect on California's status.
Polk then sent an army to the Rio Grande.
History
books describe that area as U.S. territory, Texas territory,
or land in dispute between the United States and Mexico. The
area was, however, recognized by a U.S. treaty as within Mexico's
borders. As Polk expected, Mexico attacked the army, slaughtering
a troop.
On sending
the army, Polk wrote, in advance, a request to Congress for
a declaration of war based on the incident he expected. After
it happened, he submitted his request, claiming that Mexican
troops u2018had passed the boundary of the United States . . . invaded
our territory and shed American blood upon American soil . .
. . War exists notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it.'
But Polk, not Mexico, had sought the war. Congress then declared
war on Mexico and by an easy victory, Polk acquired the southwest
for his nation."
Victor points
out that President McKinley sent the battleship Maine into
the harbor of Havana, which was Spanish territory, as a provocation
to the Spanish and when the ship exploded from within it killed
260 U.S. sailors. The false propaganda was that the Spanish caused
it, thus giving McKinley an excuse to go to war and to acquire
from Spain America's first empire. McKinley was strongly supported
in his efforts to get into the war by none other than the "Megaphone
of Mars," Teddy Roosevelt, who was serving as the Assistant
Navy Secretary. Roosevelt declared "The Maine was
sunk by an act of dirty treachery on the part of the Spaniards."
The new battle cry for the war was now "Remember the Maine."
The author
expresses no moral judgment against these presidents for starting
their respective wars and states that:
"Deception
is as old as the history of war. According to the classic work
The
Art of War by Sun-tzu u2018All warfare is based on deception.'
It is, of course, practiced on enemies, but deception is also
used on subordinates. A common example is a suicide attack.
In order to have troops carry it out officers may hide the attack's
hopelessness from them. They may even mislead troops to believe
that it will succeed."
Victor recites
the views expressed by General George C. Marshall at the Pearl
Harbor hearings before Congress in 1945–6, as follows:
"In
my view, General Marshall was indeed an outstanding chief of
staff, upright, honorable, and incorruptible — as much so as
his position permitted. Testifying to various tribunals investigating
the Pearl Harbor disaster, other military officers vigorously
denied that they had withheld vital information from field commanders.
The denials were false. Marshall was the exception; he testified
to a congressional committee that withholding vital information
from commanders was routine practice. World War II documents
show not only withholding of information from field commanders,
but also distortion of it to mislead them."
The author
concludes this extremely disturbing book with the following two
paragraphs:
"Despite
the history of war, the idea that Roosevelt withheld warnings
from Kimmel and Short for the purpose of getting the United
States openly into the European war is still unthinkable to
many people, but to fewer and fewer as the years pass. As has
happened over time with other unthinkable acts, the repugnance
aroused by the idea of using the Pacific Fleet as a lure will
probably continue to fade. Polk's exposure of an army, Lincoln's
exposure of a fort, and McKinely's exposure of a battleship
are more or less accepted. In the Philippines, Midway, Wake,
Guam, Samoa, and in other outlying islands, U.S. forces were
exposed to Japanese attack, and that is also more or less accepted.
The Pearl
Harbor disaster was different from losses of the Philippines
and other Pacific islands because it shattered America's confidence,
arousing massive fear, a crisis of trust in the nation's leaders,
and an outcry for scapegoats. The nation seized on the administration's
explanation of betrayal by Japan and by Kimmel and Short, and
the disaster unified the nation to fight World War II with the
slogan u2018Remember Pearl Harbor!' The explanation became a major
national myth, which has substantially withstood the unearthing
of secret alliances, war strategies, and warnings received in
Washington."
In the preface
the author states: "I am not the first admirer of Roosevelt
to present him in Machiavellian terms." Victor goes on to
quote an admiring biographer of Roosevelt, James MacGregor Burns,
who stated: "It was not strange that [Roosevelt] should follow
Machiavelli's advice . . . for this had long been the first lesson
for politicians." Victor's final assessment is that:
"History
has recorded many, many rulers' manipulations of their people
into war without their subordinates blowing the whistle. Presidents
James Polk, Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson did it before
Roosevelt; and others have done it after him . . . .
Presidents
who succeeded Roosevelt also ordered sacrifices, but toward
smaller and sometime meaner ends. Here Roosevelt's manipulations
and the sacrifices he ordered are compared to those of Polk,
Lincoln, McKinley and Wilson, all of whom were implementing
ends considered noble in the light of traditional values."
[Emphasis supplied]
The author,
George Victor, mentions the deceit of President Wilson in getting
us into World War I but provides no details. However, you can
find this in Charles Tansil's excellent book entitled America
Goes to War. Justice Brandeis, who was appointed to the U.S.
Supreme Court by Wilson, rendered his opinion to President Wilson
that the alleged sinking of the French cross-channel passenger
ship, the S.S. Sussex, by a German submarine in the English
Channel with the loss of lives of the U.S. citizens justified
a declaration of war against Germany by the United States. The
ship was painted all black and the usual insignia to show it was
not a military ship were missing. The German commander of the
submarine wrote that he took the ship to be a military ship rather
than a passenger ship. Wilson relied on this legal opinion of
Justice Brandeis, who was Wilson's most influential adviser along
with Col. House, and the president addressed both houses of Congress
on April 2, 1917 using the sinking of Sussex and the loss
of American lives as a reason to declare war on April 7, 1917.
It was only after America was committed to the war that the truth
came out, which apparently was not considered material by the
news media, so the public never was fully informed. The Sussex
was not sunk and no American lives were lost. The ship was torpedoed
by the Germans but made it safely to the harbor at Boulogne where
it was hidden for some period of time.
Victor mentions
that subsequent presidents to Roosevelt have also deceitfully
taken America into wars but provides no names. He could have cited
President Lyndon Johnson and his lies about the Gulf of Tonkin
incident to get Congress to authorize him to retaliate to get
America into the Viet Nam War. He could also have mentioned our
current president and the lies about weapons of mass destruction
to get us into the war with Iraq. In both cases Congress accepted
the lies of the president and unconstitutionally delegated the
war making power to the president rather than declaring war itself,
as the Constitution requires.
I agree that
Victor has accurately described the deceitful conduct of the presidents
he cites (see the chapters "Lincoln and the First Shot"
and "Roosevelt and the First Shot" in my book A
Century of War) but I strongly disagree with his conclusion
that the American people have knowingly condoned the deceitful
activity of the presidents Victor mentions because our history
books do not contain this information, it is not taught in the
schools and universities and it is not recited by the news media.
You have to have independent researchers like Victor to find and
disclose most of this information.
I wonder
if Victor's book will be taught or read at West Point, Annapolis
or the Air Force Academy. After finishing it, the famous lines
from Tennyson's poem The Charge of the Light Brigade came
to mind:
"Theirs
not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die.
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred."
July
27, 2007
John V.
Denson [send
him mail] is a practicing attorney in Alabama and an adjunct
scholar at the Mises Institute. He is the author of A
Century of War, and editor of The
Costs of War and Reassessing
the Presidency.
