Are Mortgage Borrowers Rational?

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"I believe in people. I believe most people
are rational."

~ Brian Wesbury, as appeared
on CNBC June 20th

Earlier this week economists Gary Shilling and
Brian Wesbury squared off on CNBC to discuss the current state of
the housing market. Wesbury, the younger and far more frequent guest
over the past eight years, was bullish: the market is simply "correcting
back to normal." Shilling, the bear, subscribes to the housing
bubble theory. As evidence, last year 40% of home sales were speculative
in nature — that is, to second home buyers and investors. According
to Shilling, it would take a 35% drop in housing prices to restore
the long-term balance between median home prices and the Consumer
Price Index. What caught our attention was the essence of Wesbury's
assuredness: there never was a bubble because most people are
rational.

In a sense, Brian Wesbury is right. Man tends to
act rationally to pursue his own interests and remove discomfort.
Markets would fail if man always acted randomly and without purpose.
Imagine a household attempting to minimize its income and maximize
prices paid at the grocery store. Its members would quickly perish.
From 2001 to 2004 the Federal Reserve put the price of mortgage
credit on sale as it drove short-term interest rates through the
floor. Can existing and would-be homeowners be faulted for lining
up in droves?

A long-time friend from Scottsdale, Arizona (inventories
up ten-fold the past year) points out a distinction in the behavior
of the debtor class. Some have clearly acted responsibly: they consolidated
their debts into tax deductible mortgages, locked in the lowest
long-term rates in 40 years, and tossed the interest savings into
their rainy day and investment jars. From a consumption standpoint,
little has changed except that these old school borrowers pocketed
a windfall compliments of their friendly neighborhood central banker.

Others — to put it mildly — have gotten carried
away. Mortgage equity withdrawal (a.k.a. going deeper into debt)
was roughly $2.2 trillion over the past three years. Homebuying
on margin (peddled as "the American dream") greatly expanded
in the credit-challenged "subprime" strata. Debt service
costs (household financial obligations at nearly 19% of disposable
personal income) have never been higher, even with generously low
interest rates.

Thanks to the young and reckless, today housing's
vital signs look less than encouraging:

  • 29% of mortgages assumed in 2005 are now underwater.
  • 16% of those with mortgages pay over half of their income on
    housing, up from 2% five years ago.
  • 22% of the $9.3 trillion residential mortgage market is now
    subprime.
  • $2.7 trillion of adjustable-rate mortgages are expected to reset
    in the next 18 months with payments increasing on average 45%.
  • Total home inventories and the inventory/sales ratio are at
    record highs.

On Main Street, Madison Avenue, and especially
Wall Street, anything worth doing is worth overdoing. A good idea
inevitably wilts under the sunlight of too much attention. So, too,
the mortgage refi bloom is succumbing to over-exposure.

Man tends to act rationally until you place him
in a group and offer him something for nothing. Over a century and
a half ago Charles Mackay, in his classic Extraordinary Popular
Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, observed that "men
go mad in herds." 130 years later historian Barbara Tuchman,
in The March of Folly, chronicled the recurrent "pursuit
of policy contrary to self interest" from the Battle of Troy
to the Vietnam War. More recently Bill Bonner co-authored two highly
readable and entertaining books crash testing his theory on human
progress: in science and technology man tends to learn; in love,
finance, and war he makes the same mistakes over and over. This
play of perpetual blunder has many acts: fear, skepticism, rationalization,
exuberance, denial, resentment, and finally resignation. Only the
actors change.

For some, folly is a participatory sport, while
others choose to watch from the sidelines. Gary Shilling has been
around long enough to see this game before. He recognized the manias
of Japan in the late '80s and tech-land in the late '90s. He
now claims the mortgage market went manic
after the Greenspan
Fed opened the credit spigot to fend off a deflating tech balloon
in 2001. We have no knowledge of Brian Wesbury's view on "Japan,
Inc." in 1989, though six
years ago he jumped on the New Economy bandwagon
. Today he dismisses
the housing naysayers and assures us that the market is "pulling
back to normal."

We
have little doubt who's crystal ball is more popular with CNBC viewers.

June
24, 2006

Kevin
Duffy [send him mail]
is a principal of Bearing Asset Management.

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