Paris Accord, The Sequel

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According to
numerous reports, President Bush — while at a meeting with leaders
of the European Union last week — gave the Mullahs an ultimatum:

"If
Iran’s leaders want peace and prosperity and a more hopeful future
for their people, they should [1] accept our offer, [2] abandon
any ambitions to obtain nuclear weapons and [3] come into compliance
with their international obligations.”

In other words,
if Iran's leaders — the Mullahs — don't meet Bush's three demands,
he intends to launch yet another pre-emptive war of aggression to
remove the elected leaders of yet another sovereign state.

Now, the Mullahs
have stated over and over that they have no "ambitions"
to obtain nuclear weapons to abandon. Nuclear Weapons would be against
their religion, the Mullahs say.

And, after
more than three years of intrusive go-anywhere see-anything interview-anyone
inspections by staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Director-General ElBaradei continues to report to the IAEA Board
of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran
is in compliance with its "international obligations."

So OK, that's
two conditions met. Now, what's this "offer" Bush is talking
about?

And who is
"our"?

Virtually everyone
reporting of Bush's ultimatum went on to note that "the suspension
of uranium enrichment is a non-negotiable precondition set out in
the proposal made to Iran by the five permanent UN Security Council
members — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States —
plus Germany."

Now, you're
supposed to get the impression that the Security Council has made
a proposal — "our offer" — to Iran containing a "non-negotiable
precondition."

But it hasn't.

The proposal
was transmitted to the Mullahs earlier this month by Javier Solana,
an EU official who has no connection whatsoever to the Security
Council.

In fact, Solana
is the EU High Representative who was a party in "support"
of the Brit-French-German-Iranian Paris Accord of 15 November, 2004.

The Paris Accord
negotiations were undertaken by the Iranians in the hope they could
obtain “objective guarantees” that the EU would defy the United
States, would re-establish normal diplomatic and trade relations,
and would, inter alia, respect both Iran’s “inalienable”
rights and European obligations under the Treaty on Nonproliferation
of Nuclear Weapons.

Iran reaffirmed
that "it does not and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons."

And, in order
to "build further confidence" Iran "decided — on
a voluntary basis — to continue and extend its suspension to include
all enrichment and reprocessing activities."

Since all these
activities were already subject to IAEA Safeguards, the IAEA Board
of Governors was notified of this voluntary suspension and the IAEA
Secretariat asked to "verify and monitor" it.

Monitoring
the Iranian voluntary suspension of IAEA Safeguarded activities
is the sum total of IAEA involvement in the Paris Accord
negotiations!

Whether those
negotiations succeeded or failed was literally none of the
IAEA Board's beeswax.

On March 23,
2005, the Iranians made a confidential proposal to the EU to voluntarily
"confine" their nuclear programs.

In particular,
the Iranians offered to forego indefinitely the chemical
processing of spent fuel to recover unspent uranium and plutonium,
and to limit their uranium-enrichment activities to meeting
contingency refueling requirements for Iranian nuclear power
plants, planned and under construction.

The Iranians
also offered to submit to “continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors
at the conversion and enrichment facilities to provide unprecedented
added guarantees.”

When the Iranians
got no response to their offer, the Iranians went public, announcing
on Aug. 1, 2005, the “phased” implementation of the “confined” —
that is, contingency only — uranium-enrichment program set out in
their March proposal.

Bush promptly
went ballistic, strong-armed the IAEA Board into demanding that
Iran return to the Paris Accord negotiating table. Or else.

When that didn't
work, Bush strong-armed the IAEA Board into "reporting" the Iranian
"dossier" to the UN Security Council, hoping the Security Council
would demand that Iran return to the Paris Accord negotiating table.
Or else.

That didn't
work either.

So now Bush
has got the Russians and Chinese to join him and the Brits-French-Germans-EU
in demanding that Iran return to the "negotiating table."

The Iranians
were asked to keep the terms of the "offer" Solana brought
to them confidential, and apparently have, so far. But according
to leaks "by "Western diplomats on condition of anonymity,"
this time the Mullahs will be required to negotiate
with the US-Brits-French-Germans-Russians-Chinese the extent to
which the Iranians will be allowed to exercise their inalienable
rights, guaranteed under the NPT.

And this time
there is a pre-condition. The "confidence building" suspensions
by Iran that were made voluntarily under the Paris Accord
are now required.

Under the Paris
Accord, there were no "pre-conditions." In fact, under
the Paris Accord, the Brits-French-Germans-EU recognize up-front
"Iran's rights under the NPT, exercised in conformity with
its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination."

On March 23,
2005, the Iranians offered to voluntarily "confine" their
program while reserving all their NPT rights — and hence,
reserving the rights of all NPT signatories.

It was a good
offer and Bush should have allowed the EU to accept it.

June
26, 2006

Physicist
James Gordon Prather [send
him mail
] has served as a policy-implementing official for national
security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency,
the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department
of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department
of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for
national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. –
ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the
Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather
had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in California and Sandia National Laboratory
in New Mexico.

Gordon
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