Iran's Right to Nuclear Power

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According
to the United Nations statute establishing the International Atomic
Energy Agency:

The
Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of
atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.
It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided
by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not
used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

The
Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its members, and all members — in order to ensure to all of
them the rights and benefits resulting from membership — shall
fulfill in good faith the obligation assumed by them in accordance
with this Statute.

Hence,
the IAEA Secretariat, the IAEA Board of Governors and all members
are to, “in good faith,” assist in the development and practical
application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes in all member
states.

In
order to ensure that “special fissionable or other materials, equipment,
services, equipment, facilities and information” are not used “in
such a way as to further any military purpose,” the IAEA Secretariat
administers a Safeguards system.

Iran
entered into a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1974.

Under
that agreement (contrary to what the neo-crazy sycophantic
media has told you) Iran is not required to inform the IAEA
about the existence of facilities — such as the uncompleted nuclear
power plant at Bushehr, for example– until 180 days before
“special fissionable or other materials” are actually introduced
into the facility.

Iran
notified the IAEA about Bushehr, the Uranium Conversion Facility
at Estefan and the Uranium Enrichment Facility at Natanz — and subjected
them to IAEA Safeguards — years before being required to
do so.

Hence,
for years, the principal responsibility of the IAEA’s director general,
Mohamed ElBaradei, in Iran has been to assist the Iranians get those
“safeguarded” facilities at Bushehr, Estefan and Natanz up and operating,
safely and peacefully.

As
well as to counter the “bad faith” efforts of the Cheney Cabal to
prevent the Iranians from getting those facilities up and operating.

So,
ElBaradei’s report to the IAEA Board’s quarterly meeting last week
was mostly an update of what he has done to assist the Iranians
at Bushehr, Estefan and Natanz. Right?

Wrong!

ElBaradei’s
report is mostly an update of what he has not done.

You
see, at their last quarterly meeting, the Board directed ElBaradei
to report to the U.N. Security Council their determination that
to satisfy some Board members as to the exclusively peaceful intent
of Iran’s nuclear program, the Board “deemed it necessary” for Iran
to,
inter alia:

implement
transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including
in GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the
Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access
to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use
equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development
as the Agency may require in support of its ongoing investigations.

Beyond
the requirements of a potential Additional Protocol.

Far
beyond the requirements of Iran’s existing Safeguards Agreement.

Iran
promptly informed ElBaradei that — in the future — it would comply
only with their Safeguards agreement. After three years of
voluntary cooperation that went beyond even an Additional Protocol
not yet in force, Iran declared:

It
should also be recalled that Iran has fully cooperated in provision
of voluminous information; granting many accesses to different locations
[even military sites]; arranging interviews with individuals; submission
of non-Safeguards related information; [granting] permission for
taking large number of environmental samples from nuclear and non-nuclear
sites and even from military sites; [arranging] over thousands of
hours of meetings with experts in understanding the detail of every
subject [which amounted to more than 1,700 man-days of inspection];
therefore, the Agency has full understanding on every part of the
program and has achieved progress on the matters.

So,
does ElBaradei acknowledge in his latest report that previous cooperation
by Iranians had — in fact — gone far, far beyond what was required
under their existing Safeguards Agreement?

No.

He
just complains about how hard it is, now, “to follow up” on “information”
obtained from a mysterious “walk-in” laptop, provided him by the
Cheney Cabal.

First,
there is “Operation Green Salt,” an inexplicable — therefore, highly
suspect — military uranium-conversion program.

Then,
there is the “design of a missile re-entry vehicle,” which — if
authentic — is highly classified Iranian national security information
and, under the IAEA Statute, absolutely none of ElBaradei’s business.

June
19, 2006

Physicist
James Gordon Prather [send
him mail
] has served as a policy-implementing official for national
security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency,
the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department
of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department
of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for
national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. –
ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the
Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather
had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in California and Sandia National Laboratory
in New Mexico.

Gordon
Prather Archives

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