ElBaradei Beats Bolton

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Mohamed
ElBaradei will serve a third term as director general of the International
Atomic Energy Agency.

Since
abject failure appears to be a criterion for being awarded the Presidential
Medal of Freedom, look for John Bolton – currently undersecretary
of state – to be the next recipient.

You
see, Bolton has been "point man" in the Bush administration’s
campaign to discredit and/or supersede ElBaradei and his pesky IAEA
nuke proliferation-prevention regime.

How
pesky?

In
President Bush’s first State of the Union message, he essentially
accused North Korea, Iran and Iraq of having clandestine nuke programs:

"States
like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil,
arming to threaten the peace of the world.

"I
will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand
by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America
will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us
with the world’s most destructive weapons."

But
– at that time – North Korea, Iran and Iraq were signatories
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All three had their "declared"
nuclear facilities subject to IAEA periodic inspection, and both
Iraq and North Korea were subject to additional stringent IAEA surveillance.

The
IAEA nuke proliferation prevention regime applied to Iraq was especially
severe. The IAEA Action Team on Iraq had been granted extraordinary
authority by U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. To wit:

  1. Identifying
    Iraqi facilities capable of enriching or extracting nuke-usable
    materials;
  2. Assessing
    Iraqi industrial capabilities for constructing such plants;
  3. Identifying
    Iraqi plants capable of producing non-nuclear components of nukes;
  4. Searching
    for evidence – including analysis of ongoing research and
    development activities – of an Iraqi nuke program.

    [This extraordinary
    authority given by the Security Council to the IAEA for Iraq
    then became the basis for developing the 1997 Model Additional
    Protocol to be added to all existing IAEA Safeguards Agreements.]

As
for North Korea, under the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework of 1994, all
existing North Korean "nuclear" activities had been "frozen"
– under IAEA lock and seal – in return for a promise of
free nuclear power plants and an interim supply of free fuel-oil.

If
the IAEA had determined that a) Iraq was not in compliance with
Security Council resolutions or that b) North Korea was not in compliance
with the Agreed Framework or that c) Iran was not in compliance
with its Safeguards Agreement, it could have asked the U.N. Security
Council to impose "sanctions," which could – under
the U.N. Charter – include the use of military force.

However,
the IAEA had made no such determination.

Obviously,
if Bush was to impose regime change on Iraq, Iran and North Korea
on the pretext they had nukes, the IAEA nuke proliferation-prevention
regime had to be discredited or superseded.

So,
Bush announced his own National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction in late 2002 and developed from it the Proliferation
Security Initiative of 2003, whose objective was to create a web
of international "counter-proliferation partnerships"
to prevent "proliferators" from "carrying out their
trade in WMD and missile-related technology."

According
to Bolton, the PSI was necessary because "proliferators and
those facilitating the procurement of deadly capabilities are circumventing
existing laws, treaties and controls against WMD proliferation."
Unlike the existing U.N. nuke proliferation-prevention regime, "PSI
is not diverted by disputes about candidacies for director general,
agency budgets, agendas for meetings and the like."

Bolton
began implementing Bush’s PSI almost nine months after Bush had
unilaterally abrogated the IAEA-monitored Agreed Framework with
North Korea and several months after Bush had defied the U.N. Security
Council by unilaterally invading and occupying Iraq.

Bolton
claimed the PSI was presaged by Security Council Resolution 1540
of 2004, which reaffirmed the UNSC President’s Statement (S 23500)
of Jan. 31, 1992.

Bolton
to the contrary, that statement actually includes the following
reaffirmation of the NPT and the role of the IAEA in preventing
nuke proliferation:

"On
nuclear proliferation, they [Council members] note the importance
of the decision of many countries to adhere to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and emphasize the integral role in the implementation of
that Treaty of fully effective IAEA safeguards, as well as the importance
of effective export controls. The members of the Council will take
appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to them
by the IAEA."

Bolton
has been demanding, publicly and privately, that ElBaradei be replaced.
Well, that’s not going to happen. But stay tuned. Maybe Bolton will
be replaced … so as to be eligible for the Presidential Medal
of Freedom.

January
10, 2005

Physicist
James Gordon Prather [send
him mail
] has served as a policy-implementing official for national
security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency,
the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department
of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department
of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for
national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. –
ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the
Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather
had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in California and Sandia National Laboratory
in New Mexico.

Gordon
Prather Archives

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