Ten Questions for Michelle Malkin

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Dear
Ms Malkin,

As
you did not respond substantively to any of the points I raised
in my column
or my first email to you, I am addressing the following questions
directly to you.

  1. I have
    asserted that there was no reasonable risk of invasion.

    This opinion is supported by modern military experts. You have
    written that “the risk of full-scale invasion was low.” Did
    this “low” risk alone justify the internment?

  2. Was the
    number of troops stationed in California, Oregon and Washington
    in February 1942 sufficient to deal with Japan's trans-Pacific
    troop transport capacity?

  3. The production
    figures for 1940 through 1945 show a significant delta between
    the United States and Japan. Could sabotage have accounted for
    enough damage to, as you suggest, potentially cripple the war
    effort, and what percentage of lost production would you describe
    as "crippling"?

  4. Did this
    potential risk of sabotage alone justify the internment?

  5. Was the
    potential for cumulative damage from sabotage and spot raids
    on the West Coast greater or less than the cumulative damage
    to Germany wrought by the Allied bombing campaign of Germany
    in 1943 and 1944?

  6. 160 planes
    were destroyed at Pearl Harbor. Based on 1940–41 production
    figures, how long did it take to replace those planes and how
    many planes were left to American forces?

  7. Were any
    subsequent "spot raids" likely to cause more or less
    damage than Pearl Harbor?

  8. Considering
    that the Japanese lost 29 planes in the Pearl Harbor attack,
    what is the probable number of spot raids they could have made
    with the three carriers you cite were available to them for
    use in such a capacity in 1942?

  9. Since German
    military production increased 278 percent from 1942 to 1944
    while being bombed on a daily and nightly basis, while US production
    increased only 206 percent over the same period, is it reasonable
    to assume that Japanese spot raids would have slowed US production
    or the war effort at all? If your answer is yes, please explain
    how and why.

  10. Did the
    risk of these potential spot raids alone justify internment?

Please
provide clear, specific and unevasive answers to these questions;
you can offer qualifiers, explanations and assertions of whatever
you like in a separate rebuttal.

Uninformedly
yours,
Vox Day
Universal
Press Syndicate

September
14, 2004

Vox
Day [send him mail]
is syndicated nationally by Universal Press Syndicate. Visit his
web log, Vox Popoli, for
daily commentary and responses to reader email.

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