The Progressive Era and the Family

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While the
"Progressive Era" used to be narrowly designated as
the period 1900–1914, historians now realize that the period
is really much broader, stretching from the latter decades of
the nineteenth century into the early 1920s. The broader period
marks an era in which the entire American polity — from economics
to urban planning to medicine to social work to the licensing
of professions to the ideology of intellectuals — was transformed
from a roughly laissez-faire system based on individual rights
to one of state planning and control. In the sphere of public
policy issues closely related to the life of the family, most
of the change took place, or at least began, in the latter decades
of the nineteenth century. In this paper we shall use the analytic
insights of the "new political history" to examine the
ways in which the so-called progressives sought to shape and control
selected aspects of American family life.

ETHNORELIGIOUS
CONFLICT AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

In the last
two decades, the advent of the "new political history"
has transformed our understanding of the political party system
and the basis of political conflict in nineteenth century America.
In contrast to the party systems of the twentieth century (the
"fourth" party system, 1896–1932, of Republican
supremacy; the "fifth" party system, 1932–? of
Democratic supremacy), the nineteenth century political parties
were not bland coalitions of interests with virtually the same
amorphous ideology, with each party blurring what is left of its
image during campaigns to appeal to the large independent center.
In the nineteenth century, each party offered a fiercely contrasting
ideology, and political parties performed the function of imposing
a common ideology on diverse sectional and economic interests.
During campaigns, the ideology and the partisanship became fiercer
and even more clearly demarcated, since the object was not to
appeal to independent moderates — there were virtually none —
but to bring out the vote of one’s own partisans. Such partisanship
and sharp alternatives marked the "second" American
party system (Whig versus Democrat, approximately 1830 to the
mid-1850s) and the "third" party system (closely fought
Republican versus Democrat, mid-1850s to 1896).

Another important
insight of the new political history is that the partisan passion
devoted by rank-and-file Democrats and Republicans to national
economic issues, stemmed from a similar passion devoted at the
local and state level to what would now be called "social"
issues. Furthermore, that political conflict, from the 1830s on,
stemmed from a radical transformation that took place in American
Protestantism as a result of the revival movement of the 1830s.

The new revival
movement swept the Protestant churches, particularly in the North,
like wildfire. In contrast to the old creedal Calvinist churches
that stressed the importance of obeying God’s law as expressed
in the church creed, the new "pietism" was very different.
The pietist doctrine was essentially as follows: Specific creeds
of various churches or sects do not matter. Neither does obedience
to the rituals or liturgies of the particular church. What counts
for salvation is only each individual being "born again"
— a direct confrontation between the individual and God, a mystical
and emotional conversion in which the individual achieves salvation.
The rite of baptism, to the pietist, therefore becomes secondary;
of primary importance is his or her personal moment of conversion.

But if the
specific church or creed becomes submerged in a vague Christian
interdenominationalism, then the individual Christian is left
on his own to grapple with the problems of salvation. Pietism,
as it swept American Protestantism in the 1830s, took two very
different forms in North and South, with very different political
implications. The Southerners, at least until the 1890s, became
"salvationist pietists," that is, they believed that
the emotional experience of individual regeneration, of being
born again, was enough to ensure salvation. Religion was a separate
compartment of life, a vertical individual-God relation carrying
no imperative to transform man-made culture and interhuman relations.

In contrast,
the Northerners, particularly in the areas inhabited by "Yankees,"
adopted a far different form of pietism, "evangelical
pietism." The evangelical pietists believed that man could
achieve salvation by an act of free will. More particularly, they
also believed that it was necessary to a person’s own
salvation — and not just a good idea — to try his best
to ensure the salvation of everyone else in society:

"To
spread holiness," to create that Christian commonwealth by
bringing all men to Christ, was the divinely ordered duty of the
"saved." Their mandate was "to transform the world
into the image of Christ."

1

Since each
individual is alone to wrestle with problems of sin and salvation,
without creed or ritual of the church to sustain him, the evangelical
duty must therefore be to use the state, the social arm of the
integrated Christian community, to stamp out temptation and occasions
for sin. Only in this way could one perform one’s divinely mandated
duty to maximize the salvation of others.

2

And to the evangelical pietist, sin took on an extremely
broad definition, placing the requirements for holiness far beyond
that of other Christian groups. As one antipietist Christian put
it, "They saw sin where God did not." In particular,
sin was any and all forms of contact with liquor, and doing anything
except praying and going to church on Sunday. Any forms of gambling,
dancing, theater, reading of novels — in short, secular enjoyment
of any kind — were considered sinful.

The forms
of sin that particularly agitated the evangelicals were those
they held to interfere with the theological free will of individuals,
making them unable to achieve salvation. Liquor was sinful because,
they alleged, it crippled the free will of the imbibers. Another
particular source of sin was Roman Catholicism, in which priests
and bishops, arms of the Pope (whom they identified as the Antichrist),
ruled the minds and therefore crippled the theological freedom
of will of members of the church.

Evangelical
pietism particularly appealed to, and therefore took root among,
the "Yankees," i.e., that cultural group that originated
in (especially rural) New England and emigrated widely to populate
northern and western New York, northern Ohio, northern Indiana,
and northern Illinois. The Yankees were natural "cultural
imperialists," people who were wont to impose their values
and morality on other groups; as such, they took quite naturally
to imposing their form of pietism through whatever means were
available, including the use of the coercive power of the state.

In contrast
to evangelical pietists were, in addition to small groups of old-fashioned
Calvinists, two great Christian groups, the Catholics and the
Lutherans (or at least, the high-church variety of Lutheran),
who were "liturgicals" (or "ritualists") rather
than pietists. The liturgicals saw the road to salvation in joining
the particular church, obeying its rituals, and making use of
its sacraments; the individual was not alone with only his emotions
and the state to protect him. There was no particular need, then,
for the state to take on the functions of the church. Furthermore,
the liturgicals had a much more relaxed and rational view of what
sin really was; for instance, excessive drinking might
be sinful, but liquor per se surely was not.

The evangelical
pietists, from the 1830s on, were the northern Protestants of
British descent, as well as the Lutherans from Scandinavia and
a minority of pietist German synods; the liturgicals were the
Roman Catholics and the high-church Lutherans, largely German.

Very rapidly,
the political parties reflected a virtually one-to-one correlation
of this ethnoreligious division: the Whig, and later the Republican,
party consisting chiefly of the pietists, and the Democratic party
encompassing almost all the liturgicals. And for almost a century,
on a state and local level, the Whig/Republican pietists tried
desperately and determinedly to stamp out liquor and all Sunday
activities except church (of course, drinking liquor on Sunday
was a heinous double sin). As to the Catholic church, the pietists
tried to restrict or abolish immigration, since people coming
from Germany and Ireland,
liturgicals, were outnumbering people from Britain
and Scandinavia. Failing that and despairing of doing anything
about adult Catholics poisoned by agents of the Vatican,
the evangelical pietists decided to concentrate on saving Catholic
and Lutheran youth by trying to eliminate the parochial schools,
through which both religious groups transmitted their precious
religious and social values to the young. The object, as many
pietists put it, was to "Christianize the Catholics,"
to force Catholic and Lutheran children into public schools, which
could then be used as an instrument of pietist Protestantization.
Since the Yankees had early taken to the idea of imposing communal
civic virtue and obedience through the public schools, they were
particularly receptive to this new reason for aggrandizing public
education.

To all of
these continuing aggressions by what they termed "those fanatics,"
the liturgicals fought back with equal fervor. Particularly bewildered
were the Germans who, Lutheran and Catholic alike, were accustomed
to the entire family happily attending beer gardens together on
Sundays after church and who now found the "fanatic"
pietists trying desperately to outlaw this pleasurable and seemingly
innocent activity. The pietist Protestant attacks on private and
parochial schools fatally threatened the preservation and maintenance
of the liturgicals’ cultural and religious values; and since large
numbers of the Catholics and Lutherans were immigrants, parochial
schools also served to maintain group affinities in a new and
often hostile world — especially the world of Anglo-Saxon pietism.
In the case of the Germans, it also meant, for several decades,
preserving parochial teaching in the beloved German language,
as against fierce pressures for Anglicization.

In the last
three decades of the nineteenth century, as Catholic immigration
grew and the Democratic party moved slowly but surely toward a
majority status, the Republican, and — more broadly — pietist
pressures became more intense. The purpose of the public school,
to the pietists, was "to unify and make homogeneous the society."
There was no twentieth century concern for separating religion
and the public school system. To the contrary, in most northern
jurisdictions only pietist-Protestant church members were allowed
to be teachers in the public schools. Daily reading of the Protestant
Bible, daily Protestant prayers and Protestant hymns were common
in the public schools, and school textbooks were rife with anti-Catholic
propaganda. Thus, New York City school textbooks spoke broadly
of "the deceitful Catholics," and pounded into their
children, Catholic and Protestant alike, the message that "Catholics
are necessarily, morally, intellectually, infallibly, a stupid
race."3

Teachers
delivered homilies on the evils of Popery, and also on deeply
felt pietist theological values: the wickedness of alcohol (the
"demon rum") and the importance of keeping the Sabbath.
In the 1880s and 1890s, zealous pietists began working ardently
for antialcohol instruction as a required part of the public-school
curriculum; by 1901, every state in the Union required instruction
in temperance.

Since most
Catholic children went to public rather than parochial schools,
the Catholic authorities were understandably anxious to purge
the schools of Protestant requirements and ceremonies, and of
anti-Catholic textbooks. To the pietists, these attempts to de-Protestantize
the public schools were intolerable "Romish aggression."
The whole point of the public schools was moral and religious
homogenization, and here the Catholics were disrupting the attempt
to make American society holy — to produce, through the public
school and the Protestant gospel, "a morally and politically
homogeneous people." As Kleppner writes:

When
they [the pietists] spoke of "moral education," they
had in mind principles of morality shared in common by the adherents
of gospel religion, for in the public school all children,
even those whose parents were enslaved by "Lutheran formalism
or Romish superstition," would be exposed to the Bible. That
alone was cause for righteous optimism, for they believed the
Bible to be "the agent in converting the soul,"
"the volume that makes human beings men."4

In this way,
"America [would]
be Saved Through the Children."5

The pietists
were therefore incensed that the Catholics were attempting to
block the salvation of America’s
children — and eventually of America
itself — all at the orders of a "foreign potentate."
Thus, the New Jersey Methodist Conference of 1870 lashed out with
their deepest feelings against this Romish obstructionism:

Resolved,
That we greatly deprecate the effort which is being made by
"Haters of Light," and especially by an arrogant priesthood,
to exclude the Bible from the Public Schools of our land; and
that we will do all in our power to defeat the well-defined and
wicked design of this "Mother of Harlots."6

Throughout
the nineteenth century, "nativist" attacks on "foreigners"
and the foreign-born were really attacks on liturgical immigrants.
Immigrants from Britain
or Scandinavia, pietists all, were "good Americans"
as soon as they got off the boat. It was the diverse culture of
the other immigrants that had to be homogenized and molded
into that of pietist America.
Thus, the New England Methodist Conference of 1889 declared:

We
are a nation of remnants, ravellings from the Old World…. The
public school is one of the remedial agencies which work in our
society to diminish this…and to hasten the compacting of these
heterogeneous materials into a solid nature. 7

Or, as a
leading citizen of Boston declared, "the only way to elevate
the foreign population was to make Protestants of their children."8

Since the
cities of the North, in the late nineteenth century, were becoming
increasingly filled with Catholic immigrants, pietist attacks
on sinful cities and on immigrants both became aspects of the
anti-liturgical struggle for a homogeneous Anglo-Saxon pietist
culture. The Irish were particular butts of pietist scorn; a New
York City textbook bitterly warned that continued immigration
could make America "the common sewer of Ireland," filled
with drunken and depraved Irishmen.9

The growing
influx of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe toward the
end of the nineteenth century seemed to pose even greater problems
for the pietist progressives, but they did not shrink from the
task. As Elwood P. Cubberley of Stanford
University, the nation’s outstanding
progressive historian of education, declared, "southern and
eastern Europeans have served to dilute tremendously our national
stock, and to corrupt our civil life.. . . Everywhere these people
tend to settle in groups or settlements, and to set up here their
national manners, customs, and observances. Our task is to break
up these groups or settlements, to assimilate and amalgamate these
people as a part of our American race and to implant in their
children. . . the Anglo-Saxon conception of rightousness, law
and order, and popular government. . ."10

PROGRESSIVES,
PUBLIC EDUCATION, AND THE FAMILY: THE CASE OF SAN FRANCISCO

The molding
of children was of course the key to homogenization and the key
in general to the progressive vision of tight social control over
the individual via the instrument of the state. The eminent University
of Wisconsin sociologist Edward Alsworth Ross, a favorite of Theodore
Roosevelt and the veritable epitome of a progressive social scientist,
summed it up thus: The role of the public official, and in particular
of the public school teacher, is "to collect little plastic
lumps of human dough from private households and shape them on
the social kneadingboard."11

The view
of Ross and the other progressives was that the state must take
up the task of control and inculcation of moral values once performed
by parents and church. The conflict between middle and upper-class
urban progressive Anglo-Saxon Protestants and largely working-class
Catholics was sharply delineated in the battle over control of
the San Francisco public school system during the second decade
of the twentieth century. The highly popular Alfred Roncovieri,
a French-Italian Catholic, was the elected school superintendent
from 1906 on. Roncovieri was a traditionalist who believed that
the function of schools was to teach the basics, and that teaching
children about sex and morality should be the function of home
and church. Hence, when the drive for sex hygiene courses in the
public schools got under way, Roncovieri consulted with mothers’
clubs and, in consequence, kept the program out of the schools.

By 1908,
upper-class progressives launched a decade-long movement to oust
Roncovieri and transform the nature of the San Francisco public
school system. Instead of an elected superintendent responding
to a school board elected by districts, the progressives wanted
an all-powerful school superintendent, appointed by a rubber-stamp
board that in turn would be appointed by the mayor. In other words,
in the name of "taking the schools out of politics,"
they hoped to aggrandize the educational bureaucracy and maintain
its power virtually unchecked by any popular or democratic control.
The purpose was threefold: to push through the progressive program
of social control, to impose upper-class control over a working-class
population, and to impose pietist Protestant control over Catholic
ethnics.12

The ethnoreligious
struggle over the public schools in San Francisco was nothing
new; it had been going on tumultuously since the middle of the
nineteenth century.13
In the last half of the nineteenth century, San Francisco was
split into two parts. Ruling the city was a power elite of native-born
old Americans, hailing from New England, including lawyers, businessmen,
and pietist Protestant ministers. These comprised successively
the Whig, Know-Nothing, Populist, and Republican parties in the
city. On the other hand were the foreign-born, largely Catholic
immigrants from Europe, Irish, Germans, French, and Italians,
who comprised the Democratic party.

The Protestants
early tried to use the public schools as a homogenizing and controlling
force. The great theoretician and founder of the public school
system in San Francisco, John Swett, "the Horace Mann of
California," was a lifelong Republican and a Yankee who had
taught school in New Hampshire before moving West. Moreover, the
Board of Education was originally an all-New England show; consisting
of emigrants from Vermont, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. The
mayor of San Francisco was a former mayor of Salem, Massachusetts,
and every administrator and teacher in the public schools was
a transplanted New Englander. The first superintendent of schools
was not exactly a New Englander, but close: Thomas J. Nevins,
a Yankee Whig lawyer from New York and an agent of the American
Bible Society. And the first free public school in San Francisco
was instituted in the basement of a small Baptist chapel.

Nevins, installed
as superintendent of schools in 1851, promptly adopted the rule
of the New York City schools: Every teacher was compelled to begin
each day by a Protestant Bible reading and to conduct daily Protestant
prayer sessions. And John Swett, elected as Republican state superintendent
of public instruction during the I 860s, declared that California
needed public schools because of its heterogeneous population:
"Nothing can Americanize these chaotic elements, and breathe
into them the spirit of our institutions," he warned, "except
the public schools."14

Swett was
keen enough to recognize that the pietist educational formula
meant that the state takes over jurisdiction of the child from
his parents, since "children arrived at the age of maturity
belong, not to the parents, but to the State, to society, to the
country."15

A seesaw
struggle between the Protestant Yankees and Catholic ethnics ensued
in San Francisco during the 1850s. The state charter of San Francisco
in 1855 made the schools far more responsive to the people, with
school boards being elected from each of a dozen wards instead
of at large, and the superintendent elected by the people instead
of appointed by the board. The Democrats swept the Know-Nothings
out of office in the city in 1856 and brought to power David Broderick,
an Irish Catholic who controlled the San Francisco as well as
the California Democratic party. But this gain was wiped out by
the San Francisco Vigilance Movement, a private organization of
merchants and New England-born Yankees, who, attacking the "Tammany"
tactics of Broderick, installed themselves in power and illegally
deported most of the Broderick organization, replacing it with
a newly formed People’s party.

The People’s
party ran San Francisco with an iron hand for ten years, from
1857 to 1867, making secret nominations for appointments and driving
through huge slates of at-large nominees chosen at a single vote
at a public meeting. No open nomination procedures, primaries,
or ward divisions were allowed, in order to ensure election victories
by "reputable" men. The People’s party promptly reinstalled
an all-Yankee school board, and the administrators and teachers
in schools were again firmly Protestant and militantly anti-Catholic.
The People’s party itself continually attacked the Irish, denouncing
them as "micks" and "rank Pats." George Tait,
the People’s party-installed superintendent of schools in the
1860s, lamented, however, that some teachers were failing to read
the Protestant Bible in the schools, and were thus casting "a
slur on the religion and character of the community."

By the l870s,
however, the foreign-born residents outnumbered the native-born,
and the Democratic party rose to power in San Francisco, the People’s
party declining and joining the Republicans. The Board of Education
ended the practice of Protestant devotions in the schools, and
Irish and Germans began to pour into administrative and teaching
posts in the public school system.

Another rollback
began, however, in 1874, when the Republican state legislature
abolished ward elections for the San Francisco school board, and
insisted that all board members be elected at large. This meant
that only the wealthy, which usually meant well-to-do Protestants,
were likely to be able to run successfully for election. Accordingly,
whereas in 1873, 58 percent of the San Francisco school board
was foreign-born, the percentage was down to 8 percent in the
following year. And while the Irish were approximately 25 percent
of the electorate and the Germans about 13 percent, the Irish
were not able to fill more than one or two of the twelve at-large
seats, and the Germans virtually none.

The seesaw
continued, however, as the Democrats came back in 1883, under
the aegis of the master politician, the Irish Catholic Christopher
"Blind Boss" Buckley. In the Buckley regime, the post-1874
school board dominated totally by wealthy native-born, Yankee
businessmen and professionals, was replaced by an ethnically balanced
ticket with a high proportion of working-class and foreign-born.
Furthermore, a high proportion of Irish Catholic teachers, most
of them single women, entered the San Francisco schools during
the Buckley era, reaching 50 percent by the turn of the century.

In the late
l880s, however, the stridently anti-Catholic and anti-Irish American
party became strong in San Francisco and the rest of the state,
and Republican leaders were happy to join them in denouncing the
"immigrant peril." The American party managed to oust
the Irish Catholic Joseph O’Connor, principal and deputy superintendent,
from his high post as "religiously unacceptable." This victory
heralded a progressive Republican "reform" comeback in 1891,
when none other than John Swett was installed as superintendent
of schools in San Francisco. Swett battled for the full reform
program: to make everything, even the mayoralty, an appointive
rather than an elective office. Part of the goal was achieved
by the state’s new San Francisco charter in 1900, which replaced
the twelve-man elected Board of Education by a four-member board
appointed by the mayor.

The full
goal of total appointment was still blocked, however, by the existence
of an elective superintendent of schools who, since 1907, was
the popular Catholic Alfred Roncovieri. The pietist progressives
were also thwarted for two decades by the fact that San Francisco
was ruled, for most of the years between 1901 and 1911, by a new
Union Labor party, which won on an ethnically and occupationally
balanced ticket, and which elected the German-Irish Catholic Eugene
Schmitz, a member of the musician’s union, as mayor. And for eighteen
years after 1911, San Francisco was governed by its most popular
mayor before or since, "Sunny Jim" Rolph, an Episcopalian
friendly to Catholics and ethnics, who was pro-Roncovieri and
who presided over an ethnically pluralistic regime.

It is instructive
to examine the makeup of the progressive reform movement that
eventually got its way and overthrew Roncovieri. It consisted
of the standard progressive coalition of business and professional
elites, and nativist and anti-Catholic organizations, who called
for the purging of Catholics from the schools. Particular inspiration
came from Stanford educationist Elwood P. Cubberley, who energized
the California branch of the Association of Collegiate Alumnae
(later the American Association of University Women), led by the
wealthy Mrs. Jesse H. Steinhart, whose husband was later to be
a leader in the Progressive party. Mrs. Steinhart got Mrs. Agnes
De Lima, a New York City progressive educator, to make a survey
of the San Francisco schools for the association. The report,
presented in 1914, made the expected case for an "efficient,"
business-like, school system run solely by appointed educators.
Mrs. Steinhart also organized the Public Education Society of
San Francisco to agitate for progressive school reform; in this
she was aided by the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce.

Also backing
progressive reform, and anxious to oust Roncovieri, were other
elite groups in the city, including the League of Women Voters,
and the prestigious Commonwealth Club of California.

At the behest
of Mrs. Steinhart and the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, which
contributed the funds, Philander Claxton of the U.S. Office of
Education weighed in with his report in December 1917.
The report, which endorsed the Association of Collegiate Alumnae
study and was extremely critical of the San Francisco school system,
called for all power over the system to go to an appointed superintendent
of schools. Claxton also attacked the teaching of foreign languages
in the schools, which San Francisco had been doing, and insisted
on a comprehensive "Americanization" to break down ethnic
settlements.

The Claxton
Report was the signal for the Chamber of Commerce to swing into
action, and it proceeded to draft a comprehensive progressive
referendum for the November 1918 ballot, calling for an appointed
superintendent and an appointed school board. This initiative,
Amendment 37, was backed by most of the prominent business and
professional groups in the city. In addition to the ones named
above, there were the Real Estate Board, elite women’s organizations
such as the Federation of Women’s Clubs, wealthy neighborhood
improvement clubs, and the San Francisco Examiner. Amendment
37 lost, however, by two to one, since it had little support in
working-class neighborhoods or among the teachers.

Two years
later, however, Amendment 37 passed, aided by a resurgence of
pietism and virulent anti-Catholicism in postwar America.
Prohibition was now triumphant, and the Ku Klux Klan experienced
a nationwide revival as a pietist, anti-Catholic organization.
The KKK had as many as 3,500 members in the San Francisco Bay
Area in the early 1920s. The anti-Catholic American Protective
Association also enjoyed a revival, led in California by a British
small businessman, the anti-Irish Grand Master Colonel J. Arthur
Petersen.

In opposing
Amendment 37 in the 1920 elections, Father Peter C. Yorke, a prominent
priest and Irish immigrant, perceptively summed up the fundamental
cleavage: "The modem school system," he declared, "is
not satisfied with teaching children the 3 Rs. . . it reaches
out and takes possession of their whole lives."

Amendment
37 passed in 1920 by the narrow margin of 69,200 to 66,700. It
passed in every middle- and upper-class Assembly District, and
lost in every working-class district. The higher the concentration
of foreign-born voters in any district, the greater the vote against.
In the Italian precincts 1 to 17 of the 33rd A.D., the Amendment
was beaten by 3 to 1; in the Irish precincts, it was defeated
by 3 to 1 as well. The more Protestant a working-class district,
the more it supported the Amendment.

The bulk
of the lobbying for the Amendment was performed by the ad hoc
Educational Conference. After the victory, the conference happily
presented a list of nominees to the school board, which now consisted
of seven members appointed by the mayor, and which in turn appointed
the superintendent. The proposed board consisted entirely of businessmen,
of whom only one was a conservative Irish Catholic. The mayor
surrendered to the pressure, and hence, after 1921, cultural pluralism
in the San Francisco school system gave way to unitary progressive
rule. The board began by threatening to dock any teacher who dared
to be absent from school on St. Patrick’s Day (a San Francisco
tradition since the 1870s), and proceeded to override the wishes
of particular neighborhoods in the interest of a centralized city.

The superintendent
of schools in the new regime, Dr. Joseph Marr Gwinn, fit the new
dispensation to a tee. A professional "scientist" of
public administration, his avowed aim was unitary control. The
entire package of typical progressive educational nostrums was
installed, including a department of education and various experimental
programs. Traditional basic education was scorned, and the edict
came down that children should not be "forced" to learn
the 3 Rs if they didn’t feel the need. Traditional teachers, who
were continually attacked for being old-fashioned and "unprofessional,"
were not promoted.

Despite continued
opposition by teachers, parents, neighborhoods, ethnic groups,
and the ousted Roncovieri, all attempts to repeal Amendment 37
were unsuccessful. The modern dispensation of progressivism had
conquered San Francisco. The removal of the Board of Education
and school superintendent from direct and periodic control by
the electorate had effectively deprived parents of any significant
control over the educational policies of public schools. At last,
as John Swett had asserted nearly sixty years earlier, schoolchildren
belonged "not to the parents, but to the State, to society,
to the country."

ETHNORELIGIOUS
CONFLICT AND THE RISE OF FEMINISM

Women’s
Suffrage

By the l890s,
the liturgically oriented Democracy was slowly but surely winning
the national battle of the political parties. Culminating the
battle was the Democratic congressional victory in 1890 and the
Grover Cleveland landslide in the presidential election of 1892,
in which Cleveland carried both Houses of Congress along with
him (an unusual feat for that era). The Democrats were in way
of becoming the majority party of the country, and the root was
demographic: the fact that most of the immigrants were Catholic
and the Catholic birthrate was higher than that of the pietist
Protestants. Even though British and Scandinavian immigration
had reached new highs during the 1880s, their numbers were far
exceeded by German and Irish immigration, the latter being the
highest since the famous post-potato-famine influx that started
in the late 1840s. Furthermore, the "new immigration"
from southern and eastern Europe, almost all Catholic — and especially
Italian — began to make its mark during the same decade.

The pietists
became increasingly embittered, stepping up their attacks on foreigners
in general and Catholics in particular. Thus, the Reverend T.
W. Cuyler, President of the National Temperance Society, intemperately
exclaimed in the summer of 1891: "How much longer [will]
the Republic. . . consent to have her soil a dumping ground for
all Hungarian ruffians, Bohemian bruisers, and Italian cutthroats
of every description?"

The first
concrete political response by the pietists to the rising Catholic
tide was to try to restrict immigration. Republicans successfully
managed to pass laws partially cutting immigration, but President
Cleveland vetoed a bill to impose a literacy test on all immigrants.
The Republicans also managed to curtail voting by immigrants,
by getting most states to disallow voting by aliens, thereby reversing
the traditional custom of allowing alien voting. They also urged
the lengthening of the statutory waiting period for naturalization.

The successful
restricting of immigration and of immigrant voting was still not
enough to matter, and immigration would not really be foreclosed
until the 1920s. But if voting could not be restricted sharply
enough, perhaps it could be expanded — in the proper
pietist direction.

Specifically,
it was clear to the pietists that the role of women in the liturgical
"ethnic" family was very different from what it was
in the pietist Protestant family. One of the reasons impelling
pietists and Republicans toward prohibition was the fact that,
culturally, the lives of urban male Catholics — and the cities
of the Northeast were becoming increasingly Catholic — revolved
around the neighborhood saloon. The men would repair at night
to the saloon for chitchat, discussions, and argument — and they
would generally take their political views from the saloonkeeper,
who thus became the political powerhouse in his particular ward.
Therefore, prohibition meant breaking the political power of the
urban liturgical machines in the Democratic party.

But while
the social lives of liturgical males revolved around the saloon,
their wives stayed at home. While pietist women were increasingly
independent and politically active, the lives of liturgical women
revolved solely about home and hearth. Politics was strictly an
avocation for husbands and sons. Perceiving this, the pietists
began to push for women’s suffrage, realizing that far more pietist
than liturgical women would take advantage of the power to vote.

As a result,
the women’s suffrage movement was heavily pietist from the very
beginning. Ultrapietist third parties like the Greenback and the
Prohibition parties, which scorned the Republicans for being untrustworthy
moderates on social issues, supported women’s suffrage throughout,
and the Populists tended in that direction. The Progressive party
of 1912 was strongly in favor of women’s suffrage; theirs was
the first major national convention to permit women delegates.
The first woman elector, Helen J. Scott of Wisconsin, was chosen
by the Progressive party.

Perhaps the
major single organization in the women’s suffrage movement was
the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, founded in 1874 and reaching
an enormous membership of 300,000 by 1900. That the WCTU was also
involved in agitating for curfew, antigambling, antismoking, and
antisex laws — all actions lauded by the women’s suffrage movement
— is clear from the official history of women’s suffrage in the
nineteenth century:

[The
WCTU] has been a chief factor in State campaigns for statutory
prohibition, constitutional amendment, reform laws in general
and those for the protection of women and children in particular,
and in securing anti-gambling and anti-cigarette laws. It has
been instrumental in raising the "age of protection"
for girls in many States, and in obtaining curfew laws in 400
towns and cities. . . . The association [WCTU] protests against
the legalization of all crimes, especially those of prostitution
and liquor selling.16

Not only
did Susan B. Anthony begin her career as a professional prohibitionist,
but her two successors as president of the leading women’s suffrage
organization, the National American Woman Suffrage Association
— Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt and Dr. Anna Howard Shaw — also began
their professional careers as prohibitionists. The leading spirit
of the WCTU, Frances E. Willard, was prototypically born of New
England-stock parents who had moved westward to study at Oberlin
College, then the nation’s center
of aggressive, evangelical pietism, and had later settled in Wisconsin.
Guided by Miss Willard, the WCTU began its prosuffrage activities
by demanding that women vote in local option referendums on prohibition.
As Miss Willard put it, the WCTU wanted women to vote on this
issue because "majorities of women are against the liquor
traffic . . . ."17

Conversely,
whenever there was a voters’ referendum on women’s suffrage, the
liturgicals and the foreign-born, responding to immigrant culture
and reacting against the pietist-feminist support of prohibition,
consistently opposed women’s suffrage. In Iowa, the Germans voted
against women’s suffrage, as did the Chinese in California. The
women’s suffrage amendment in 1896 in California was heavily supported
by the bitterly anti-Catholic American Protective Association.
The cities, where Catholics abounded, tended to be opposed to
women’s suffrage, while pietist rural areas tended to favor it.
Thus, the Oregon referendum of 1900 lost largely because of opposition
in the Catholic "slums" of Portland and Astoria.

A revealing
religious breakdown of votes on an 1877 women’s suffrage referendum
was presented in a report by a Colorado feminist. She explained
that the Methodists (the most strongly pietistic) were "for
us," the (less pietistic) Presbyterians and Episcopalians
"fairly so," while the Roman Catholics "were not
all against us" — clearly they were expected to be.18 And, testifying before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in
favor of women’s suffrage in 1880, Susan B. Anthony presented
her own explanation of the Colorado vote:

In
Colorado. . . 6,666 men vote "Yes." Now, I am going
to describe the men who voted "Yes." They were native-born
men, temperance men, cultivated, broad, generous, just men, men
who think. On the other hand, 16,007 voted "No." Now,
I am going to describe that class of voters. In the southern part
of that State are Mexicans, who speak the Spanish language. .
. . The vast population of Colorado is made up of that class of
people. I was sent out to speak in a voting precinct having 200
voters; 150 of those voters were Mexican greasers, 40 of them
foreign-born citizens, and just 10 of them were born in this country;
and I was supposed to be competent to convert those men to let
me have so much right in this Government as they had. . . 19

A laboratory
test of which women would turn out to vote occurred; in Massachusetts,
where women were given the power to vote in school board elections
from 1879 on. In 1888, large numbers of Protestant women in Boston
turned out to drive Catholics off the school board. In contrast,
Catholic women scarcely voted, "thereby validating the, nativist
tendencies of suffragists who believed that extension of full
suffrage to women would provide a barrier against further Catholic
influence."20 During the last two decades of the nineteenth
century "the more hierarchical the church organization and
the more formal the ritual, the greater was its opposition to
women suffrage, while the democratically organized churches with
little dogma tended to be more receptive."21 The key, we might add, was the basic attitude toward ritual and
creed, rather than the form of church organization.

Four mountain
states adopted women’s suffrage in the early and mid-1890s. Two,
Wyoming and Utah, were simply ratifying, as new states, a practice
they had long adopted as territories: Wyoming in 1869 and Utah
in 1870. Utah had adopted women’s suffrage as a conscious policy
by the pietistic Mormons to weight political control in favor
of their polygamous members, who contrasted to the Gentiles, largely
miners and settlers who were either single men or who had left
their wives back East. Wyoming had adopted women’s suffrage in
an effort to increase the political power of its settled householders,
in contrast to the transient, mobile, and often lawless single
men who peopled that frontier region.

No sooner
had Wyoming Territory
adopted women’s suffrage, than it became evident that the change
had benefited the Republicans, particularly since women had mobilized
against Democratic attempts to repeal Wyoming’s Sunday prohibition
law. In 1871, both houses of the Wyoming legislature, led by its
Democratic members, voted to repeal women’s suffrage, but the
bill was vetoed by the Republican territorial governor.

Two additional
states adopting women’s suffrage in the 1890s were Idaho and Colorado.
In Idaho the drive, adopted by referendum in 1896, was led by
the ultrapietistic Populists and by the Mormons, who were dominant
in the southern part of the state. The Populist counties of Colorado
gave a majority of 6,800 for women’s suffrage, while the Republican
and Democratic counties voted a majority of 500 against.22

It may be
thought paradoxical that a movement — women’s suffrage — born
and centered in the East should have had its earliest victories
in the remote frontier states of the Mountain West. But the paradox
begins to clear when we realize the pietist-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant
nature of the frontiersmen, many of them Yankees hailing originally
from that birthplace of American pietism, New England. As the
historian Frederick Jackson Turner, that great celebrant of frontier
ideals, lyrically observed:

In
the arid West these pioneers [from New England] have halted and
have turned to perceive an altered nation and changed social ideals.
. . .If we follow back the line of march of the Puritan farmer,
we shall see how responsive he has always been to isms. .
. . He is the Prohibitionist of Iowa and Wisconsin, crying out
against German customs as an invasion of his traditional ideals.
He is the Granger of Wisconsin, passing restrictive railroad legislation.
He is the Abolitionist, the Anti-mason, the Millerite, the Woman
Suffragist, the Spiritualist, the Mormon, of Western New York.23

Eugenics
and Birth Control

Thus the
women’s suffrage movement, dominated by pietist progressives,
was not directed solely to achieving some abstract principle of
electoral equality between males and females. This was more a
means to another end: the creation of electoral majorities for
pietist measures of direct social control over the lives of American
families. They wished to determine by state intervention what
those families drank and when and where they drank, how they spent
their Sabbath day, and how their children should be educated.

One way of
correcting the increasingly pro-Catholic demographics was to restrict
immigration; another to promote women’s suffrage. A third way,
often promoted in the name of "science," was eugenics,
an increasingly popular doctrine of the progressive movement.
Broadly, eugenics may be defined as encouraging the breeding of
the "fit" and discouraging the breeding of the "unfit,"
the criteria of "fitness" often coinciding with the
cleavage between native, white Protestants and the foreign born
or Catholics — or the white-black cleavage. In extreme cases,
the unfit were to be coercively sterilized.

To the founder
of the American eugenics movement, the distinguished biologist
Charles Benedict Davenport, a New Yorker of eminent New England
background, the rising feminist movement was beneficent provided
that the number of biologically superior persons was sustained
and the number of the unfit diminished. The biologist Harry H.
Laughlin, aide to Davenport, associate editor of the Eugenical
News, and highly influential in the immigration restriction
policy of the 1920s as eugenics expert for the House Committee
on Immigration and Naturalization, stressed the great importance
of cutting the immigration of the biologically "inferior"
southern Europeans. For in that way, the biological superiority
of Anglo-Saxon women would be protected.

Harry Laughlin’s
report to the House Committee, printed in 1923, helped formulate
the 1924 immigration law, which, in addition to drastically limiting
total immigration to the United States,
imposed national origin quotas based on the 1910 census, so as
to weight the sources of immigration as much as possible in favor
of northern Europeans. Laughlin later emphasized that American
women must keep the nation’s blood pure by not marrying what he
called the "colored races," in which he included southern
Europeans as well as blacks: for if "men with a small fraction
of colored blood could readily find mates among the white women,
the gates would be thrown open to a final radical race mixture
of the whole population." To Laughlin the moral was clear:
"The perpetuity of the American race and consequently of
American institutions depends upon the virtue and fecundity of
American women."24

But the problem
was that the fecund women were not the pietist progressives but
the Catholics. For, in addition to immigration, another source
of demographic alarm to the pietists was the far higher birthrate
among Catholic women. If only they could be induced to adopt birth
control! Hence, the birth control movement became part of the
pietist armamentarium in their systemic struggle with the Catholics
and other liturgicals.

Thus, the
distinguished University of California
eugenicist, Samuel J. Holmes, lamented that "the trouble
with birth control is that it is practiced least where it should
be practiced most." In the Birth Control Review, leading
organ of the birth control movement, Annie G. Porritt was more
specific, attacking "the folly of closing our gates to aliens
from abroad, while having them wide open to the overwhelming progeny
of the least desirable elements of our city and slum population."25
In short, the birth controllers were saying that if one’s goal
is to restrict sharply the total number of Catholics, "colored"
southern European or no, then there is no point in only limiting
immigration while the domestic population continues to increase.

The birth
control and the eugenics movement therefore went hand in hand,
not the least in the views of the well-known leader of the birth
control movement in the United States:
Mrs. Margaret Higgins Sanger, prolific author, founder and long-time
editor of the Birth Control Review. Echoing many of the
various strains of progressivism, Mrs. Sanger hailed the emancipation
of women through birth control as the latest in applied science
and "efficiency." As she put it in her Autobiography:

In
an age which has developed science and industry and economic efficiency
to their highest points, so little thought has been given to the
development of a science of parenthood, a science of maternity
which could prevent this appalling and unestimated waste of womankind
and maternal effort.26

To Mrs. Sanger,
"science" also meant stopping the breeding of the unfit.
A devoted eugenicist and follower of C. B. Davenport, she in fact
chided the eugenics movement for not sufficiently emphasizing
this crucial point:

The
eugenists wanted to shift the birth control emphasis from less
children for the poor to more children for the rich. We went back
of that and sought first to stop the multiplication of the unfit.
This appeared the most important and greatest step toward race
betterment.27

GATHERED
TOGETHER: PROGRESSIVISM AS A POLITICAL PARTY

Progressivism
was, to a great extent, the culmination of the pietist Protestant
political impulse, the urge to regulate every aspect of American
life, economic and moral — even the most intimate and crucial
aspects of family life. But it was also a curious alliance of
a technocratic drive for government regulation, the supposed expression
of "value-free science," and the pietist religious impulse
to save America — and
the world — by state coercion. Often both pietistic and scientific
arguments would be used, sometimes by the same people, to achieve
the old pietist goals. Thus, prohibition would be argued for on
religious as well as on alleged scientific or medicinal grounds.
In many cases, leading progressive intellectuals at the turn of
the twentieth century were former pietists who went to college
and then transferred to the political arena, their zeal for making
over mankind, as a "salvation by science." And then
the Social Gospel movement managed to combine political collectivism
and pietist Christianity in the same package. All of these were
strongly interwoven elements in the progressive movement.

All these
trends reached their apogee in the Progressive party and its national
convention of 1912. The assemblage was a gathering of businessmen,
intellectuals, academics, technocrats, efficiency experts and
social engineers, writers, economists, social scientists, and
leading representatives of the new profession of social work.
The Progressive leaders were middle and upper class, almost all
urban, highly educated, and almost all white Anglo-Saxon Protestants
of either past or present pietist concerns.

From the
social work leaders came upper-class ladies bringing the blessings
of statism to the masses: Lillian D. Wald, Mary Kingsbury Simkhovitch,
and above all, Jane Addams. Miss Addams, one of the great leaders
of progressivism, was born in rural Illinois to a father, John,
who was a state legislator and a devout nondenominational evangelical
Protestant. Miss Addams was distressed at the southern and eastern
European immigration, people who were "primitive" and
"credulous," and who posed the danger of unrestrained
individualism. Their different ethnic background disrupted the
unity of American culture. However, the problem, according to
Miss Addams, could be easily remedied. The public school could
reshape the immigrant, strip him of his cultural foundations,
and transform him into a building block of a new and greater American
community.28

In addition
to writers and professional technocrats at the Progressive party
convention, there were professional pietists galore. Social Gospel
leaders Lyman Abbott, the Reverend R. Heber Newton, and the Reverend
Washington Gladden were Progressive party notables, and the Progressive
candidate for governor of Vermont was the Reverend Fraser Metzger,
leader of the Inter-Church Federation of Vermont. In fact, the
Progressive party proclaimed itself as the "recrudescence
of the religious spirit in American political life."

Many observers,
indeed, reported in wonder at the strongly religious tone of the
Progressive party convention. Theodore Roosevelt’s acceptance
address was significantly entitled, "A Confession of Faith,"
and his words were punctuated by "amens" and by a continual
singing of Christian hymns by the assembled delegates. They sang
"Onward, Christian Soldiers," "The Battle Hymn
of the Republic," and finally the revivalist hymn, "Follow,
Follow, We Will Follow Jesus," except that "Roosevelt"
replaced the word "Jesus" at every turn.

The New
York Times of August 6, 1912, summed up the unusual
experience by calling the Progressive assemblage "a convention
of fanatics." And, "It was not a convention at all.
It was an assemblage of religious enthusiasts. It was such a convention
as Peter the Hermit held. It was a Methodist camp following done
over into political terms."29

Thus the
foundations of today’s massive state intervention in the internal
life of the American family were laid in the so-called "progressive
era" from the 1870s to the 1920s. Pietists and "progressives"
united to control the material and sexual choices of the rest
of the American people, their drinking habits, and their recreational
preferences. Their values, the very nurture and education of their
children, were to be determined by their betters. The spiritual,
biological, political, intellectual, and moral elite would govern,
through state power, the character and quality of American family
life.

SIGNIFICANCE

It has been
known for decades that the Progressive Era was marked by a radical
growth in the extension and dominance of government in America’s
economic, social, and cultural life. For decades, this great leap
into statism was navely interpreted by historians as a simple
response to the greater need for planning and regulation of an
increasingly complex economy. In recent years, however, historians
have come to see that increasing statism on a federal and state
level can be better interpreted as a profitable alliance between
certain business and industrial interests, looking for government
to cartelize their industry after private efforts for cartels
and monopoly had failed, and intellectuals, academics, and technocrats
seeking jobs to help regulate and plan the economy as well as
restriction of entry into their professions. In short, the Progressive
Era re-created the age-old alliance between Big Government, large
business firms, and opinion-molding intellectuals — an alliance
that had most recently been embodied in the mercantilist system
of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries.

Other historians
uncovered a similar process at the local level, especially that
of urban government beginning with the Progressive Era. Using
the influence of media and opinion leaders, upper-income and business
groups in the cities systematically took political power away
from the masses and centralized this power in the hands of urban
government responsive to progressive demands. Elected officials,
and decentralized ward representation, were systematically replaced
either by appointed bureaucrats and civil servants, or by centralized
at-large districts where large-scale funding was needed to finance
election races. In this way, power was shifted out of the hands
of the masses and into the hands of a minority elite of technocrats
and upper-income businessmen. One result was an increase of government
contracts to business, a shift from "Tammany" type charity
by the political parties to a taxpayer-financed welfare state,
and the imposition of higher taxes on suburban residents to finance
bond issues and redevelopment schemes accruing to downtown financial
interests.

During the
last two decades, educational historians have described a similar
process at work in public, especially urban, school systems. The
scope of the public school was greatly expanded, compulsory attendance
spread outside of New England and other "Yankee" areas
during the Progressive Era, and a powerful movement developed
to try to ban private schools and to force everyone into the public
school system.

From the
work of educational historians, it was clear that the leap into
comprehensive state control over the individual and over social
life was not confined, during the Progressive and indeed post-Progressive
eras, to government and the economy. A far more comprehensive
process was at work. The expansion of compulsory public schooling
stemmed from the growth of collectivist and anti-individualist
ideology among intellectuals and educationists. The individual,
these "progressives" believed, must be molded by the
educational process to conform to the group, which in practice
meant the dictates of the power elite speaking in the group’s
name. Historians have long been aware of this process.30 But the accruing insight into
progressivism as a business cartelizing device led historians
who had abandoned the easy equation of "businessmen"
with "laissez faire" to see that all the facets of progressivism
— the economic and the ideological and educational — were part
of an integrated whole. The new ideology among business groups
was cartelist and collectivist rather than individualist and laissez
faire, and the social control over the individual exerted by progressivism
was neatly paralleled in the ideology and practice of progressive
education. Another parallel to the economic realm, of course,
was the increased power and income accruing to the technocratic
intellectuals controlling the school system and the economy.

If the action
of business and intellectual elites in turning toward progressivism
was now explained, there was still a large gap in the historical
explanation and understanding of progressivism and therefore of
the leap into statism beginning in the early twentieth century.
There was still a need to explain mass voting behavior and the
ideology and programs of the political parties in the American
electoral system. This chapter applies the illuminating findings
of recent "ethnoreligious historians" to significant
changes that took place during the Progressive Era in the power
of government over the family. In particular, we discuss the movement
to expand the power of the public school and the educationist
elite over the family, as well as the women’s suffrage and eugenics
movement, all important features of the Progressive movement.
In every case, we see the vital link between these intrusions
into the family and the aggressive drive by Anglo-Saxon Protestant
"pietists" to use the state to "make America holy,"
to stamp out sin and thereby assure their own salvation by maximizing
the salvation of others. In particular, all of these measures
were part and parcel of the long-standing crusade by these pietists
to reduce if not eliminate the role of "liturgicals,"
largely Roman Catholics and high-church Lutherans, from American
political life. The drive to stamp out liquor and secular activities
on Sundays had long run into successful Catholic and high-church
Lutheran resistance. Compulsory public schooling was soon seen
as an indispensable weapon in the task of "Christianizing
the Catholics," of saving the souls of Catholic children
by using the public schools as a Protestantizing weapon. The neglected
example of San Francisco politics was urged as a case study of
this ethnoreligious political battle over the schools and hence
over the right of Catholic parents to transmit their own values
to their children without suffering Anglo-Saxon Protestant obstruction.
Women’s suffrage was seized upon as a means of increasing Anglo-Saxon
Protestant voting power, and immigration restriction as well as
eugenics was a method of reducing the growing demographic challenge
of Catholic voters.

In sum, recent
insights into the cartelizing drive of various business interests
have provided an important explanation of the rapid growth of
statism in the twentieth century. Ethnoreligious history provides
an explanation of mass voting behavior and political party programs
that neatly complement the cartelizing explanation of the actions
of business elites.

References

1

The quotations are, respectively, from the Minutes of
the Ohio Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church,
1875, p. 228; and the Minutes of the Annual Meeting of
the Maine Baptist Missionary Convention, 1890, p. 13. Both
are cited in Paul Kleppner, The
Third Electoral System, 1853–1892: Parties. Voters. and
Political Cultures
(Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1979), p. 190. Professor Kleppner is the doyen
of the "new political," also known as the "ethnocultural,"
historians. See also his The
Cross
of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics,
1850–1900
(New York: The Free Press, 1970).

2

In contrast to previous Christian groups, which were either
amillennial (the return of Jesus will bring an end to human
history) or premillennial (the return of Jesus will usher in
a thousand-year reign of the Kingdom
of God on earth), most evangelical
pietists were postmillennialists. In short, whereas Catholics,
Lutherans, and most Calvinists believed that the return of Jesus
is independent of human actions, the postmillennialists held
that Christians must establish a thousand-year reign of the
Kingdom of God
on earth as a necessary precondition of Jesus’ return. In short,
the evangelicals will have to take over the state and stamp
out sin, so that Jesus can then return.

3 Cited in David B. Tyack, The
One Best System:
A
History of American Urban Education
(Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 84–85.

4 Kleppner, Third Electoral System, n. 1, p. 222.

5 Our Church Work (Madison, Wis.), July 17, 1890.
Cited in ibid., p. 224.

6 Minutes of the New Jersey Annual Conference of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, 1870, p. 24. Cited in ibid., p. 230. Similar
reactions can be found in the minutes of the Central Pennsylvania
Methodists in 1875, the Maine Methodists in 1887, the New York
Methodists of 1880, and the Wisconsin Congregationalists of
1890.

7 Minutes of the Session of the New England Annual Conference
of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1889, p. 85. Cited in
ibid., p. 223.

8 Tyack, n. 3, p. 84.

9 Tyack, n. 3, p. 85.

10 Ellwood P. Cubberley, Changing Conceptions of
Education in America
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1909), pp. 15–16.

11 Edward Alsworth Ross, Social
Control
(New York, 1912). Cited in Paul C Violas, "Progressive
Social Philosophy: Charles Horton Cooley and Edward Alsworth
Ross," in C. J. Karier, P. C. Violas, and J. Spring. eds., Roots
of Crisis: American Education in the 20th Century (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1973), pp. 40–65.

12 The cities were already beginning to reach the point
where class and ethnic divisions almost coincided, where, in
other words, few working-class Anglo-Saxon Protestants resided
in the cities.

13 For an excellent study and analysis of the ethnoreligious
struggle over the San Francisco public schools from the mid-nineteenth
through the first three decades of the twentieth century, see
the neglected work of Victor L. Shradar, "Ethnic Politics,
Religion, and the Public Schools of San Francisco, 1849–1933"
(Ph.D. dissertation, School of
Education, Stanford
University, 1974).

14 Shradar, n. 13. p. 14.

15 Rousas John Rushdoony, "John Swett: The Self-Preservation
of the State," in The
Messianic Character of American Education: Studies
in
the History of the Philosophy of Education
(Nutley.
N.J.: Craig Press, 1963), pp. 79–80.

16 Susan B. Anthony and Ida H. Harper. The History
of Woman Suffrage. Vol. 4 (Rochester: Susan B. Anthony,
1902), pp. 1046–47.

17 Cited in Eleanor Flexner, Century
of Struggle: The Woman’s Rights Movement in the
United
States
(New York: Atheneum,
1970), p. 183.

18 Anthony and Harper, n. 15, Vol. 3, p. 724.

19 Quoted in Alan P. Grimes, The Puritan Ethic
and Woman Suffrage (New York: Oxford University Press,
1967), p. 87.

20 Jane Jerome Camhi, "Women Against Women: American
Antisuffragism, 1880–1920" (Ph.D. dissertation in
history, Tufts University, 1973), p. 198. See also James J,
Kenneally, "Catholicism and Woman Suffrage in Massachusetts,"
Catholic Historical Review 53 (April 1967): 253. Joining
in the demand that only Protestants be elected to the Boston
school board were, in addition to British-American clubs and
numbers of Protestant ministers, the WCTU, the Loyal Women of
American Liberty, the National Women’s League, and the League
of Independent Women Voters. See Kleppner, Third Electoral
System, n. 1, p. 350. See also Tyack. n. 3, pp. 105–6;
and Lois Bannister Merk, "Boston’s Historic Public School
Crisis," New England Quarterly 31 (June 1958): 172–99.

21 Camhi, n. 20, p. 200. Hierarchically organized
pietist churches, like the Methodist or the Scandinavian Lutheran,
were no less receptive to women’s suffrage than the others.

22 Furthermore, in the Colorado legislature that submitted
the women’s suffrage amendment to the voters in 1893, the party
breakdown of voting was as follows: Republicans, 19 for women’s
suffrage and 25 against; Democrats, 1 in favor and 8 against;
Populists, 34 in favor and 4 against. See Grimes, n.
19, p. 96 and passim.

23 Frederick Jackson Turner, "Dominant Forces
in Western Life," in The
Frontier in
American
History
(New York: Holt. Rinehart & Winston,
1962), pp. 239–40. Quoted in Grimes, n. 19, pp. 97–98.

24 Cited in Donald K. Pickens, Eugenics
and the Progressives
(Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University
Press, 1968), p. 67.

25 Annie G. Porritt. "Immigration and Birth Control,
an Editorial," The Birth Control Review 7 (Sept.
1923): 219. Cited in Pickens, n. 24, p. 73.

26 Quoted in Pickens. n. 24, p. 80.

27 Ibid., p. 83.

28 See Paul C Violas, "Jane Addams and the New
Liberalism," in Karier et al., eds. Roots
of Crisis
, n. 11, pp. 66–83.

29 Cited in John Allen Gable, The
Bull Moose Years: Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party

(Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1978), p. 75.

30 For further discussion of education, see Robert
B. Everhart. ed., The
Public School Monopoly:
A
Critical Analysis of Education and the State in American
Society
(San Francisco: Pacific Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1982).

First
printed in Joseph R. Peden and Fred R. Glahe (eds.), The
American Family and the State (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute, 1986).

Murray
N. Rothbard (1926–1995), the founder of modern libertarianism
and the dean of the Austrian School of economics, was the author
of The
Ethics of Liberty
and For
a New Liberty
and many
other books and articles
. He was also academic vice president
of the Ludwig von Mises Institute and the Center for Libertarian
Studies, and the editor – with Lew Rockwell – of The
Rothbard-Rockwell Report
.

Murray
Rothbard Archives


     

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